Domestic intermodal accounts for roughly 6% of the 53-foot capacity U.S. freight market. Truckload accounts for 94%.

Truckload capacity is tightening. FMCSA enforcement actions are pulling carriers from the market. Fuel is escalating because of the Iranian conflict. By every traditional signal, this is the environment where intermodal should be taking share. Yet the latest info from IANA’s YTD data shows US intermodal volume down 6.4%.

We just ran a 750-lane study showing intermodal was the more economical option on better than half of spot market lanes analyzed.

So the question is obvious. If intermodal is cheaper on most long-haul lanes, and the savings are real and repeatable, why does 94% of that freight still move on a truck?

Price alone does not explain it. Neither does transit time, though both matter. The real answer has multiple layers. Some are problems the industry can address. Others are structural realities inherent to the mode with no clean solution. Both deserve an honest look.

This article is written to bring those layers into the open.

At the end of this article, you will understand:

• How much of the freight market is actually addressable by intermodal, and how much is a structural mismatch

• The specific barriers that prevent qualified shippers from converting, from organizational politics to pricing opacity to institutional scar tissue from bad experiences

• What the industry, including IMCs and railroads, has done to damage its own cause

• What would actually have to change to move intermodal from 6% toward its real potential

• The roadmap shippers have successfully used to convert their truckload freight to intermodal where it makes sense

Originally posted on Rick LaGore’s LinkedIn page.

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Before the barriers: understanding the market intermodal actually competes in

The 94-6 split looks alarming until you remove the freight intermodal is never going to move.

Short-haul freight dominates the U.S. market. The majority of freight tonnage moves short distances, and that share keeps growing as supply chains regionalize and distribution networks push closer to the end consumer. Freight under 750 miles is functionally unavailable to intermodal. Ramp costs, dray on both ends, container handling: the fixed costs overwhelm any linehaul savings on a short haul. Our lane analysis confirmed this directly. Under 750 truckload is more competitive than intermodal.

That short-haul figure has been growing for twenty-five years, driven by a structural shift. Truckload haul lengths have shortened.

The drivers are well understood. E-commerce pushed distribution center networks closer to population centers, converting long regional replenishment moves into shorter, localized freight. Next-day and same-day delivery expectations reinforced the trend. As the ATA’s chief economist has noted, the continued rise of online sales is forcing supply chains to position inventory closer to the end customer, and that physics works against intermodal’s core strength.

This is the structural backdrop the 94-6 number sits inside. The freight intermodal is best equipped to handle, long hauls above 1,000 miles, represents a shrinking share of total truck volume. In other words, intermodal has not been losing to truckload on a segment of shipments that it is currently designed to compete against.

Strip out the short-haul freight that is not currently addressed, and the real competition is happening in a much narrower lane. Only a relatively small share of U.S. freight is structurally suited for today’s intermodal.

The geography and ramp density problem

The lanes where intermodal delivers strong, repeatable savings are specific corridors between well-positioned ramps. The lanes where it does not work are concentrated in specific regions and distance bands.

This is not a minor asterisk. It is a structural constraint.

The best intermodal economics require an origin within roughly 50-100 miles of a functioning ramp and a destination within the same radius. That sounds manageable until you map actual freight flow origins against ramp locations.

Large portions of U.S. freight originate in secondary and tertiary markets that are poorly served by intermodal ramp infrastructure.

Under Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR), the Class I railroads knowingly made this worse in their efforts to improve OR (operating ratios). Beginning around 2017 and accelerating through 2021, railroads closed or reduced service at intermodal terminals in dozens of secondary markets in pursuit of efficiency. They optimized for financial metrics at the cost of geographic coverage.

The geography constraint is not solvable by a shipper doing a better analysis.

The service memory problem

The freight industry has a long memory. Sometimes too long.

In 2022, U.S. Class I railroad service quality struggled. Intermodal on-time performance dropped significantly across multiple railroads. Shippers who had built intermodal programs and committed contracted volumes found their freight sitting at ramps, missing appointments, and creating operational chaos downstream.

Before accepting that narrative at face value, two things deserve to be said.

First, intermodal is more than rail. The IMC is the entity ultimately responsible for the intermodal service experience. A well-run IMC controls pickup and delivery through its drayage network and can either absorb what is happening on the rails or make it worse.

The shippers who had the best 2022 intermodal experiences were the ones with IMCs who managed dray proactively, communicated exceptions early, and owned the problem rather than pointing at the railroad. The shippers who had the worst experiences often had providers who did neither, yet continued to tell their customers they can take on more freight.

Second, railroad capacity does not flex like truckload capacity. Adding a truckload carrier can take days. Adding rail capacity takes years of planning and billions in capital investment. Nobody planned for 2022. Nobody could have. The pandemic-driven freight surge was an event with no historical precedent, compressed into a nine-month window, followed by a collapse. Blaming Class I railroads for not having capacity ready for a surge no one saw coming, that would have sat idle for decades after, is not a fair read of what happened.

And truckload had its own struggles in 2022. Two of the three legs of every intermodal shipment involve trucking. The dray capacity problems IMCs faced that year were not railroad problems. They were the same issues as every truckload shipper was dealing with simultaneously, in addition to chassis constraints, and terminal congestion.

While there are a number of astericks, none of that changes what shippers experienced. Service has recovered significantly since then, but the shippers who lived through 2022 did not come back automatically when performance improved. They rebuilt routing guides around truckload. They told procurement teams that intermodal is unreliable. They explained to operations leadership that the extra transit days carry too much risk. That institutional memory is sticky in a way that rate comparisons cannot overcome with a single pitch.

The pushback is simple. You cannot design a rail network around a once-in-a-generation surge any more than you can run a business based on a single anomalous quarter. Dismissing intermodal entirely because of 2022 is not a balanced view. It ignores the structural realities of the network and the meaningful progress made since.

But that is the nature of this mode. Every service failure creates a damage period that lasts years. One bad lane. One missed appointment that cost a plant shutdown. One cycle of demurrage charges on a quarter-end P&L. The shipper who experienced that writes off intermodal for three to five years, sometimes permanently.

Intermodal earns trust slowly and loses it fast. That asymmetry is one of the most underappreciated dynamics in the entire adoption problem.

The pricing opacity problem

This is the one nobody inside the industry likes to talk about. But it is real, and it keeps shippers away from intermodal even when the economics favor it.

A truckload quote is simple. Pickup, delivery, fuel, one invoice. The only variable most shippers deal with is the possibility of detention, and that is a known risk they have learned to manage.

Intermodal is a different conversation. Detention exists with this mode too, but shippers with less operational control over their supply chain can also pick up demurrage, chassis usage, per diem, storage, and ramp congestion charges. These are real costs that can appear on an intermodal invoice with little warning. The savings that looked compelling in the rate comparison disappear in the accessorial reconciliation, and the shipper is left explaining to their CFO why intermodal cost more than expected.

Not all IMCs operate this way. The better providers take on a portion of accessorial risk where it makes sense and actively manage charges to keep them to a minimum. That is the service model intermodal needs more of within its ranks.

But enough of the market operates on a cost-plus, pass-through model that the perception of pricing opacity is both widespread and justified. When that is your first intermodal experience, it is often your last.

The damage shows up in shipper behavior in a specific way. Finance teams remember the quarter intermodal accessorials ate the savings. They add a risk premium to every future evaluation. That premium often tips the analysis back toward truckload even on lanes where a well-managed intermodal program would genuinely deliver what it promises.

The compounding factor is that some of these charges are not anyone’s fault. Chassis availability, demurrage at rail ramps, and dray detention can be driven by terminal congestion, equipment positioning decisions, and railyard operating practices that neither the shipper nor the IMC fully controls. A shipper who does everything right can still get hit. In truckload, that outcome is rare. In intermodal, it is common enough that experienced shippers build it into their expectations before the first quote conversation even starts.

That is the real damage. Not the charges themselves. The anticipation of them.

The drayage problem

Intermodal has three legs. Origin dray. Rail linehaul. Destination dray.

The rail linehaul gets almost all the attention. It is where the structural fuel efficiency advantage lives. It is what the math is built around.

Dray gets almost none of the attention. And it is where intermodal often fails.

Based on direct experience managing intermodal programs, approximately 95% of service failures occur in the dray segment, not the rail segment. Missing a ramp cut-time. Chassis availability issues in certain markets. A dray carrier late on pickup. Destination ramp congestion delaying container availability. These are the moments that define whether a shipper calls intermodal reliable or unreliable, and they have almost nothing to do with the train.

These failures are invisible in most rate comparisons because dray cost and execution risk are modeled at best-case. The quote assumes the container will be picked up on time, the chassis will be available, and the ramp will not be congested. When any of those assumptions breaks, the savings evaporate and the service failure becomes the story the shipper tells internally for the next three years.

The dray market adds structural risk that truckload does not have. Dray carriers are a separate tier of transportation provider operating within limited geographic zones around ramps. Their business model depends on completing multiple short moves per day, since their length of haul is short enough to allow it. But that only works when they are moving. Drayage margins are among the tightest in the freight industry, which means any delay, a missed chassis, a congested ramp, a grounded container that cannot be located, directly cuts into a driver’s ability to earn for the day. That economic pressure creates turnover and capacity fragility that long-haul trucking does not experience in the same way.

And unlike long-haul truckload, where a shipper with enough volume can command priority service, dray carriers at major terminals often operate on allocation or first-come-first-served models that limit shipper control regardless of relationship or volume.

The three-leg structure is intermodal’s fundamental execution challenge. The rail can run perfectly and the shipment can still fail. Until all three legs perform consistently, savings in the linehaul will be partially consumed by cost and variability in the dray segments. The shipper who experiences a smooth rail move and then waits three days to get their container out of a congested destination ramp does not come away with a positive view of the mode.

They come away with a story about why intermodal does not work.

And that story spreads.

The organizational inertia problem

This is the barrier that nobody publishes a data point on, yet it is very much part of the equation.

Inside many shipper organizations, the transportation team is not incentivized to optimize across modes. They are incentivized to cover loads first and manage cost second. No shipper wants stockouts on their sheet. Empty retail shelves mean lost sales, and lost sales can mean lost planogram space that took years to earn. That risk lives in the transportation planner’s mind on every load decision, even when the freight has nothing to do with retail replenishment.

A truck call takes five minutes. Load board quote, carrier who knows the lane, rate agreed in real time, pickup confirmed. Done.

An intermodal conversion takes planning. Lane analysis against ramp locations. Blocking and bracing evaluation. Coordination with operations on cut-times and slightly longer transit. Setting expectations with customer service on delivery windows. TMS configuration for intermodal-specific tracking. An approval process if the mode is new to the organization.

In an environment where a transportation planner is measured on load coverage and on-time delivery, “just put it on a truck” is the safest career decision available. The savings from modal conversion flow to the CFO’s P&L, distributed and invisible in most internal reporting systems. The missed appointment from the one intermodal load that failed gets tied directly to the person who booked it. Specific. Attributable. Remembered.

That asymmetry between upside and downside strongly favors the status quo every single time.

This is why successful intermodal adoption almost always originates with senior procurement leadership carrying an explicit modal diversification mandate. The shipper organizations that have built durable intermodal programs did so because a VP of Supply Chain or a CFO made it a strategic directive, not because a dispatcher decided to try something new on a Tuesday morning.

Without that top-down mandate, the organizational default is always truck. Not because truck is better. Because truck is safer for the person making the decision.

Another part of the inertia may be a quiet feedback loop. Shippers watch the market share data. They see that intermodal’s slice has not grown meaningfully in years. Recent data shows it shrinking. And they draw a conclusion that feels logical even if it is wrong: if the mode were really that good, more people would be using it. Since they are not, maybe there is a reason. So the shipper does not look further, the number stays flat, and that becomes the next piece of evidence for the next shipper who runs the same math.

That loop is self-reinforcing and largely invisible. It has nothing to do with rates, transit times, or corridor economics. It is herd mentality, and it is suppressing adoption on lanes where intermodal would perform well.

The volume requirement problem

Contract intermodal, where the pricing and capacity commitments that make intermodal programs truly work, typically requires a minimum volume commitment. The standard threshold is often cited as three or more loads per week on a lane to justify contracted rates and dedicated capacity.

This requirement is invisible in most rate comparisons, which are done on a per-load basis. A shipper who ships two loads a week on a qualifying lane sees an attractive rate comparison, commits to intermodal, and then discovers that the contracted economics do not apply to their volume level.

Mid-market shippers are particularly affected. The companies running 500 to 2,000 truckload shipments per year, with freight spread across dozens of origin-destination pairs, often cannot concentrate enough volume on individual lanes to qualify for the rates that make the intermodal financial case compelling. Their freight is too fragmented to build consistent intermodal programs, even when their long-haul lanes by mileage would qualify.

The spot market fills this gap partially, but spot intermodal lacks the predictability and priority that makes intermodal operationally reliable for many shippers.

Shippers who most need intermodal as a cost tool, mid-market companies without negotiating leverage in the truckload market, face barriers to accessing the intermodal economics that would benefit them most.

The IMC quality problem

There are roughly 500,000 for-hire carriers and about 700,000 total motor carriers in the United States, along with approximately 25,000 freight brokers.

By comparison, the number of companies that focus on door-to-door domestic intermodal as a core offering is a small fraction of that, likely in the hundreds rather than the thousands. Within that group, the market is concentrated, with the top ten IMCs controlling better than half the market share.

Digging deeper, an even smaller subset of IMCs holds direct ramp-to-ramp contracts with all Class I railroads. The rest access intermodal capacity through door programs or intermediaries that do. The operational difference between these models is significant and largely invisible to a shipper comparing quotes.

A true IMC with direct Class I contracts owns the rate relationship, has priority access to equipment, and can escalate service issues directly with the railroad. An entity accessing intermodal through a door program is effectively a broker, with no direct railroad relationship and limited ability to resolve problems when they occur.

A meaningful portion of the market promotes “intermodal” without operating as true IMCs. This contributes to confusion and inconsistent service expectations. Shippers who believe they hired an IMC but receive broker-level service often have no way to determine whether the issue was the provider model or the mode itself. When service breaks down and the response becomes fragmented across multiple parties with no direct railroad accountability, the conclusion is often that intermodal does not work.

The quality gap within the IMC market remains one of the industry’s most underaddressed problems. It directly suppresses adoption, as negative experiences tend to carry more weight and influence future transportation decisions within shipper organizations.

The freight qualification problem

Not all freight that moves on long-haul truck can move on intermodal. This is understood in general terms, but the specifics are not always communicated clearly, and the consequences of getting it wrong are severe.

Weight restrictions. Intermodal containers carry 2,500 pounds less than a standard over-the-road trailer due to the weight of the container and chassis combination. Shippers who regularly maximize truckload weight often cannot move the same load by rail.

Blocking and bracing requirements. Freight on rail experiences different forces than freight on a truck. Harmonic vibration during rail movement requires proper blocking and bracing to prevent load shifting. Shippers who skip this step discover the problem at the destination, and the product damage becomes the story that circulates internally.

Commodity restrictions. Class I railroads publish prohibited and restricted commodity lists. Certain chemicals, hazardous materials, and high-value goods either cannot move by rail or require special handling that adds cost and complexity.

Temperature control limitations. True temperature-controlled intermodal capacity is more limited than refrigerated truckload capacity, and the performance envelope is narrower. Shippers who need precise temperature control for perishables or pharmaceuticals face a smaller intermodal option set.

Each of these disqualifiers removes freight from the addressable market. And each one represents a category of shipper who tried intermodal, encountered the limitation, and built a rule into their routing guide: this freight type does not go on intermodal. The rule is sometimes applied correctly and sometimes applied far more broadly than the limitation warrants, but once the rule exists it shapes freight decisions for years.

The cycle-chasing problem

Watch how intermodal adoption moves across freight market cycles and you see a persistent pattern.

Truckload capacity tightens. Rates spike. Tender rejections rise. Shippers scramble to find alternatives. Intermodal gets a look. Shippers who had dismissed it start calling IMCs. Short-term programs get set up. Savings materialize.

Truckload capacity loosens. Rates fall. Every load covers easily. The urgency around intermodal evaporates. The programs get quietly discontinued. The operational knowledge built over the tight-market period disperses. The people who learned how to run intermodal move on or shift focus.

The next cycle starts. The scramble repeats.

This is not a theoretical pattern. It has played out in 2018-2019, in 2020-2022, and it is playing out again in 2026. Intermodal gets discovered during capacity crunches and abandoned during soft markets.

The problem is that the best intermodal economics come from consistent programs, not crisis response. A shipper with a well-established intermodal program, contracted capacity, trained operations staff, and integrated TMS visibility performs fundamentally differently than a shipper standing up intermodal for the first time during a capacity squeeze.

Cycle-chasing produces exactly the wrong economics. Emergency intermodal during a tight market means spot rates, limited equipment availability, reduced service priority, and a first-time operations team learning under pressure. The result is often a poor experience that reinforces the narrative that intermodal does not work.

The shippers who successfully use intermodal as a strategic cost tool build programs during soft markets, when time and capacity allow deliberate implementation, and hold them through tight markets, when the savings accelerate and the trucking alternatives become unreliable. Those shippers represent the 6% who have figured this out. The 94% are still chasing cycles.

The knowledge gap

There is a straightforward dimension to the adoption problem that underlies all of the more complex barriers above.

A significant portion of U.S. shippers, particularly in the mid-market, do not have deep operational knowledge of intermodal. They know it exists. They know it involves trains. They have heard it is cheaper on long lanes. But they do not know how to evaluate whether their freight qualifies, how to find a competent IMC, how to handle blocking and bracing, how to integrate intermodal tracking into their TMS, or how to explain the mode shift to their customers and operations teams.

Some of the misconceptions go further than that. Shippers still tell us they cannot use intermodal because they do not operate out of a rail-sided building. Others believe they can only use 53-foot equipment and assume that disqualifies them. Others think they need an onsite lift to handle the containers. None of those things are true, but they are repeated often enough that they function as real barriers. A shipper who believes they are structurally disqualified never asks the next question.

Intermodal has a learning curve that truckload does not. A shipper can book truckload with no prior knowledge of the mode. Intermodal requires operational preparation that is not intuitive and is not documented in any accessible, practical form that most mid-market shippers can easily find and act on.

IANA, Intermodal Association of North America, has worked to address this through education and certification efforts. Individual IMCs, including InTek, publish content designed to walk shippers through the evaluation and implementation process. But the information gap remains wide relative to the scale of the opportunity.

The result is a market where shippers who are theoretically positioned to benefit from intermodal remain on truck because they do not know enough to make the change confidently, and the consequences of a botched implementation feel riskier than the savings feel valuable.

What would actually change the number?

Intermodal’s share within its core long-haul lane set has been relatively stable in recent years, with incremental gains during tight capacity cycles like the pandemic, followed by normalization. The bigger question is what it would take to materially increase that share over time.

Some of it requires industry action that individual shippers cannot drive.

Rail service has to stay reliable. The 2022 service collapse and the PSR-related ramp closures of the previous decade created damage that is still being recovered from. Railroads that continue to optimize for operating ratio at the expense of geographic coverage and service consistency are actively limiting intermodal’s market potential. On-time performance has significantly improved since 2022, but shippers need to see the published service levels to be consistently reliable and they need to understand the challenges we discussed earlier in this article as to what happened in 2022.

The dray execution gap has to close. The mode will not penetrate deeper into the shipper market until the dray execution standard comes closer to what shippers experience from well-run truckload carriers.

Pricing transparency has to improve. The portion of the IMC market that operates on linehaul-plus-pass-through without accessorial accountability is actively damaging adoption. Negative surprises get attributed to the mode, not the pricing model, and that is a distinction shippers do not make after the first bad invoice.

The fix is not complicated. If a cost is predictable and recurring on a lane, build it into the price. Yes, the all-in number will not show 20%-plus savings against truckload. But a quote that saves 10% and delivers exactly what it promised wins the business and keeps it. A quote that shows 30% and lands at 12% after accessorials loses the business permanently and sends another shipper back to truck with a story to tell.

Transparent pricing that slightly underwhelms on paper beats opaque pricing that dramatically disappoints in execution. Every time.

The IMC quality standard needs teeth. The industry’s inability to clearly differentiate between true IMCs and entities using door programs creates information asymmetry that harms shippers and suppresses adoption. An IANA-governed certification with meaningful standards, similar to the UIIA framework, would help shippers identify providers with direct railroad contracts and accountable service models. This conversation is overdue.

Build programs during soft markets. The shippers that have figured out how to build their programs when there was time and capacity to implement them well have a leg up on other shippers. Now, with intermodal pricing at or near cycle lows and truckload tightening, is exactly the right time to run the lane analysis, qualify the freight, find a competent IMC, and build the operational muscle before the next capacity crunch makes everyone scramble.

Evaluate the full landed cost. Not the linehaul rate. The door-to-door rate including dray, fuel surcharge, and expected accessorials. If your IMC cannot or will not quote all-in, that is a provider problem to address, not a mode problem to dismiss.

Start with the right lanes. The freight that has never worked in intermodal will never work in intermodal. The qualifying long-haul freight where the mode is structurally competitive is a large absolute number. Most shippers have at least some lanes in that universe. The analysis to find them is not difficult. The decision not to do it is.

Treat intermodal as a strategic platform, not a spot option. The companies getting the most value from intermodal use it as a core element of their long-haul transportation strategy, not as an emergency overflow when trucks get expensive. That means contracted capacity, consistent volumes, and operational integration, not one-off spot loads during a capacity squeeze.

When intermodal actually works: the four conditions that have to be true simultaneously

The previous sections documented what holds intermodal back. This section is the other side of that ledger.

Intermodal works when four conditions are true at the same time. Not three. All four. When any one of them is absent, the economics or execution begin to break down.

Condition 1: The lane is long enough.

The data from our 750-lane February 2026 analysis is clear on this. Above 1,500 miles, intermodal wins 82% of spot lanes. Above 2,000 miles, the win rate is 93%. Below 750 miles, intermodal is often not the choice when compared against truckload.

The practical floor is somewhere between 700 and 800 miles depending on the specific corridor. The acceleration above 1,500 miles is not marginal. Savings nearly double when you cross that threshold, and the win rate jumps 16 percentage points. That jump is structural, not cyclical.

Condition 2: The corridor is structurally supported.

Two lanes of identical distance can produce very different intermodal results depending on origin and destination market structure. The residual data in our analysis, which measures how much a state or corridor over- or underperforms the expected savings for its distance, shows this clearly.

The corridors that work have ramp density, carrier competition, and freight flow orientation that compound the rail economics. The corridors that do not work have structural headwinds, usually from port market premium pricing, abundant regional truckload capacity, or limited ramp access, that eat into the linehaul savings before they reach the shipper’s invoice.

Condition 3: The freight qualifies.

Intermodal cannot move everything. Weight-sensitive freight, time-definite shipments with no transit buffer, certain commodities with railroad restrictions, and freight requiring specialized equipment that is not available in 53-foot domestic containers are all outside the intermodal universe.

The blocking and bracing requirement deserves specific mention because it is the operational detail most new intermodal shippers miss. Rail movement creates harmonic vibration that standard truckload packing does not account for. Shippers who load a container exactly as they would load a trailer often experience product damage on the first few loads. The fix is not complicated, typically staggered pallet patterns plus a simple 2x4 footer to secure the last row, but it requires awareness and process adjustment that takes time to implement correctly.

Condition 4: The shipper has the operational readiness to execute.

Intermodal requires planning that truckload does not. Cut-times at ramps are fixed and unforgiving. Transit windows need to be communicated to operations and customer service teams. Blocking and bracing standards need to be embedded in the loading process. TMS visibility for rail tracking needs to be configured differently than truckload tracking. And the IMC relationship needs to be managed as a partnership, not a transaction.

Shippers who treat intermodal as a drop-in truckload substitute discover that the mode requires deliberate operational integration to perform consistently. The companies that have built successful intermodal programs did not do it by making calls on Mondays and hoping for the best. They built processes, trained teams, and treated the first 90 days as a setup period, not a performance period.

When all four of these conditions are in place, the economics and service excel.

What shippers should do right now

The data in this analysis points to a specific set of actions for shippers who have qualifying freight. None of them require waiting for the industry to solve its structural problems.

Run the lane analysis before the next freight cycle tightens.

The current market is one of the best environments in recent memory for building an intermodal program. Intermodal pricing is at or near cycle lows. Equipment availability is strong. Rail service has stabilized. Truckload capacity is tightening from supply attrition rather than demand growth, and that dynamic makes the rate spread wider today than it typically is.

The shippers who act in soft markets build better programs than the shippers who act in tight markets. They get deliberate onboarding instead of emergency coverage. They get contracted rates instead of spot premiums. They get 90 days to train their operations teams instead of 90 minutes to cover a load.

Identify your lanes above 1,500 miles. Match them against the corridor data. Pull quotes that include all-in landed cost, not linehaul only. That analysis takes days, not months. The results will show you where your money is sitting on the table.

Start with the structural corridors, not the marginal ones.

The transcontinental corridors in this dataset where the economics are undeniable and the structural support is proven. Start there. Build the operational confidence and the provider relationship on lanes where you have maximum margin for error because the savings are large enough to absorb imperfection during implementation.

Once those lanes are running cleanly, expand to the corridors where the economics are strong but slightly more sensitive: mid-haul lanes in the 750-1,499 mile range where corridor and state residuals are positive.

Pick the right IMC, not just the cheapest quote.

The difference between a true IMC with direct Class I railroad contracts and an entity using a door program is invisible in the rate quote and visible in the service delivery. Ask directly: do you hold direct intermodal contracts with all Class I railroads? Ask for documentation. The answer determines whether your IMC can actually escalate and resolve service issues with the railroad when something goes wrong, or whether they are as dependent on the railroad’s goodwill as you are.

Treat the first 90 days as an investment, not a performance test.

The first quarter of a new intermodal program is when blocking and bracing processes get refined, when cut-time compliance gets built into scheduling, when the operations team learns what intermodal tracking looks like versus truckload tracking, and when the IMC relationship gets tested and calibrated. Shippers who treat the first 90 days as a pilot with a high pass/fail bar often kill programs that would have worked once the operational kinks were resolved.

Define what success looks like before the first load moves. Set realistic service expectations for transit, typically one to two days longer than truckload on comparable lanes. Measure landed cost including all accessorials, not just base rate. Give the program time to mature before drawing conclusions.

The close: competitive advantage goes to whoever acts first

Intermodal is at 6% of the long-haul freight market. The economics in this analysis say it should be significantly higher. The gap between those two numbers is not explained by transit time alone.

It is explained by two decades of service failures and recovery, by pricing models that buried savings in accessorial surprises, by organizational incentive structures that punish the person who booked the failed load and invisibly reward the person who kept freight on truck, by ramp closures that removed viable intermodal options from entire regions, and by a provider market that blurs the line between true IMCs and brokers wearing IMC labels.

None of those barriers are permanent. Some are already being addressed. Rail service is better today than it was in 2022. The conversation about IMC certification is happening at the IANA level. Several Class I railroads are adding intermodal schedules and improving terminal access in underserved markets.

But the improvement is gradual and the opportunity is now. Intermodal pricing near cycle lows. Truckload tightening from supply attrition. A rate spread between modes at one of its widest points in recent memory.

The companies that build intermodal programs now, on the right lanes, with the right providers, and with the operational integration to execute consistently, will carry a structural freight cost advantage into the next cycle that their competitors will not have. When truckload tightens fully and spot rates continue climbing, those companies will not be scrambling to find intermodal capacity on emergency terms. They will already have contracted capacity, trained operations, and proven lanes.

The window is open. The data tells you exactly where to look. The only remaining question is whether your organization treats this as a freight market moment or as a strategic infrastructure decision.

The 6% who have figured intermodal out made the second choice. The 94% are still choosing the first.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, check the InTek Intermodal Index for weekly rate updates, and listen to the InTek Intermodal Podcast.

Rick LaGore CEO, InTek Logistics

Truckload pricing is moving up, and fast. FMCSA’s work to clean up unsafe carriers and drivers is reducing capacity in a meaningful way (and that is a good thing for the industry long term). Diesel is roughly 50% higher than a year ago thanks to crude oil disruption tied to the Middle East. Both forces push truckload rates higher, and contract renewals are already reflecting it.

Intermodal pricing has just started to move upwards. Intermodal spot rates, excluding fuel, have sat flat since Week 19 of 2024. That is nearly two years of stability on one side of the ledger while the other side is climbing. The spread between truckload and intermodal pricing hasn’t been this wide in years.

That window doesn’t stay open forever.

Yet there’s a narrative holding shippers back that refuses to die.

It goes like this. Railroads and ultimately IMCs failed intermodal shippers during the pandemic. Service fell apart. Long memories from that period are one of the most frequently heard reasons why intermodal still carries a trust deficit today.

Part of that is true. Intermodal service did struggle. Shippers did get burned. Those memories are still shaping modal decisions right now.

But the conclusion people draw from it, that Class I railroads simply didn’t step up, misses how rail capacity actually works. And getting that wrong is costing shippers real money today.

Here’s what actually happened. And why the diagnosis matters more now than it has in years.

Originally posted on Rick LaGore’s LinkedIn page.

Freight market analysis. Intermodal + truckload. What to do next. Free.

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Rail Capacity and Truckload Capacity Are Not the Same Animal

Truckload capacity is relatively elastic. When demand spikes, more trucks enter the market. Drivers get their CDLs. Carriers buy equipment. Owner-operators jump in. The supply side responds, imperfectly and with a lag, but it responds.

Rail capacity doesn’t work that way.

Adding meaningful Class I capacity requires years of planning, billions in capital investment, regulatory coordination, and eventually the physical construction or purchase of more assets. New or enlarged intermodal ramps don’t get permitted and built in a quarter. New locomotives don’t roll off an assembly line in six weeks. Terminal expansion requires land, infrastructure, and labor development cycles that dwarf anything in the over-the-road world.

This isn’t a criticism of railroads. It’s physics and capital allocation reality.

No Capital Committee Would Approve a Project Built on a Pandemic Assumption

Having sat in capital approval meetings back in my GM days, there would never be approval for a multi-billion dollar investment built around supporting a pandemic.

The investments needed to handle pandemic-level intermodal demand would have required approval and groundbreaking years earlier. Someone in 2017 or 2018 would have needed to make the case for massive network expansion based on a global pandemic that hadn’t happened yet and that no model was predicting. Not a chance.

That isn’t how infrastructure investment works. And it shouldn’t be.

A capital committee approving billions in rail network expansion based on a once-in-a-generation demand shock would have been making a bad decision.

Another point about capital-intensive businesses like railroading. You have to be mindful of the commitments you’re making. You cannot build for the come. As the saying goes from the 1980s film Field of Dreams, “build it and they will come” will bankrupt a business if they never actually do. There has to be a balance of risk against the investment.

Or as one of my old bosses put it years ago. A church cannot and should not build a building for Easter Sunday attendance.

In other words, you plan for normal. You manage through extraordinary.

Truckload Expanded Dramatically, and Still Couldn’t Meet Demand

Here’s the part that usually gets left out of the pandemic capacity conversation.

Truckload, the most elastic capacity model in freight, expanded aggressively during the pandemic. Drivers entered the market. New carriers formed. Equipment was purchased. The number of operating authorities issued by FMCSA surged to levels the industry had never seen.

Even with all of that, truckload capacity still couldn’t meet demand at pre-pandemic pricing. Rates moved to levels nobody had modeled. Service commitments broke down across modes, not just rail.

If the most flexible capacity model in freight couldn’t absorb that demand shock, expecting railroads to have performed any differently isn’t realistic.

The Hangover from Truckload’s Expansion is What’s Tightening the Market Right Now

This is where the pandemic story loops back to today’s freight environment.

The rapid influx of trucking capacity during the pandemic didn’t just solve a short-term problem. It created a longer-term one.

FMCSA is now actively working to reduce the number of carriers and drivers that entered the market as bad actors during that period. Non-domicile CDL abuse. ELD fraud. Chameleon carriers. These aren’t fringe issues. They’re a direct consequence of a capacity model that expanded fast and without adequate screening.

Railroads didn’t have that problem because railroads couldn’t expand that fast. The same structural constraint that frustrated shippers in 2021 protected the industry from the compliance and safety fallout that trucking is now working through.

And that cleanup effort, along with the diesel spike, is exactly what’s pushing truckload rates higher today.

Where Does that Leave Intermodal’s Trust Problem?

Service did fail during the pandemic. That is real. Shippers who built intermodal programs around 2019 reliability and then experienced 2021 variability have long memories.

But the diagnosis matters.

Rail linehaul on major corridors has recovered and, in many cases, improved. The JOC Intermodal Service Scorecard reflects that. The data is there.

What drives the difference in shipper experience, both then and now, is what happens at the first and last mile. Dray management. Exception handling. Communication when things go sideways. IMC accountability under stress.

That is not a railroad issue. It is an execution issue that can be found at the IMC level, as they are responsible for the full door-to-door customer experience.

And for shippers still carrying a bias against intermodal based on the pandemic, it’s worth resetting the context. The capacity environment at that time was extraordinary. It was temporary. And it is not structurally repeatable the same way.

The rail network did not break. It was overwhelmed, along with every other mode.

The Window is Open, but It Won’t Hold

Here’s what ties all of this back to today.

Truckload capacity is tightening because FMCSA is cleaning up the mess that pandemic-era expansion created. Diesel is roughly 50% above a year ago. Both forces are working their way into truckload rates, and contract renewals are already reflecting the pressure.

Intermodal pricing hasn’t reacted yet. That spread versus truckload is wider than it’s been in years.

Spreads like this don’t last. Modal shift moves both ways, and when shippers start converting in volume, intermodal pricing will follow. History has shown us that time and again.

The shippers who act while the numbers still favor them will be the ones who lock in real savings over the next 12 to 24 months. The ones still waiting for “the pandemic thing to settle” are already five years late to that reality.

The better question today isn’t whether railroads failed during the pandemic.

It’s whether your IMC is built to execute when the network gets stressed, and whether you’ll get clear, direct answers when it does.

That has nothing to do with Class I capital plans. It has everything to do with who is managing your dray.

Final words

A few things to sit with as the freight cycle turns:

• Rail capacity is structurally less elastic as truckload, and for good reason. Expecting it to flex like truckload misunderstands how the network was built and how it’s financed.

• Truckload expanded fast during the pandemic and still couldn’t meet demand. The rail network being overwhelmed was not a rail failure. It was a market failure that hit every mode.

• The compliance cleanup now tightening truckload capacity is a direct consequence of how easily trucking expanded in 2020 and 2021. That same cleanup is why intermodal’s pricing advantage is widening right now.

• First and last mile drayage, not rail linehaul, is where the intermodal experience usually breaks down. Choose your IMC accordingly.

• The longer a shipper waits to convert, the less of the pricing gap they capture. Truckload is already moving. Intermodal is next.

If the pandemic is still the reason your organization isn’t looking seriously at intermodal, it’s time for a new reason.

To learn more about how InTek approaches intermodal differently, visit our website, read our blog, and listen to the InTek Intermodal Podcast.

The Iran situation remains the defining variable. The U.S. and Israel launched an air war on February 28. Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz. Diesel was $3.65/gal entering March, jumped to $4.859 by March 9, and sat at $5.643 the week of April 6. That March 9 move was the largest one-week spike in ten years of EIA data.

A fragile two-week ceasefire took effect April 8, brokered by Pakistan. The strait has not meaningfully reopened. U.S.-Iran talks collapsed on April 12, and the administration declared a naval blockade of Iranian ports. Roughly 230 loaded tankers remain trapped inside the Gulf. The gap between ceasefire and open navigation is as wide as ever.

Against that backdrop, the March freight data tells a genuinely mixed story. AAR intermodal volumes recorded their second-highest March level on record. Cass freight shipments showed strong sequential improvement. ISM Manufacturing held above 50 for the third consecutive month. The LMI printed 65.7, its highest reading since May 2022.

And yet. University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment crashed to 47.6 in April’s preliminary reading, the lowest in modern survey history. Nonfarm payrolls shed 92,000 jobs. The inventory-to-sales ratio is ticking higher with no restocking signal. Consumer confidence expectations remain deeply negative.

The freight market in April 2026 is caught between two real forces pulling in opposite directions. A supply and energy cost shock pushing rates sharply higher. And a consumer and demand picture that is deteriorating, not improving.

Which force wins, and on what timeline, is the analysis every shipper needs right now.

Originally posted on Rick LaGore’s LinkedIn page.

Freight market analysis. Intermodal + truckload. What to do next. Free.

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Key Market Trends

Intermodal Market Overview: April at a Glance

More on Truckload Market Conditions

The truckload market is not just tightening. It is repricing.

What started as a structural supply-side story, capacity exiting through CDL enforcement, insurance repricing, and driver demographics, has now been compounded by an energy shock reshaping every carrier’s cost basis at the same time. The distinction matters, because these forces are additive on the cost side and both point to higher truckload pricing regardless of whether freight demand recovers.

The structural exits (unchanged)

Regulatory enforcement continues to tighten capacity across the truckload market. Increased scrutiny around non-domiciled CDLs, renewed enforcement of English proficiency standards, and ongoing Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse prohibitions, now impacting over 180,000 drivers, are all reducing the available driver pool.

At the same time, structural pressures are building. An aging workforce, rising insurance costs driven by nuclear verdicts, and higher equipment costs tied to EPA 2027 regulations are making it harder for marginal carriers to operate.

Not all of this capacity is permanently removed, but much of it is slower to return and more expensive to replace. As a result, the market is losing elasticity, and capacity will not respond as quickly when demand improves.

Tender rejections are now hovering near 14%, levels not seen consistently since the post-COVID unwind in 2022. The contract-to-spot rate premium, which sat at $0.39/mi a year ago, has compressed to just $0.11/mi as spot rates have caught up. Spot linehaul climbed from $1.57/mi in May 2025 to $2.01/mi through February 2026, a gain of roughly 28% in under a year. C.H. Robinson revised its 2026 truckload rate forecast upward to roughly +8% year-over-year.

The fuel shock update

The diesel picture has continued to deteriorate since last month.

At $5.643/gal, diesel is now 54% above the 2025 annual average of $3.660. It is within 17 cents of the all-time record high of $5.810 set June 20, 2022. The fuel surcharge mechanism, indexed weekly to the EIA reading, is translating every tick of diesel price directly into carrier and shipper invoices.

According to Commercial Carrier Journal, the $2/gal increase in diesel versus one year ago equates to upwards of a 40-cent per mile increase in fuel surcharges for contract truckload rates. That is not a rounding error. On a 1,500-mile lane, that is $600 or more in additional fuel cost per load before any other rate adjustment.

The statistical relationship between truckload and intermodal spot rates (r-value ~0.90) still holds. But the current truckload move is no longer a clean signal. It contains structural supply exit, weather-driven tightness, and an energy cost shock with no precedent in the current cycle. The confirmation question remains relevant. It is just being asked of a much more complicated market.

Post-tariff-pull-forward truckload volumes continue to run approximately 6-8% below year-ago levels on a seasonally adjusted basis. Prices are up sharply. Volumes are not. The mechanism is cost compression on the supply side, not demand expansion. Both forces are real. Neither resolves without either demand recovery or energy normalization, and right now neither is clearly in the near-term data.

Intermodal Volume Outlook

March intermodal volumes delivered a genuinely encouraging reading.

AAR reported that U.S. intermodal originations averaged 280,076 units per week in March, the second-highest March level on record, and up 1.4% from a year earlier. Weekly intermodal volume for the week ending March 28 was 282,088 containers and trailers, up 1.6% year-over-year. Total YTD intermodal units through 12 weeks stand at 3,311,403, down just 0.2% from last year. A real improvement from the deeper year-over-year deficits seen throughout 2025.

This is real volume performance. March intermodal demand is holding while the truckload market tightens, which is the early signal that mode conversion is happening even before spot rates fully confirm.

The fuel shock is accelerating intermodal conversion. As diesel holds above $5.50 per gallon, the cost equation on lanes already evaluating intermodal continues to shift toward rail.

Rail’s fuel efficiency, moving a ton-mile of freight roughly 450–500 miles per gallon, provides a built-in advantage. While both truckload and intermodal reprice with fuel, rail tends to adjust more gradually.

As a result, when diesel spikes, intermodal’s landed cost advantage on qualifying lanes typically widens, making conversion more compelling, especially on long-haul, repeatable freight.

West Coast outbound lanes remain the strongest performing corridor. The 20-30% cost advantage over truckload that existed entering 2026 is now larger under the fuel shock. Shippers who built intermodal programs during the last two years of pricing stability are the beneficiaries.

The cross-border Mexico intermodal corridor continues to show strong momentum. Early 2026 rail volumes in Mexico are up high single to low double digits versus last year, supported by ongoing nearshoring activity.

That tailwind is real, although still evolving with broader economic and policy conditions. At the same time, elevated diesel costs are improving the competitiveness of overland intermodal relative to cross-border truckload on longer-haul lanes.

One important development to watch. With tender rejections at 14% and spot rates firming, routing guide compliance is beginning to slip for shippers relying on truckload capacity at contract rates. That slippage creates urgency for mode diversification that wasn’t present in 2025.

Economic Pulse: April 2026

Key Freight-Economic Leading Indicators

Data Sources: Cass Freight Index | Federal Reserve Industrial Production | Federal Reserve NAICS 3327 | ISM Manufacturing and Services PMI | U.S. Census Bureau Housing Starts | Conference Board Consumer Confidence | Inventory-to-Sales Ratio (FRED) | Logistics Managers’ Index | BLS Nonfarm Payrolls | University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment | EIA Weekly Diesel Retail Prices | Port of LA/LB Statistics

Summary

March and early April data are sending conflicting signals, and the conflict matters.

On the positive side, industrial and logistics indicators improved in March. ISM Manufacturing is hovering around the 50 expansion line. The Cass Freight Index showed solid sequential improvement, with shipments up roughly 3% month-over-month and expenditures rising close to 5%. The March LMI came in at 65.7, the strongest expansion reading since May 2022. AAR data shows intermodal volumes at near-record March levels. These are not noise. They reflect real activity and tightening conditions.

On the negative side, consumer indicators are deteriorating. Michigan Consumer Sentiment fell to 47.6 in the April preliminary reading, among the lowest levels on record. Consumer expectations remain weak. The labor market is showing signs of softening. Inventory-to-sales ratios are stabilizing or rising in some sectors, and port volumes remain below prior-year levels.

The interpretive challenge is that both sets of signals are real. March activity was stronger. April consumer data is weaker. The two can coexist. Historically, when consumer sentiment deteriorates sharply while production activity temporarily holds, freight demand tends to follow the consumer with a lag.

Energy volatility is the exogenous variable driving this disconnect. Spending is rising in part because costs are rising, not because underlying demand is strengthening. The LMI’s Transportation Prices reading near 90 reflects real cost pressure. But similar spikes in 2022 preceded a prolonged freight downturn.

The comparison to 2022 is instructive. Transportation Prices are nearly identical between the two periods. The difference is inventories. In 2022, inventories were expanding rapidly into an already full system. Today, they are leaner and turning faster. Supply chains are more flexible than they were four years ago.

What 2022 suggests is that energy-driven cost inflation, without underlying demand growth, does not produce a durable freight recovery. Today’s consumer is weaker than in 2022, facing higher fuel costs, inflation pressure, and a softening labor backdrop.

The takeaway is simple. Watch the consumer. Freight will follow.

LMI Deep Dive: March 2026 Data

The March 2026 LMI came in at 65.7, up 4.2 points from February’s 61.5 and the highest reading since May 2022. This is the first month above the all-time LMI average of 61.3 after eleven consecutive months below it.

The headline is genuinely strong. The context matters.

Overall Index: 65.7

Growth is increasing at an increasing rate across Inventory Levels, Inventory Costs, Warehousing Prices, Transportation Utilization, and Transportation Prices. Warehousing Capacity and Transportation Capacity are both contracting. The LMI researchers note this expansion is consistent across upstream and downstream respondents, small and large firms, and early and late March responses. A broad signal, not a sampling artifact.

Upstream vs. Downstream Split

March shows a different picture from earlier in the year. Downstream activity remains in expansion, both overall (61.5) and in inventory levels (62.5), and appears to be strengthening. That shift is worth watching.

Transportation prices are nearly identical between upstream (89.9) and downstream (89.6), confirming that cost pressure is hitting the full supply chain, not just one segment.

The caution is in utilization. Downstream transportation utilization at 52.1 is only marginally in expansion. Retailers are not yet moving freight aggressively. They are seeing cost pressure without clear evidence of strong volume pull-through.

Transportation Capacity and Prices

Transportation Prices surged to 89.4 in March, the highest level since March 2022, with a double-digit increase month-over-month.

Transportation Capacity contracted to 39.2, down from February’s already contracting 47.1.

The spread between prices (89.4) and capacity (39.2) is over 50 points, one of the widest inversions since the peak of the Covid-era freight market.

LMI researchers note that similar price spikes in the past have been tied to geopolitical conflict and energy market disruption. Current conditions reflect a comparable dynamic, with fuel-driven cost pressure pushing transportation prices higher.

Interpretation

The scale of the current cost pressure is significant. If sustained, it increases the likelihood that transportation pricing remains elevated. The key question is whether demand follows. So far, the data suggests cost inflation is leading, not volume growth.

Inventory Levels

Inventory Levels expanded at 54.8 in March, largely in line with recent readings.

Inventory Costs rose to 76.2, the highest since August 2025.

Companies are restocking, but at a measured pace. At the same time, the cost of holding that inventory is rising due to higher transportation and input costs. This creates pressure on margins without a clear signal of demand acceleration.

Future Expectations

LMI respondents project one year out:

• Transportation Capacity: 42.3 (continued contraction)

• Transportation Utilization: 69.0 (solid expansion)

• Transportation Prices: 79.5 (elevated, but below current levels)

These projections were made before the full impact of recent fuel and geopolitical developments could be reflected.

Given that Transportation Prices already reached 89.4 in March, the forward expectation of 79.5 may understate near-term pricing risk if current conditions persist.

Industry Spotlight: Energy Volatility, Diesel, and What Comes Next

Energy markets have become the defining variable in the freight outlook.

Recent geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have introduced significant volatility into global oil flows. The Strait of Hormuz, which handles roughly 20% of global oil shipments, remains a key risk point. Even without a full disruption, the threat of constrained supply has pushed diesel prices sharply higher.

Diesel has moved materially higher in a short period, resetting the cost baseline for freight. For Q2 and Q3, shippers are operating in an environment where fuel costs are meaningfully above what was modeled earlier in the year.

What this means for trucking

The structural pressures on truckload capacity remain unchanged:

• CDL enforcement

• English proficiency requirements

• Drug & Alcohol Clearinghouse restrictions

• Aging workforce

• Insurance cost escalation

• EPA 2027 equipment pressures

Fuel is now compounding those pressures.

For smaller carriers operating with thin margins, higher diesel prices quickly compress profitability. Carriers that were marginally viable at lower fuel levels are increasingly under pressure, accelerating capacity exits or reducing utilization.

What this means for intermodal

Rail’s fuel efficiency advantage becomes more pronounced in this environment.

On a 1,500-mile move, a truckload consuming roughly 200 gallons sees fuel costs increase significantly as diesel rises. In contrast, intermodal movements, where drayage represents a smaller share of total fuel consumption, experience a more muted cost increase.

The result is a widening cost gap between truckload and intermodal on qualifying lanes. That widening gap is driving renewed evaluation and conversion activity, particularly on long-haul, repeatable freight.

What happens next

Two scenarios remain:

• Escalation scenario: Further disruption to global oil flows pushes diesel higher and extends the current cost pressure environment

• Stabilization scenario: Tensions ease and fuel prices moderate, though likely not back to prior baseline levels in the near term

For planning purposes, shippers should assume continued volatility and avoid relying on a rapid normalization of fuel costs.

Rail Consolidation Watch

Rail consolidation continues to be a topic of industry discussion, but there is no formal transaction currently in the regulatory process.

At recent industry events, including the Northeast Association of Rail Shippers (NEARS) conference, executives emphasized the potential benefits of greater network integration. The core argument remains consistent: reducing interline handoffs could improve service reliability, shorten transit times, and expand the addressable market for intermodal conversion from truckload and Union Pacific - Norfolk Southern have one view, while the BNSF - CSX have a different view.

These concepts are not new, but they are gaining renewed attention in the current environment. Higher fuel costs, tighter truckload capacity, and continued focus on service consistency are all increasing the value of single-line rail solutions.

At the same time, competitive dynamics among Class I railroads are already shifting. Service enhancements and lane development activity have increased as railroads compete more aggressively for share, particularly in intermodal.

For IMCs and shippers, the practical approach remains unchanged. Planning and contracting should be based on today’s network. Scenario planning for potential future network changes is appropriate, but execution should remain grounded in current service realities.

Asset-Based IMC and Provider Updates

J.B. Hunt is the clearest proof point that intermodal demand has improved

JB Hunt’s Q1 2026 release is the strongest fresh IMC datapoint. Its intermodal segment revenue rose 2%, operating income rose 21%, and volume rose 3% year over year. The company said overall domestic intermodal demand remained strong, delivered the highest first-quarter volume in company history, and produced a record volume week in March. The split matters too: transcontinental loads were flat while eastern network loads rose 7%, which says the strength is not uniform across the network. Revenue per load excluding fuel surcharge was down 2%, so this is not just pricing strength. It is a real volume and execution story.

Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern continue to sell the merger story

Union Pacific’s CEO, Jim Vena, continues to push his message and team forward with the potential UP - NS merger. Reuters reported in January that the STB returned the original UP-NS merger filing as incomplete. Since then, industry reporting and Axios have said UP plans to refile on April 30.

BNSF’s leadership is sharing the counter story to the UP - NS merger

BNSF Railway CEO Katie Farmer has been unusually direct in recent public comments about the proposed Union Pacific Railroad–Norfolk Southern Railway merger.

At an April 2026 industry conference, she framed the deal as a major threat to competition, stating it would concentrate roughly 50% of U.S. rail freight under one carrier, reducing flexibility and optionality for shippers.

Freight Market Outlook

Truckload
The cost environment has reset in a way that was not anticipated at the start of the year. Diesel has moved materially higher, increasing operating costs across the truckload sector. At the same time, structural capacity pressures continue.

Together, these forces are driving rate increases and narrowing the gap between contract and spot pricing. Shippers without intermodal alternatives on key long-haul lanes are absorbing the full cost impact, and that exposure is likely to persist into Q3 absent a meaningful easing in energy markets.

Intermodal
Intermodal volumes remain strong for the time of year, signaling ongoing mode conversion. Rail’s fuel efficiency advantage becomes more pronounced as diesel rises.

Importantly, much of the fuel impact is being absorbed through fuel surcharge mechanisms rather than base rate repricing. This dynamic is favorable for shippers establishing intermodal programs now, but the window for favorable contract terms is narrowing as truckload rates move higher.

LTL
Stable to tightening. Fuel surcharges are flowing through as expected, and carriers have maintained pricing discipline through the downcycle. With truckload tightening and fuel costs rising, upward pressure on LTL pricing is likely to build through Q2.

Ocean
Elevated geopolitical tensions in the Middle East are increasing risk across key global shipping routes. While the primary impact is on energy markets, certain trade lanes are experiencing higher costs and volatility. Importers managing tariff-related inventory strategies are facing higher transportation costs simultaneously.

Air
Weak overall, with targeted demand emerging from time-sensitive shipments and tariff-related pull-forwards. Rates remain below historical peaks but are beginning to firm directionally.

Macro
Overall, 2019 and 2022 parallels are both relevant comparisons to consider at this time, but neither fully captures today’s market.

• 2019 showed how policy-driven demand can distort freight flows and unwind quickly.

• 2022 showed how cost inflation can push rates higher even as underlying demand weakens.

2026 has elements of both, but with a critical difference. Capacity is less elastic than in prior cycles. Regulatory pressure, higher operating costs, and structural constraints are limiting how quickly supply can return.

That changes the outcome.

Instead of a clean rate collapse when demand weakens, the market is more likely to experience periods of elevated pricing alongside uneven volumes. Volatility, not direction, becomes the defining characteristic.

The implication is straightforward. Watch the consumer for demand signals, but watch capacity for pricing behavior. In this cycle, they may not move together.

Intermodal Outlook

Intermodal is positioned to be one of the more strategically defensible freight modes through Q2 and into Q3 2026.

The current energy environment is reshaping the cost comparison. At elevated diesel levels, shippers evaluating long-haul lanes are comparing a truckload option with significantly higher fuel costs against an intermodal option where fuel exposure is more limited to the dray component. Rail’s efficiency advantage becomes more pronounced in this environment and scales as fuel costs rise.

This is not purely a cyclical story. While fuel will eventually normalize, the path back to prior cost levels is uncertain, and the relative advantage for intermodal remains meaningful in the interim.

March AAR volume data suggests that shippers are responding. Intermodal originations were at near-record levels for the month, indicating that mode conversion is occurring. The key question is whether that conversion accelerates into Q2 and Q3 or is offset by broader demand softness.

The confirmation framework is evolving. Intermodal spot rates have begun to firm off cycle lows as the truckload cost gap widens. This is not a demand-driven signal of a full freight recovery. It is a cost-driven signal that intermodal’s competitive position has improved. The distinction matters.

Implication for shippers

The appropriate posture is to accelerate intermodal program development on qualified lanes while pricing remains relatively accessible. As truckload costs rise, intermodal becomes more attractive, and that demand is likely to tighten available capacity over time.

The fuel advantage will continue to drive interest in rail. The key question is whether shippers capture that advantage through planned program development or react later in a tighter capacity environment.

The shift is not fully realized, but it is underway.

Final Words

Cass Freight shipments recovered sequentially in March, up 3.0% month over month, but remained 4.5% below last year. Expenditures rose 4.9% month over month, reinforcing that costs are rising faster than demand.

ISM Manufacturing held at 52.7 in March, the third consecutive month above 50 and the strongest reading in more than three years. April now matters more because it will help determine whether this is stabilization or something more durable.

Michigan Consumer Sentiment fell to 47.6 in April’s preliminary reading, among the weakest readings on record. That remains a serious warning sign for goods demand.

The March BLS release showed February nonfarm payrolls down 92,000, an unexpectedly weak result. The next report matters because it will show whether that was a one-month event or the start of broader labor softening.

March LMI printed 65.7, the highest since May 2022. Transportation Prices at 89.4 and Transportation Capacity at 39.2 produced a 50.2-point inversion, the widest since November 2021. That is a cost-pressure signal first, not a clean demand-recovery signal.

AAR intermodal volumes ran at near-record March levels and were up modestly year over year, indicating that mode conversion is occurring even if broad freight demand remains uneven.

UP and Norfolk Southern are expected to submit a revised merger application on April 30, 2026. For now, shippers should continue planning around today’s network while staying aware of potential future changes.

About This Report

The Monthly Intermodal Shipping Report provides a comprehensive, data-driven snapshot of North American intermodal trends integrating rail network performance, economic indicators, intermodal pricing, and strategic market intelligence for shippers.

If you’d like to contribute insight or suggest topics for future editions, InTek Intermodal welcomes collaboration.

Want to go deeper on intermodal? Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to The Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

As with all previous comments on the LMI, my thoughts are strictly focus on the freight and transportation pieces within the March Logistics Managers’ Index.

Overall take away is the freight market just shifted faster than anyone expected, and not for reasons we typically anticipate or look to for signs.

Main points covered are:

• Why Transportation Prices at 89.4 changes everything

• What the 50.2-point freight inversion signals

• Whether this looks more like 2022 or something different entirely

Originally posted on Rick LaGore LinkedIn page.

Freight market analysis. Intermodal + truckload. What to do next. Free.

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Transportation Metrics Exploded Higher

This is not the freight market we were analyzing 30 days ago.

Transportation Prices jumped 12.7 points in March to 89.4. That’s the highest reading since March 2022. And it accelerated throughout the month, going from 81.9 in early March to 94.0 in the second half of the month. A reading of 94.0 is close to the maximum of 100.0 with most reporting price increases.

Transportation Capacity dropped another 1.8 points to 39.2. That’s the lowest reading since September 2021, at the height of the pandemic freight surge.

Transportation Utilization climbed to 62.9, the highest in two years. It also accelerated through the month, moving from 56.9 early to 66.7 in late March.

Three metrics. All at levels we haven’t seen since 2021 or 2022. All moving in the same direction. All accelerating.

The 50.2-point gap between Transportation Prices (89.4) and Transportation Capacity (39.2) is the highest positive inversion since November 2021. That was the peak of the pandemic freight boom.

These stats indicate the freight market turned. The question now is what kind of market we’re in.

Supply Shock, Not a Demand Surge

Here’s what’s different about March.

The Transportation Price reading of 89.4 in March 2026 is nearly identical to the 89.7 we saw in March 2022. That’s not a coincidence. There is a similar thread in both months.

In March 2022, the invasion of Ukraine took approximately 10% of global oil supplies off the board. Diesel prices spiked. Freight costs followed.

In March 2026, the conflict with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz has taken approximately 20% of global oil off the board. Diesel hit $5.40 per gallon by March 30th, up 42% from late February. Three of the 11 largest week-to-week diesel price jumps in history happened in March, including the largest ever at 96 cents per gallon in a single week.

In California, diesel reached $7.60 per gallon in early April. That’s the highest price ever recorded.

Fuel typically accounts for 20-25% of over-the-road costs. When diesel moves this fast, freight rates follow. That’s exactly what we’re seeing.

The difference between a supply shock and a demand surge matters. A demand surge means the economy is growing and freight volumes are expanding. A supply shock means costs are rising regardless of underlying demand. The mechanics look similar in the short term. The implications are very different.

The other side of the supply shock in the freight market is coming from the work the FMCSA is doing to remove “bad actors” from the industry. The work they are doing on non-domiciled CDLs, non-proficient English, ELD compliance, chameleon carriers, and shutting down CDL training schools that print CDLs is structurally changing the supply side also.

The end result is the removal of what is expected to be somewhere in the range of 8% to 10% of drivers. Carriers will take elasticity out of the truckload market. So when demand returns, capacity will not come back as quickly. That means rates will move faster and more aggressively than in prior cycles, because adding drivers and trucks is no longer as easy as it once was.

Capacity Picture is Real, but Complicated

Transportation Capacity at 39.2 is the tightest since September 2021.

Part of this is structural. The capacity rationalization we’ve been tracking for three years is finally showing up. Twelve carriers with over 100 employees filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March alone. The FreightWaves rejection index has been in double digits for most of this year, well above 2025 levels.

But part of this is also about who’s bearing the cost.

Smaller firms reported Transportation Prices expanding at 92.7, significantly higher than the 84.6 reported by larger firms. Small carriers and owner-operators lack the purchasing power and long-term contract rates that larger fleets have. They’re absorbing fuel surcharges in real time. Some are being forced off the road. Others are passing costs directly to shippers.

The LMI notes that smaller respondents also reported significantly higher Transportation Utilization (67.6) than larger firms (56.4). Smaller players are working harder to find freight that covers their costs. That’s a sign of stress, not strength.

2022 Comparison is Instructive, but Not Predictive

The LMI researchers compared March 2026 to March 2022 directly. It’s worth understanding both the similarities and the differences.

The similarities:

• Transportation Prices are nearly identical (89.4 now vs. 89.7 then)

• Both were triggered by geopolitical shocks that restricted oil supplies

• Both happened in March, at the start of the traditional freight season

The differences:

• Inventory Levels were expanding rapidly in 2022 at 75.7. In 2026, they’re barely moving at 54.8.

• Warehousing was full in 2022. It’s lean now.

• Fleet capacity was at historic highs in 2022 after years of expansion. It’s been rationalized significantly since then.

Why does this matter?

In 2022, high inventories gave the economy a buffer. When demand dropped due to inflation, firms could draw down existing stock. Freight volumes collapsed because there was less product to move. The freight recession that followed was brutal precisely because the market had been riding so high.

In 2026, inventories are lean, as a strategy to manage tariffs. Firms don’t have large stores to draw from. If demand holds, freight has to keep moving. There’s no cushion.

The risk cuts both ways. Lean inventories could support freight activity even as costs rise. Or lean inventories could leave supply chains vulnerable to stockouts if sourcing gets disrupted. The conflict in the Middle East and ongoing tariff uncertainty make both scenarios plausible.

Divergence in Small vs. Large Companies

The gap between small and large firms is a concerning signal in this report.

Large firms reported Inventory Levels expanding at 62.5. Small firms reported no movement at 50.0.

Large firms reported Transportation Capacity contracting at 33.3. Small firms reported contraction at 43.5, still tight but less severe.

Yet small firms reported Transportation Prices expanding at 92.7, significantly higher than the 84.6 from large firms.

The pattern is clear. Large firms are building inventory, absorbing capacity, and using their scale to manage costs. Small firms are getting squeezed. They’re paying more for freight while holding less inventory.

Fuel surcharges are starting to act like tariffs for many small businesses, adding a layer of cost that’s largely outside their control.

If diesel stays elevated, expect more small carrier exits. That will tighten capacity further, but it will also concentrate market power among larger players.

What This Means for Intermodal

From the intermodal side, March’s story has a clear implication.

When diesel spikes, intermodal’s fuel efficiency advantage becomes more pronounced. Rail moves freight at roughly three times the fuel efficiency of truck. That math gets more compelling when diesel is at $5.40 nationally and $7.60 in California.

The LMI notes that intermodal was up 0.5% year-over-year in March and 4.2% year-to-date, as firms have looked to avoid fuel surcharges. That’s exactly what should happen in this environment.

For shippers who have intermodal programs in place, those programs just became more valuable. The cost spread versus truckload is widening.

For shippers who don’t, the window to convert freight is still open, but the urgency just increased. Intermodal capacity is not immune to tightening. IMCs with strong dray networks and railroad relationships will be in high demand.

The carriers and IMCs you’ve built relationships with over the past three years matter more now than ever. This is not the time to shop purely on rate. It’s the time to ensure you have capacity when you need it.

Final Words

March gave us the most dramatic freight signal since the pandemic era.

Transportation Prices hit 89.4, the highest since March 2022. Capacity contracted to 39.2, the tightest since September 2021. The 50.2-point inversion between prices and capacity is the largest since November 2021.

But this is a supply shock, not a demand surge. Diesel is driving this. Geopolitics is driving this. FMCSA tightening policies is driving this.

The underlying economy is mixed at best.

What matters now:

• Whether diesel prices stabilize or continue climbing

• Whether consumer and industrial demand holds up under cost pressure

• Whether lean inventories support freight activity or create stockout risks

• How long the Strait of Hormuz remains closed

For shippers, the message is clear: costs are rising fast, and they’re rising for everyone. Lock in capacity where you can. Lean into intermodal where it fits. And don’t assume this stabilizes quickly.

For carriers and IMCs, this is the rate environment you’ve been waiting for. But it comes with fuel costs that eat into margins and small competitors exiting the market. The survivors will be those who’ve built operational discipline and customer relationships, not those who simply ride the rate cycle.

Either way, March made one thing clear: the freight market can change overnight. This time, it did.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the The Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

One that stood out for me was Derek Barr, Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. He covered a lot of ground, from CDL credentialing reform to ELD fraud to cabotage enforcement, and the conversation was direct, detailed, and worth sharing beyond the room where it happened.

What follows is a breakdown of what he shared for shippers, carriers, and anyone trying to understand where federal trucking enforcement is actually headed in 2026.

What he shared matters well beyond the conference room. The actions FMCSA is taking right now have real implications for carrier capacity, freight risk, and who is actually moving your goods.

At the end of this post, you will understand:

• Why the fraud problem in U.S. trucking is far worse than most shippers realize

• What specific enforcement actions FMCSA is taking right now, and what’s coming

• How all of this connects directly to carrier selection, safety risk, and freight operations

Article originally published on LinkedIn: FMCSA 2026 Enforcement Update: CDL Reform, ELD Fraud, Cabotage, and What’s Coming Next.

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It starts with safety. And it always should.

Mr. Barr didn’t lead with policy or acronyms. He asked a simple question: stand up if you’ve ever witnessed a death on the side of the road.

Look around the room, he continued. I didn’t do a formal count, but I’d guess that better than half the room was on their feet.

That moment set the tone for everything that followed. Roughly 37,000 people die on U.S. roadways every year. A significant percentage involve commercial vehicles. And a meaningful share involve carriers that never should have been on the road. Fraudulent licenses. Manipulated logs. Unverified training. Ghost addresses.

Removing bad actors from the market isn’t a compliance exercise. It’s the reason the agency exists.

The non-domicile CDL rule is live right now

This one moved faster than most expected.

On March 16, 2026, FMCSA implemented new restrictions on non-domiciled CDLs. Eligibility is now limited to specific visa categories, H-2A, H-2B, and E-2. Drivers relying on broader employment authorization documents no longer qualify. States are also required to verify lawful status more rigorously and clearly designate these licenses as non-domiciled.

About 200,000 non-domiciled CDLs are expected to be affected. Not just over-the-road truck drivers. Bus drivers, school bus operators, and commercial drivers of all types are included.

The reasoning is simple. FMCSA can verify an American CDL applicant’s full history. Driving record, training, violations, background. That same verification pipeline doesn’t exist for drivers coming in from other countries. This rule closes that gap.

The capacity impact won’t be immediate. Existing non-domiciled CDL holders keep operating until their licenses expire, so the tightening plays out gradually over several years. For drayage markets and smaller carriers, that’s still worth factoring into your 2026 and 2027 planning.

And the license isn’t gone forever. Drivers who can meet the new standard can earn it back. But the burden of proof has shifted.

Delilah’s Law is moving alongside this through Congress with White House backing. It would add a 180-day verification requirement, among other provisions. Early stages, but clearly part of the same push.

ELD fraud is more widespread than anyone wants to admit

Electronic logging devices were supposed to end hours-of-service manipulation. The mandate passed. Carriers complied. Problem solved.

Except it wasn’t.

What followed was a wave of bad-actor ELD providers flooding the market with devices that, in the administrator’s words, were “paper logs 2.0.” Fully editable. Possibly managed remotely from overseas. Technically present at roadside. Practically useless for enforcement.

Here’s where FMCSA stands right now:

400 ELDs have applied to enter the market under the new internal vetting process. Of the 230-plus reviewed so far, not a single one has been allowed in. Zero. Not one met the specs.

14 ELDs have already been pulled from the existing registry.

Starting April 1, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance rolls out new out-of-service criteria specifically targeting ELD fraud. Inspectors will be looking harder, asking for fuel receipts, cross-referencing app records, and questioning co-driver claims.

The self-certification model that allowed this to happen is being actively targeted for reform. The administrator has been direct: there needs to be a codified, third-party-style vetting process similar to Canada’s model. A comment period will help shape what that looks like.

Entry-level driver training schools are getting cleaned out

The same self-certification problem that enabled ELD fraud infected driver training schools.

Over the past year, FMCSA sent investigators to 1,500 locations across the country. Some schools, when told investigators were coming, pulled themselves off the registry voluntarily. They investigated those anyway.

Result: roughly 7,000 training schools removed from the registry.

The administrator’s preferred solution? Wipe the list entirely. Start over. Require every school that wants to stay in business to re-certify under whatever new standards are put in place. The training school associations, to their credit, have reportedly backed this approach. Clean slate.

The point isn’t paperwork. It’s that a CDL should mean something. The person holding it should have actually trained, actually tested, actually earned it. Right now, that’s not consistently true.

English Language Proficiency: 17,000 drivers placed out of service

Since the middle of last year, FMCSA has placed 17,000 individual drivers out of service for English Language Proficiency (ELP) violations.

The enforcement is supposed to be uniform across all 50 states. The reality is that it isn’t always consistent at the roadside level, especially near border zones where the rules have created some confusion. FMCSA has been working directly with Texas DPS and other state agencies to clarify what the rule does and doesn’t cover.

The short version: if you drove a truck down from Arkansas and happen to be inside the border zone when you’re stopped, you’re held to the same standard as if you’d been stopped north of the zone. The border zone carve-out applies to local drayage operations, not to over-the-road drivers who happened to end up near the border.

Carrier fraud: the numbers are staggering

This is where the picture gets genuinely alarming.

FMCSA is currently working through a single crash investigation that began with one motor carrier. Investigators found 168 total carriers connected to that one company. Shared drivers. Shared vehicles. Shared safety representatives. Common ownership threads running through all of it.

That’s not an anomaly. That’s how chameleon carrier networks are structured.

FMCSA has identified a “top 10” list of carrier entities currently under active investigation. Each investigation is expected to reveal similar networks.

The address fraud problem alone involves roughly 2,000 carriers operating out of UPS stores, P.O. boxes, and Staples locations. Those carriers are being tracked down. The new registration system coming online will close the loopholes that allowed this to happen in the first place.

Cabotage enforcement is being taken seriously

Cabotage, which is the practice of a foreign-domiciled carrier making point-to-point deliveries within the U.S. without authorization, has been an open secret in parts of the market for years.

A recent joint operation between FMCSA and Customs and Border Protection resulted in 16 driver arrests and nine motor carrier referrals for active investigation, all from a single day of enforcement.

The administrator was clear about where the accountability belongs. The driver often doesn’t know they’re violating the law. The carrier does. FMCSA’s target is the motor carrier, not just the individual driver.

More enforcement actions and potentially new legislative tools are expected.

What’s coming next

FMCSA is working on approximately 10 rulemaking actions, with the goal of getting notices of proposed rulemaking out the door by end of summer at the latest. That’s aggressive for a federal agency. Mr. Barr acknowledged it’s more than they can comfortably chew. They’re chewing anyway.

The regulatory agenda includes:

• Codifying English Language Proficiency into formal rules.

• English-only written CDL examinations.

• Entry-level driver training reform.

• ELD standards reform.

• Unified registration system updates.

• New entrant training and testing requirements for carriers entering the market.

FMCSA is also hiring 39 new investigator positions. The training focus is shifting from roadside inspection skills (which they’re leaving to state partners) toward actual investigative technique: how to ask hard questions, how to trace networks, how to find fraud that doesn’t show up on a standard inspection.

What this means for shippers

The carrier market is getting cleaner. Slowly, but measurably.

Bad actors being removed from the market will tighten capacity at the margins. That’s a factor worth watching as 2026 unfolds. It isn’t the primary driver of current market conditions, but it’s one more reason not to assume excess capacity is a permanent feature of the landscape.

More practically: carrier vetting matters more than ever. The ELD fraud problem alone should give anyone using spot market carriers without proper due diligence serious pause. If you don’t know who’s actually moving your freight, the regulatory crackdown underway won’t protect you from a bad experience or a compliance event.

For intermodal shippers, this reinforces something we’ve said for years. Working with providers who have direct Class I railroad contracts, vetted drayage networks, and visible accountability at every leg isn’t just a service preference. It’s a risk management decision.

Final words

Safety has to be at the forefront. That’s how the FMCSA administrator opened his remarks. It’s the right framing.

The freight market has real safety problems embedded in it. Fraudulent licenses. Manipulated logs. Ghost schools. Chameleon carriers built to hide liability. These aren’t edge cases. They’re systemic.

What’s encouraging is that the current FMCSA leadership isn’t treating them as background noise. They’re treating them as an enforcement priority. And the early numbers, 17,000 ELP violations, 7,000 bad schools removed, 14 ELDs pulled, 168 carriers found under one investigation, suggest the effort is real.

For shippers, the takeaways:

• Carrier vetting is not optional

• Capacity will tighten as bad actors exit the market

• The regulatory environment is shifting meaningfully toward higher standards

• Working with accountable, contract-based intermodal providers reduces exposure to the fraud that spot-market carrier selection can introduce

We’ll keep watching this as the rulemaking calendar develops and enforcement actions continue to build.

For questions on how intermodal fits into your freight strategy, visit InTek Logistics, explore our blog, or reach out directly, or reach out directly.

Rick LaGore CEO, InTek Logistics

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January’s ISM Manufacturing 52.6 generated genuine excitement with it being the first expansion in over two years, with new orders at their best since early 2022. If you stopped reading there, you might think the recovery was finally on.

February didn’t confirm it, as the ISM softened. Michigan consumer confidence held at its lowest levels since 2014. Inventory-to-sales ratios showed no restocking urgency. And intermodal spot rates remained flat, still sitting at December 2019 lows.

That last data point is the one that keeps us anchored.

Truckload capacity has been exiting the market in a meaningful way. Regulatory enforcement around non-domiciled CDLs, English proficiency requirements, and Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse compliance is accelerating the exit of marginal carriers. Tender rejections have stayed elevated. Truckload spot rates are running well above where they were a year ago. By most metrics, truckload looks like it’s tightening.

But intermodal isn’t moving with it. And as we’ve said for years: truckload spot rates signal a turn, but intermodal determines whether that turn has real momentum or is just noise. Right now, intermodal is still not confirming.

Then, as this report was being finalized, a third story emerged.

The week of March 9, 2026, U.S. diesel prices jumped +$0.962/gallon a 24.7% increase in a single week. That is the largest one-week move in 10 years of EIA data, surpassing even the Russia-Ukraine invasion spike. The cause: military escalation in the Middle East threatening the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 21% of the world’s daily oil supply transits. Futures markets repriced immediately. Retail diesel followed within days.

The EIA had projected a $3.50/gallon average for 2026. That number is now a historical footnote.

Spring bid season is underway. Shippers are making decisions today that will shape their freight programs through 2026 and into 2027. The question isn’t only whether truckload is tightening it is. The question is what’s driving it, whether it lasts, and what a historic fuel shock layered on top means for every mode in your network.

That context shapes everything in this month’s report.

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This was originally posted on my LinkedIn page under March 2026 Monthly Intermodal Shipping Report.

Key Market Trends

Intermodal Market Overview: March at a Glance

Market Sentiment: Cautious. Supply-driven tightening persists; fuel shock adds new cost pressure; demand recovery still unconfirmed.

More on Truckload Market Conditions

The truckload market is tightening. On that, there is no debate.

What remains a debate is the mechanism and now there are two of them running simultaneously. The mechanism matters, because it determines whether this tightening is durable, and what it actually costs shippers.

The structural supply exit

The clearest driver coming into 2026 was supply-side attrition. Regulatory enforcement has accelerated the exit of capacity that was always marginal: non-domiciled CDL enforcement is removing carriers who relied on foreign commercial licenses to operate in the U.S.; the English proficiency rule reinstatement by FMCSA has added another layer of compliance pressure; Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse data shows more than 180,000 drivers in prohibited status with a significant share not completing the return-to-duty process; and the natural aging of the driver workforce continues, with retirements outpacing new entries at a rate the industry has quietly underestimated.

These are structural exits, not cyclical ones. Carriers who leave for these reasons are not coming back when rates improve.

The fuel shock

Layered on top of that structural story is something no one had in their 2026 forecast: a historic diesel price spike.

The week of March 9, 2026, U.S. diesel jumped from $3.897 to $4.859/gallon a +$0.962 move in seven days. To put that in context:

This isn’t a routine fuel adjustment. The Russia-Ukraine spike didn’t peak in week one it took four months to reach $5.810. Where this one goes depends on how the conflict develops, whether Strait of Hormuz transit is materially disrupted, and how OPEC+ responds. At $4.859, diesel is already 32.5% above the 2025 annual average of $3.660. The all-time record in the EIA weekly dataset is $5.810 (June 20, 2022). We are now 83 cents below that number.

The practical freight impact: a typical 1,500-mile intermodal move consumes approximately 160–200 gallons of diesel across the combined dray legs. At +$0.962/gallon, that represents an additional $154–192 per load in fuel cost alone before the carrier FSC schedule applies its multiplier to the linehaul rate. For high-volume shippers, the monthly compounding effect is material.

The FSC mechanism adjusts weekly in both directions. When diesel moves down, surcharges follow. But shippers modeling freight costs for Q2 bid season need to price against today’s baseline, not the $3.50 annual average the market assumed entering the year.

C.H. Robinson’s upward revision of its 2026 truckload forecast is notable, but their analysts are careful to frame it as supply-side, not demand. The statistical relationship between truckload and intermodal spot rates sits at approximately an r-value of 0.90. When truckload prices move without intermodal, the move either reverses or intermodal eventually follows. Two and a half months into 2026, intermodal has not followed.

Post-holiday truckload volumes reverted to a baseline roughly 6–8% lower year-over-year after the peak faded. You can have the tightest capacity environment in years and the highest diesel prices in four years but if freight volumes aren’t there to fill that capacity, rate improvement plateaus. That’s the market we’re in.

Intermodal Volume Outlook

Selective strength is the right way to describe intermodal demand entering spring.

West Coast outbound lanes remain attractive, with the 20–30% cost advantage over truckload drawing mode conversion interest as shippers renegotiate spring contracts. Southern California has largely normalized post-peak, and chassis utilization has stabilized.

The fuel shock strengthens that cost advantage further. When diesel spikes, the gap between intermodal and truckload landed costs widens on every lane where intermodal already made sense. Shippers running their lane economics against last month’s fuel assumptions need to rerun those numbers.

Bid season is producing the most important volumes to watch. Shippers who locked in intermodal at current pricing levels are positioning well ahead of any potential second-half demand recovery. Those waiting for more certainty may find the pricing window narrower than expected.

One area of increasing attention: the cross-border Mexico intermodal corridor. Several providers reported 50%+ year-over-year growth in 2025. That trend is continuing, driven by nearshoring tailwinds and growing awareness among shippers that overland intermodal can compete on both cost and transit for the right origin-destination pairs.

Railroads continue holding competitive spot pricing aligned closely to truckload rates. That approach has helped stabilize intermodal economics at a time when the freight market is searching for direction and the fuel shock doesn’t change the rail side of that equation the way it changes the truckload side.

Economic Pulse: February 2026

Key Freight-Economic Leading Indicators

Data Sources: Cass Freight Index | Federal Reserve Industrial Production | Federal Reserve NAICS 3327 | ISM Manufacturing and Services PMI | U.S. Census Bureau Housing Starts | Conference Board Consumer Confidence | Inventory-to-Sales Ratio (FRED) | Logistics Managers’ Index | BLS Nonfarm Payrolls | University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment | EIA Weekly Diesel Retail Prices | Port of LA/LB Statistics

Summary

The macro environment continues to send conflicting signals and a new one arrived late in the reporting window.

The ISM Manufacturing bounce to 52.6 in January was real, but the context deserves scrutiny. ISM Business Survey Committee Chair Susan Spence noted explicitly that “January is a reorder month after the holidays, and some buying appears to be to get ahead of expected price increases due to ongoing tariff issues.” That’s not a demand recovery. That’s timing.

Cass Freight shipments fell 7.1% year-over-year in January — the third consecutive annual decline. Expenditures are increasing, but only because per-shipment costs are rising, not because volumes are recovering.

University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment remains the most troubling demand-side signal in the table. When consumers pull back, housing remains stagnant and restocking slows. When restocking slows, freight demand lags. The net message from February’s data: this is still a supply-driven tightening environment, not a demand-driven recovery.

Greater Depth Perspective

The 2019 parallel holds. And it’s worth revisiting because it’s being underappreciated and because this cycle just added a variable that 2019 never had.

In 2019, the Fed cut rates three times. Housing responded quickly. Mortgage rates fell, home sales improved, construction picked up. Freight did not follow. Tariff-driven uncertainty, cautious inventory strategies, and weak manufacturing output kept volumes soft regardless of borrowing costs.

Today’s tariff setup is more challenging. In 2019, the trade conflict was primarily bilateral with China. Today, tariff exposure spans virtually all major trading partners at higher average rates. The drag heading into the back half of 2026 is meaningfully larger.

But 2019 also had one advantage this cycle doesn’t: fuel was a non-factor. Diesel prices were declining through most of 2019, sitting in the $2.90–$3.10 range. Shippers managed through a soft freight market without a fuel cost shock compressing margins simultaneously.

Today’s environment asks something different: navigate soft demand, a supply-constrained truckload market, and a diesel price that just reset 25% higher in a single week. A true freight recovery still requires goods moving manufacturing expanding, consumers restocking, inventories rebuilding. None of those signals are present in a sustained way. The ISM Manufacturing print gets the headlines. The Consumer Confidence index tells the more honest story.

LMI Deep Dive: January 2026 Data

The January 2026 LMI came in at 59.6, rebounding 5.2 points from December’s 18-month low. The headline reads as encouraging. The detail is more nuanced.

Overall Index: 59.6

The rebound was driven primarily by early January restocking after December’s historic inventory drawdown. The LMI has now been below its all-time average of 61.3 for 11 straight months. This is normalization from extreme weakness, not a return to healthy expansion.

Upstream vs. Downstream Split

The most important story in January’s LMI is the divergence between upstream and downstream respondents.

MetricUpstream (Mfg/Wholesale)Downstream (Retail)Overall LMI53.147.2 (contraction)Inventory Levels35.634.1Transportation Utilization62.147.6Transportation Prices69.559.1

Downstream respondents the retailers closest to the end consumer contracted in January. That matters enormously for freight. Upstream firms can build inventory and move goods, but if downstream isn’t pulling through, the pipeline eventually backs up.

Downstream inventory levels at 34.1 and utilization at 47.6 suggest retailers are running lean and not meaningfully rebuilding. That is not a picture of an economy preparing to accelerate.

Upstream transportation utilization at 62.1 and prices at 69.5 are healthy readings. But upstream activity driven by pre-tariff pull-forward and seasonal reordering can create short-lived freight activity that misleads on the broader trajectory.

Transportation Capacity and Prices

Transportation Capacity stayed in contraction for the second consecutive month at 47.1 in January up from December’s 36.9 but still below the neutral 50 threshold. The pace of contraction slowed, which is a positive signal, but the market has not returned to balance.

Transportation Prices surged to 71.4, the highest reading since April 2022. The capacity-price spread (71.4 minus 47.1 = 24.3 points) represents a substantial positive freight inversion one that would, in a normal cycle, suggest meaningful rate recovery ahead.

This is not a normal cycle. Prices are rising because supply is exiting, not because demand is pulling. The March 9 diesel spike adds another layer to that price pressure but again, driven by cost, not demand. That distinction is critical for forecasting. Rate improvement driven by supply contraction and fuel costs can persist, but it does not constitute a freight recovery without volume behind it.

Inventory Levels

December 2025 marked an all-time low for inventory levels in the LMI dataset. January’s rebound to 53.9 (up 18.8 points) was expected. The subdued magnitude second-lowest January reading ever suggests companies are deliberately running lean.

Upstream inventory at 35.6 is technically in slight contraction. Downstream at 34.1 is deeper into contraction. Neither reading suggests aggressive inventory rebuilding is underway.

Inventory costs remain elevated at 71.3, recording significant expansion in 12 of the past 13 months. The cost of holding inventory is keeping restocking cautious. The fuel shock adds another carrying-cost variable for goods moving through the supply chain particularly for anything that moves by truck at the dray or final-mile stage.

Future Predictions

LMI respondents project:

• Overall Index one year out: 65.3

• Transportation Capacity: 42.3 (significant contraction)

• Transportation Utilization: 69.0 (robust expansion)

• Transportation Prices: 79.5 (near-significant expansion)

If those predictions hold, the back half of 2026 and 2027 look meaningfully tighter for transportation. Respondents believe supply exits will continue outpacing demand recovery through this year. The March 9 fuel shock, if it sustains anywhere near current levels, would push transportation price projections higher than respondents could have anticipated when they made those forecasts.

The critical variable remains whether consumer demand recovers enough to put volume behind those price gains. Without volume recovery, rate improvement benefits surviving carriers but doesn’t constitute a freight market recovery.

Industry Spotlight: The Structural Trucking Capacity Crisis And a New Cost Variable

Most freight market conversations in early 2026 were focused on where truckload rates were heading. Fewer were asking why capacity was leaving in the first place. That question was already worth asking carefully before March 9th.

Now there are two stories running in parallel: the structural exit of capacity from trucking, and a fuel cost shock that just repriced every truckload operation’s cost basis in a single week.

The Structural Exits (All Permanent)

Non-Domiciled CDL Enforcement. FMCSA’s enforcement targets drivers holding commercial licenses issued in foreign countries while residing in the U.S. Credible industry sources put the affected driver population in the tens of thousands of active commercial drivers. These are experienced operators embedded in fleets. Enforcement has accelerated, and drivers removed under this rule are not eligible to return until they obtain a valid U.S. CDL a process many will not complete.

English Proficiency Requirements. FMCSA’s reinstatement of English proficiency enforcement, after a period of reduced scrutiny, created another exit mechanism for drivers who passed behind-the-wheel requirements but cannot demonstrate the language competency the regulation requires. The intersection with non-domiciled CDL enforcement is significant many drivers affected by one rule are also affected by the other. The compounding effect is larger than either rule produces in isolation.

Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse. Now in its sixth year, the Clearinghouse has accumulated more than 180,000 drivers in prohibited status. The return-to-duty completion rate suggests a meaningful portion will not return to trucking. These are permanent exits unless drivers actively complete the required evaluation and treatment process.

Aging Workforce and Retirement. The median driver age sits in the mid-to-late 40s. Retirement-eligible drivers represent a disproportionate share of experienced fleet capacity. New driver entry rates are not keeping pace with departures. It’s a slow bleed that, combined with enforcement-driven exits, is compressing available capacity in ways that won’t self-correct quickly.

Nuclear Verdicts and Insurance Repricing. Insurance premiums for smaller carriers have risen sharply in some cases representing a larger share of revenue than fuel costs. Smaller operators running thin margins are finding insurance-driven cost increases pushing them out of profitability. This is a structural repricing of trucking’s risk environment. It is not going to reverse.

EPA 2027 Emissions Standards. The EPA’s Phase 3 greenhouse gas standards for heavy-duty vehicles will meaningfully increase the cost of new truck purchases starting in 2027. Smaller fleets running aging equipment face a capital allocation decision: invest in compliant equipment at a premium price, or exit. For operators already stressed by insurance costs and soft freight rates, the 2027 equipment cycle is an additional exit incentive.

Tariff Impacts on Equipment Costs. Steel and aluminum tariffs have increased the cost of new trailer production and truck components. Equipment that was already more expensive due to emissions compliance is now more expensive due to input cost inflation. The squeeze is asymmetric it falls hardest on the marginal carrier segment.

The New Variable: Middle East Escalation and Diesel

The week of March 9, 2026 added a cost shock to an industry already under structural pressure.

Crude oil is a globally traded commodity. Approximately 21% of the world’s daily oil supply transits the Strait of Hormuz. When military escalation in the Middle East threatened that corridor, futures markets repriced immediately. U.S. retail diesel followed within days.

The +$0.962/gallon single-week move the largest in 10 years of EIA data arrived on top of an industry where small carriers were already managing thin margins against rising insurance costs, compliance expenses, and equipment cost inflation. For operators running on the edge, a fuel shock of this magnitude accelerates the exit decision.

The all-time record high in the EIA weekly dataset is $5.810 (June 20, 2022). At $4.859, we are 83 cents below that number. Where diesel goes from here depends on conflict trajectory, OPEC+ response, and whether Strait of Hormuz transit is materially disrupted. The Russia-Ukraine shock didn’t peak in week one. It took four months to reach $5.810.

The market needs to price for that uncertainty.

What This Means for Intermodal

The structural capacity exit from trucking and now the fuel shock layered on top of it changes intermodal’s competitive position in a specific way.

Rail’s fuel efficiency advantage over truckload is structural and permanent. When diesel prices spike, that gap widens. Intermodal’s cost advantage on qualifying lanes isn’t just a freight cycle story anymore. Given the regulatory, financial, equipment, and now energy dynamics converging on trucking, it is increasingly a structural story.

Shippers who mistake supply-side cost pressure for demand recovery and lock in truckload alternatives at cycle highs risk finding freight volumes insufficient to sustain those rates. The right response is to understand the mechanism and to use the current intermodal pricing window before the market fully reprices to reflect a higher trucking cost baseline.

UP-NS Merger Update

The Surface Transportation Board set a February 17, 2026 deadline for Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern to indicate whether and when they planned to refile their merger application, after the original filing was rejected as incomplete in January.

UP and NS confirmed intent to refile, with a revised application expected no later than June 22, 2026. The companies have not provided a detailed public update on how they plan to address the STB’s information requirements, including the full system impact analyses and market share projections the board found lacking.

Congressional attention remains elevated. Representative Dusty Johnson’s coalition of 47 House colleagues continues to press the STB for rigorous review, with particular focus on agricultural freight and grain export impacts.

The competitive response from other Class I railroads has been the most tangible near-term outcome. BNSF and CSX have accelerated service enhancements and new lane announcements a genuine benefit for shippers regardless of how the merger ultimately resolves.

For IMCs and shippers: the timeline extension means the current routing structure is likely stable through at least 2027. Lane planning and contract structures should be built on today’s network.

Asset-Based IMC and Provider Updates

J.B. Hunt. Q4 2025 results reflect the broader market tension. Intermodal volume decreased 2% year-over-year, with transcontinental loads down 6% and eastern network loads up 5% a geographic split that mirrors where rail service has been most competitive. Operating income growth of 16% despite volume softness reflects operational discipline and cost management. Spring bid season commentary from J.B. Hunt’s leadership has been measured acknowledging tighter truckload capacity while being careful not to declare a freight market turn. That caution aligns with the intermodal spot rate picture.

Schneider National. Q4 2025 results were below consensus, with intermodal revenue excluding fuel down 3% on a 5% revenue-per-order decline. Volume growth of 3% seven consecutive quarters of growth is the brighter data point. Schneider is winning volume in a soft rate environment. The Mexico intermodal corridor growth of over 50% year-over-year is notable and worth watching as a structural growth lane independent of the domestic freight cycle. The leadership transition Jim Filter becoming President and CEO in July 2026 adds a strategic narrative element heading into the second half of the year.

Hub Group. Hub continues to benefit from what the market is calling a flight to quality. In a freight environment where service reliability and operational consistency are differentiators, Hub’s emphasis on those attributes has supported customer retention through a prolonged soft market. The Spring bid season will be an important test of whether that positioning translates into volume gains or primarily holds existing business.

What We’re Watching in Q2 2026

• Diesel price trajectory. The week of March 9 established a new baseline the market is now repricing around. How the Middle East conflict develops, OPEC+ response, and Strait of Hormuz status will determine whether $4.859 is a spike or a floor. The Russia-Ukraine precedent suggests peaks don’t arrive in week one. Weekly EIA readings will carry more weight than usual through Q2.

• ISM Manufacturing follow-through. One month above 50 is an event. Two months is starting to say something. Three consecutive months above 50 is a trend. March ISM readings will determine whether January was the start of a genuine demand or tariff pull-forward noise.

• Consumer Sentiment. US consumers are the backbone of the economy. Watching for any sustained improvement as a prerequisite for restocking acceleration.

• UP-NS revised merger application. Expected no later than June 22. The content of the revised filing will signal how seriously UP-NS addresses the competitive concerns raised by the STB and Class I objectors.

• Spring bid season outcomes. Contract rate direction in intermodal and truckload through March and April bids will set the tone for freight economics through year-end. With diesel reset sharply higher, truckload all-in costs in bid submissions will reflect a different fuel baseline than what shippers modeled in January.

• FMCSA enforcement activity. Continuing to monitor non-domiciled CDL and English proficiency enforcement pace as the primary quantifiable drivers of structural capacity exit.

• Tariff escalation timeline. Supreme Court challenges and executive actions on tariff policy remain fluid. Any resolution in either direction would shift freight demand forecasts meaningfully.

• Chassis and dray availability. Heading into spring produce season and pre-tariff import activity, chassis pool utilization and dray carrier capacity in key markets warrant close attention.

• Import volumes post-Lunar New Year. Cargo flows returning from the Chinese New Year pause will provide early February data on how importers are managing tariff-driven procurement decisions.

Freight Market Outlook

Truckload: Supply-side tightening continues to support elevated spot rates, and the March 9 diesel spike adds meaningful cost pressure on top of the structural capacity exit story. The combination tighter supply and sharply higher fuel costs is compressing margins for smaller carriers and accelerating the exit of marginal operators. Shipper leverage, while reduced from 2024 levels, persists in markets with viable intermodal alternatives. Contract rate negotiations are firming, and bids submitted before the fuel shock will need to be revisited.

Intermodal: The 20–30% cost advantage over truckload that intermodal was offering entering spring just got larger. Rail’s fuel efficiency is structural a diesel spike changes truckload’s cost basis without changing intermodal’s in the same way. Combined with improved rail service reliability and competitive spot pricing at December 2019 lows, intermodal is positioned as one of the most defensible freight decisions shippers can make right now. Spring bid season is the right window to lock in favorable pricing on proven lanes before the market fully reprices around a higher trucking cost baseline.

LTL: Stable conditions with incremental tightening in select markets. Pricing is steady in dense freight classes, rising in heavier classes as carrier capacity management continues. The fuel shock will flow through LTL FSC schedules on the same weekly EIA-indexed mechanism as truckload. LTL will likely lag truckload tightening by several months.

Ocean: Contract rate stabilization continues as the import season winds down post-Lunar New Year. The Middle East escalation that drove the diesel spike also adds geopolitical risk to Indian Ocean and Gulf routing for certain trade lanes. Geopolitical risk in key shipping corridors remains an unpredictable variable.

Air: Weak but steady. Ample capacity continues suppressing rates. No near-term catalysts for meaningful change.

Macro: 2026 continues to track the 2019 playbook structurally, with a more challenging tariff environment adding headwinds that monetary policy cannot easily offset and now a fuel shock that 2019 never experienced. The ISM Manufacturing bounce is encouraging but requires confirmation. Consumer confidence at decade lows is a constraint on the goods demand recovery the market needs to sustain any rate improvement. Freight recovery at the volume level remains a second-half 2026 possibility at best, and more likely a 2027 story.

Intermodal Outlook

Intermodal is positioned to be one of the most cost-effective and strategically valuable modes through Q2 and beyond.

The combination of competitive pricing at cycle lows, improving rail service discipline, and a structural cost disadvantage building in trucking was already compelling heading into spring. The March 9 diesel shock adds another dimension. Rail’s fuel efficiency advantage over truckload is permanent when diesel spikes, intermodal’s cost advantage widens on every qualifying lane. Shippers who locked in intermodal contracts before the fuel reset are already benefiting. Those still running bid-season comparisons against last month’s fuel assumptions need to rerun the math.

The structural trucking capacity story strengthens intermodal’s position beyond the current cycle. If the regulatory, financial, equipment, and now energy dynamics described in this report play out as they appear to be trending, trucking’s cost trajectory over the next three to five years is materially different than the past decade. Intermodal’s cost advantage is no longer just a rate cycle story.

The confirmation framework remains unchanged. Intermodal spot rates flat at December 2019 lows tells us the truckload tightening structural or fuel-driven has not yet developed into a genuine demand recovery. When intermodal confirms, when spot rates begin moving consistently with truckload rather than lagging, the turn will have real momentum behind it.

Until then, the right posture for shippers is disciplined lane expansion, program development, and patience. The market is setting up. It is not yet setting off.

Final Words

• Cass Freight shipments fell 7.1% year-over-year in January with 2025 marking the third consecutive annual volume decline. Expenditures are stabilizing on rising per-shipment costs, not volume recovery.

• ISM Manufacturing 52.4 in February, but ISM’s own chair flagged holiday reordering and tariff pull-forward as the primary drivers. February’s and March’s print will be more telling.

• Transportation Capacity stayed in LMI contraction for the second consecutive month. Transportation Prices at 71.4 are the highest since April 2022. The spread is real but it is supply-driven and now fuel-cost-driven, not demand-driven.

• The upstream-downstream LMI split tells the honest story: upstream firms are moving; downstream retailers contracted in January at 47.2. The consumer pull-through is not there yet.

• Structural trucking capacity exits are accelerating across six converging pressure points: CDL enforcement, English proficiency rules, the Clearinghouse, aging workforce, nuclear verdict insurance repricing, and EPA 2027 compliance costs. These exits are not reversible on a short timeline.

• The week of March 9, 2026 produced the largest single-week diesel price increase in 10 years of EIA data: +$0.962/gallon (+24.7%), driven by Middle East military escalation threatening the Strait of Hormuz. Diesel moved from $3.897 to $4.859 32.5% above the 2025 annual average. The EIA’s $3.50 full-year 2026 forecast is no longer operative. Weekly EIA readings are the most important variable to track in Q2.

• Intermodal spot rates remain flat at December 2019 lows the clearest signal that supply-side and fuel-cost tightening in trucking has not yet become a demand-driven freight recovery.

• Rail’s fuel efficiency advantage widens when diesel spikes. The intermodal cost case on qualifying lanes just strengthened further, without intermodal rates moving at all.

• UP-NS confirmed intent to refile by June 22. The merger conversation continues delivering real value through competitive railroads accelerating service improvements and new lane development.

• Spring bid season is the right window to build or expand intermodal programs. Pricing is at cycle lows. Truckload costs are rising on structural capacity exits and a historic fuel shock. That combination does not last indefinitely.

About This Report

The Monthly Intermodal Shipping Report provides a comprehensive, data-driven snapshot of North American intermodal trends integrating rail network performance, economic indicators, intermodal pricing, and strategic market intelligence for shippers.

If you’d like to contribute insight or suggest topics for future editions, InTek Intermodal welcomes collaboration.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to The Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

That’s not what happened.

What happened was a thread full of industry veterans, operators, executives, and thought leaders largely agreeing. Not just agreeing that the name is a problem, but offering proof, history, and a path forward that didn’t exist before the article went live.

This isn’t a follow-up for the sake of a follow-up. The conversation moved. Voices with decades of intermodal history showed up and made the case stronger than one person could have made it alone.

And with some traction gained thought it was worth more exploration in a follow up article, so let’s talk about where this could go next.

At the end of this article, I’ll walk through the following:

• Why the industry’s own response validates that the IMC label is broken

• What 50 years of naming history tells us about what comes next

• Why the rest of the world never adopted “IMC” and what that signals

• How an IANA-governed certification could solve what a name change alone cannot

The original article is posted via my LinkedIn page.

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1. Here’s what people said.

The original article generated strong engagement. But what mattered more than the numbers was the substance.

The comments broke into a few clear themes.

First, the term ILC, Intermodal Logistics Company, surfaced as the leading alternative. Jason Hilsenbeck floated it and it pulled the highest engagement of any comment on the thread. Mulero Yessica backed it up, saying it gives sales teams a stronger starting point with beneficial cargo owners who are new to intermodal. That wasn’t a branding exercise. That was people in the field telling us what works when they’re sitting across from a shipper.

Second, the operating authority idea landed harder than expected. Shawn Bullock called the current naming a “self-inflicted conversion tax.” Tom Charters said “marketing” and “broker” devalue the solution before you even get to explain it. These aren’t theoretical concerns. These are people describing what happens in real sales conversations every week.

And third, the history crowd showed up and, rather than defending the status quo, actually strengthened the argument. More on that in a moment.

2. Fifty years of name changes. This isn’t new.

One of the most valuable contributions came from the veterans who lived through the evolution of intermodal’s identity firsthand.

Ted Prince, Bill Lee, and Jim Blaze provided context that goes back to the 1970s. Here’s the short version of a long history.

Before there were IMCs, there were shipper agents. The trade association was called NASA: National Association of Shippers Agents. When the role evolved, NASA became IMA, the Intermodal Marketing Association, which eventually merged into IANA. The term IMC, Intermodal Marketing Company, came out of that transition.

Bill Lee confirmed something critical. He started in this business in 1976. The core functions then were the same as today: end-to-end logistics including drayage, tracing, claims support, all on a single invoice. The role hasn’t changed. But what “marketing company” communicates to a shipper in 2026 is nothing like what it meant in 1980.

Back then, “marketing” described a legitimate function. You were marketing rail capacity to shippers who didn’t have direct railroad relationships. Today, “marketing company” sounds like you make brochures. Or worse, it sounds like a broker wearing a different hat.

The point is this: intermodal has changed its name before. More than once. Every time, it was because the old label stopped reflecting what the industry actually did. We’re at that point again.

And the history proves something else. The people who built this industry weren’t afraid to evolve the language when it no longer served the mission. We shouldn’t be either.

3. Why the IMC name survived anyway.

The IMC name survived not because it was good, but because it was useful at the time.

“Intermodal Marketing Company” was never meant to explain the product to the shipper. It was meant to explain the role to the railroads and regulators.

In the early days of domestic intermodal, U.S. railroads were vertically integrated, tightly regulated, and protective of pricing authority and network control. They did not want third parties presenting themselves as carriers. Calling these firms “marketing companies” solved that problem. It signaled that the railroad still owned the service, the rates, and the network, while the IMC handled sales, coordination, and execution.

The label reduced friction. It fit the regulatory environment. It made rail participation easier.

Then scale set in.

As 53’ domestic intermodal grew, IMCs became embedded in contracts, tariffs, insurance language, and railroad commercial structures. The name hardened into institutional memory. By the time deregulation matured and intermodal became mainstream, changing the label created more internal risk than benefit.

There is also a quieter reason the name stuck. IMCs sold primarily into a transportation-insider market. Shippers learned the term because they had to. No one was incented to rethink the label as long as freight kept moving and savings showed up on spreadsheets.

But markets evolve faster than language.

Today, IMCs do far more than “marketing.” They design door-to-door solutions. They manage risk. They arbitrate exceptions. They are accountable for outcomes. The name no longer reflects the economic reality of the role. It reflects the moment in history when rail needed an intermediary it could live with.

So the IMC name survived by inertia, not merit.

4. Why “forwarder” and “TSP” miss the mark

A few thoughtful comments suggested alternative names beyond ILC. Craig Manuel proposed Transportation Services Provider, or TSP. Braden Kayganich suggested going to “forwarder”.

The thinking behind both is understandable. But neither solves the core problem.

TSP is broad by design. It could describe a truckload carrier, an LTL provider, a 3PL, a broker, or an intermodal provider. That breadth is exactly the issue. When a shipper hears “Transportation Services Provider,” they don’t hear or see intermodal in the words, which trades confusion for vagueness.

Forwarder carries similar baggage. For most shippers, “freight forwarder” means international. Ocean. Air. Customs brokerage. Trying to reclaim that word for domestic intermodal would create more explaining, not less.

The goal here isn’t a label that covers everything an intermodal provider might touch. The goal is a name that does selling work the moment a shipper hears it. It needs to signal three things immediately: this company specializes in intermodal, it manages logistics end to end, and it operates as a real business, not a middleman broker.

That’s the filter any new name has to pass through.

5. The case for ILC

Let’s break down why Intermodal Logistics Company works.

Start with “Intermodal.” It keeps the identity front and center. There’s no ambiguity about what mode you specialize in. In a market where shippers are increasingly looking for partners with deep modal expertise rather than generalists who dabble in everything, leading with “intermodal” is a strength, not a limitation.

Next, “Logistics.” This is where the real upgrade happens. “Marketing” suggests you connect buyers and sellers. “Logistics” signals that you plan, execute, and manage freight movement. It tells the shipper you own the outcome, not just the introduction. For the companies in this space that manage origin dray, coordinate with railroads, handle destination dray, manage accessorials, resolve exceptions, and provide visibility through a single point of contact, “logistics” is simply more accurate.

Finally, “Company.” This sounds obvious, but it matters. “Company” sounds like a real business. It carries weight. Compare “Intermodal Marketing Company” to “Intermodal Logistics Company” out loud. One sounds like a sales desk. The other sounds like a service provider you’d trust with your freight.

Now put it in a real conversation.

A shipper asks: “What does your company do?”

Old answer: “We’re an intermodal marketing company.” Shipper response: “So you’re a broker?”

New answer: “We’re an intermodal logistics company. We manage your freight door to door, including dray, rail, and final delivery, as a single point of contact with one invoice.” Shipper response: “Tell me more.”

That’s not a theoretical difference. That’s the difference between opening a door and having one closed on you.

6. Is a name change enough? A certification would mean more.

Here’s where the conversation goes further than the first article went.

Changing what we call ourselves is important. But a new name without a validation structure behind it is just rebranding. The real problem is that there's no mechanism for a shipper to verify, at a glance, that the intermodal provider they're evaluating actually holds direct relationships with Class I railroads and operates as a full-service logistics provider. Not just another freight broker vying for their business.

Today, most intermodal providers operate under freight broker authority. That’s the same authority held by companies that match a shipper with a truck carrier for a single transaction and move on. The FMCSA makes no distinction between that model and what a full-service intermodal provider does.

That’s a problem. Because the two models are fundamentally different.

A traditional freight broker typically operates as a transaction intermediary. They connect a shipper with a carrier, facilitate the load, and their involvement often ends there.

A full-service intermodal provider holds direct contracts with Class I railroads. They manage drayage on both ends. They coordinate equipment, chassis, terminals, and exceptions. They own the shipment experience from pickup to delivery. They issue a single invoice. They absorb and mitigate accessorial risk. They are the one throat to choke, as Christopher Kelly put it in the comments.

Lumping both of those under “broker authority” tells the market they’re the same thing. They’re not.

One of the commenters on the original article, Mark Erickson, shared a story that captures this perfectly. A shipper accused his company of double brokering when the dray carrier showed up with an EMP container instead of a truck decaled with his company’s name. That’s the confusion we’re living with. The shipper couldn’t tell the difference between an IMC managing a legitimate intermodal move and a broker passing freight along. And honestly, under the current system, why would they?

Now, the initial instinct might be to push for a new operating authority through FMCSA or DOT, which could take years, maybe decades. The regulatory machinery for creating a new federal classification is not built for speed, and this industry can’t wait that long, as intermodal sits at roughly 5% of the 53’ capacity market.

But there’s a faster, more practical path. And it already has a working model.

Think of it like a certified reseller or a VAR in the software world. To hang that shingle, a company has to meet specific requirements set by the organization they represent. They go through a validation process. They prove they have the direct relationships, the capabilities, and the standing to represent that product in the market. And once they’re certified, the buyer knows exactly what they’re getting.

That’s the concept. An IANA-governed certification program for intermodal providers.

IANA is the natural home for this. They already represent all parties in the intermodal market: railroads, IMCs, drayage carriers, equipment providers, and shippers. And they already operate a parallel framework that proves the model works.

The UIIA, the Uniform Intermodal Interchange and Facilities Access Agreement, governs how drayage carriers interact with equipment providers and terminals. Motor carriers participating in the UIIA have to provide proof of insurance, CDL compliance, registration, MC number, and authorization for specific equipment types. It sets standards, requires validation, and creates accountability. It’s not a federal regulation. It’s an industry-governed agreement administered by IANA. And it works.

An intermodal provider certification would operate on the same principle. Not as part of the UIIA, but akin to it. A parallel validating tool.

Here’s what the requirements could look like:

Proof of direct contracts with Class I railroads, door and/or ramp agreements. This is the big one. If you don’t have direct railroad relationships, you’re not operating as a true intermodal provider. You’re brokering through someone who does. That distinction is the entire point. And validation is straightforward because railroad contract systems make it easy to confirm.

MC number and registration. Standard, but necessary for baseline verification.

Surety bond. Potentially at a level higher than the current $75,000 minimum that applies to brokers, which, frankly, is a number that hasn’t kept pace with the scale of transactions in this industry and overall inflation.

Proof of insurance. Standard operating requirement, same as the UIIA requires for motor carriers.

Annual revalidation. The certification would need to be renewed, ensuring that providers maintain their standing and their railroad relationships remain active.

The benefits run in multiple directions.

For the intermodal provider, it eliminates the single biggest sales hurdle in the industry. No more explaining what an IMC is and then defending against the “so you’re a broker” objection. The certification does that work before the conversation even starts. Walk in with a validated credential that says: this company has direct Class I railroad contracts and has been verified by the industry’s governing body.

For the shipper, it’s an instant validation tool. Shippers already check dozens of things about their providers. This gives them one more data point, and a meaningful one, to confirm they’re working with a legitimate, railroad-contracted intermodal operator. Not someone who might be brokering loads through another IMC without the direct relationships to manage exceptions, escalate service issues, or control accessorials.

For IANA, it creates a revenue stream through certification and annual revalidation fees while strengthening IANA’s role as the central governing body for intermodal standards. It’s a natural extension of what they already do and could easily be an extension of their membership program already in place.

And there’s an additional benefit that might not be immediately obvious: fraud deterrence. The UIIA’s identification and validation requirements for drayage carriers were never originally designed as fraud prevention tools. But in today’s environment, where cargo theft and identity fraud are escalating across the freight industry, that validation layer has become increasingly valuable. An intermodal provider certification would create a similar trust layer on the commercial side of the equation.

One area of pushback is foreseeable, but that conversation stays open to see if others see it too.

The path forward involves socializing the concept with IANA’s operating committee, engaging key stakeholders across the IMC community, and building the case with railroads and shippers. It won’t happen overnight. But unlike pushing for a new federal operating authority, this is something the industry can build and govern on its own terms.

7. Intermodal’s 5% Market Share

Currently, there are two competing views on how to double intermodal’s market share.

One is to continue down the same path, but through strengthening partnerships, leaning into technology and opening up additional intermodal lane combinations, while the other is a proposed merger between a West and East Coast Class I railroad.

When the moment comes that the opportunity to double, intermodal providers will be the ones on the front lines converting that freight. Yes, the railroads will bring the rail infrastructure and their assets, but ultimately the intermodal providers have to bring the end-to-end solution for the shippers. These companies are in place to manage dray, coordinate service, handle pricing, and own the shipper relationship.

So ask yourself: do you want to walk into those conversations calling yourself a “marketing company”? Do you want to operate under “broker authority” when you’re pitching a shipper on a full-service, door-to-door freight solution that competes directly with their truckload program?

The timing of this conversation is not a coincidence. The industry is approaching a potential inflection point. How we identify ourselves and how we’re classified will shape whether intermodal providers are seen as strategic partners or middlemen in that transition.

8. Where to go from here.

Let’s be realistic about this. Industry naming conventions and certification programs don’t materialize overnight. They require consensus, institutional support, and sustained effort.

Here’s what the next steps look like.

First, the IANA certification concept needs to be socialized. Anne Reinke’s public engagement on the original article was a positive signal. But what matters more is what happens behind the scenes. The concept of an IANA-governed certification for intermodal providers needs to move through IANA’s operating committee and gain support from key stakeholders, including IMCs, railroads, and shippers. The commitment to helping drive that process is there, and others in the industry should voice their support as well.

Second, building the case formally matters. A white paper that lays out the certification concept, its requirements, its benefits to all parties, and its precedent in the UIIA would go a long way toward moving this from a LinkedIn conversation to an industry initiative. The original article and the response it generated provide a strong foundation. The next step is putting it into a format that decision-makers can evaluate and act on.

Third, operators can start now on the naming front. You don’t need permission to stop calling yourself an IMC. If ILC or another term better describes what you do, start using it. In your sales materials. On your website. In how you introduce yourself to shippers. Language adoption in this industry has always been bottom-up as much as top-down. The more providers start presenting themselves as intermodal logistics companies, the faster the market will catch up.

Fourth, the conversation needs to include the right voices. This affects every IMC in the industry, from the largest asset-based providers to the smallest non-asset operators. It affects railroads, who benefit when their channel partners can sell more effectively. It affects drayage carriers, who are already part of the UIIA framework. And it affects shippers, who deserve a clear, verifiable way to evaluate the intermodal providers they’re considering. Getting alignment across those groups is the work ahead.

And fifth, keep the conversation going. The engagement on the original article wasn’t just high. It was substantive. People shared history, challenged assumptions, and offered real alternatives. That’s exactly the kind of discourse this industry needs more of. This article is an attempt to keep that momentum moving forward.

Final words

This started as an article about a name. Three letters. IMC.

But maybe there is more to it that can help our industry grow faster in a time it appears ready to make the leap.

The role hasn’t changed. We still manage dray, coordinate rail, handle exceptions, issue one invoice, and own the outcome. What changed is what the language communicates to the people buying our services.

“Marketing company” made sense when the job was marketing rail capacity to shippers. It doesn’t make sense when the job is operating a full-service, door-to-door logistics solution that competes head to head with truckload.

The name has changed before. Shipper agents became IMA members became IMCs. Every transition happened because the old label stopped serving the mission. We’re there again.

But this time, there’s an opportunity to do more than swap one acronym for another. An IANA-governed certification that validates intermodal providers as legitimate, railroad-contracted operators would give the new name something the old one never had: a verification structure that means something to shippers.

A name tells the market what you call yourself. A certification tells the market what you’ve proven you can do. We need both.

ILC isn’t perfect. Maybe something better surfaces. But the direction is clear: the industry needs a name that signals execution, not intermediation. Logistics, not marketing. It needs a certification framework that separates full-service intermodal providers from traditional brokers. And it has a governing body in IANA that already has the institutional capability and industry trust to make it happen.

Let’s see if this is the next step for intermodal. And let’s build something that makes intermodal easier to sell, easier to buy, and easier to trust.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the The Intermodal podcast as we continue this conversation.

Rick LaGore CEO, InTek Logistics

And yes, the name change was a nothing burger in many people’s minds. Fair enough. The original target name in our rebranding was actually InTek Intermodal, but that got shelved for a couple of reasons: people outside the industry would pigeonhole us as a dray company, and those inside it wouldn’t associate the name with the full scope of intermodal transportation services.

InTek had been evolving toward intermodal starting in 2005. In the years leading up to the rebrand, we secured the final tools needed to fully round out our intermodal transportation services to a point where our door-to-door intermodal services accounted for 95% of revenue.

The old name simply didn’t reflect that reality anymore.

A year in, some people still ask the obvious question: why narrow the brand? Doesn’t putting “Intermodal” in the name box you in? What about everything else you do?

Those are fair questions. And this article is the longer answer.

Because the rebrand didn’t narrow anything. It clarified something. Intermodal is the foundation of everything we do. Every service we offer, every capability we’ve built, exists because of intermodal or in direct support of it. “Logistics” stayed in the name for a reason. It reflects the complementary services that make our intermodal platform complete.

That’s what we’re going to unpack here. Not the branding rationale. The operational one.

At the end of this newsletter, you will understand:

• Why a freight program built around intermodal needs services that go beyond intermodal

• What those services are, how they connect, and when they apply

• How to think about intermodal as a platform, not a point solution, for your supply chain

Original article posted on my LinkedIn page.

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1. We say we’re 95% intermodal. The truth is closer to 100%.

When people ask what we do, the answer is simple: intermodal. That 95% revenue number is accurate and it communicates our focus.

But here’s the part that doesn’t get said loudly enough.

The other 5%? It’s not unrelated work.

• It’s truckload on lanes where intermodal doesn’t fit.

• Transloading at ports and inland facilities.

• Drayage management.

• Cross-border logistics for U.S.-Mexico freight.

• Managed transportation services.

• Even supporting some bulk and consolidation work.

Every one of those services exists because of intermodal. They exist to make intermodal work better, reach further, or serve as the right alternative when a specific shipment or lane falls outside intermodal’s sweet spot.

Thinking about it honestly, we’re not 95% intermodal. We’re 100% intermodal when you count everything we do to support, extend, and complement the intermodal service. That’s what the rebrand was really about.

The best freight programs aren’t built on a single mode. They’re built on a core strategy, supported by the services that make that strategy flexible, resilient, and complete.

2. Why intermodal alone isn’t enough

Intermodal is powerful. On the right lanes, it delivers 10-15% cost savings versus truckload, lower emissions, distinct capacity that doesn’t compete with the truck market, and access to a rail network that bypasses highway congestion.

But intermodal has limits. Those limits have been covered extensively, including my Slam Dunk article, and being honest about them is one of the most important things we can do as an industry.

Here are the realities:

Not every lane fits. Intermodal performs best on lanes over 700 miles between well-positioned ramps. Shorter hauls, fragmented origin-destination pairs, or geographies with poor ramp coverage don’t work.

Not every load fits. Oversized, ultra-time-definite, white-glove, or certain temperature-sensitive freight may need truckload regardless of distance.

Not every timeline fits. Some shipments need next-day or same-day service. Intermodal transit, typically truck-plus-one-day, doesn’t always accommodate that.

Not every supply chain configuration fits. Import freight arriving in ocean containers may need to be transloaded before it can enter the domestic intermodal network. Bulk materials moving in railcars need transfer to trucks for last-mile delivery. Consolidation opportunities exist for smaller shippers that can’t fill a box on their own.

These aren’t failures of intermodal. They’re the natural boundaries of any single mode. And the companies that build the strongest freight programs are the ones that plan for those boundaries.

3. Truckload: the essential complement, not the competitor

Here’s something that might sound odd coming from a CEO who’s spent nearly two decades promoting intermodal.

Truckload is essential.

Not as a replacement for intermodal. But as the mode that fills the gaps where intermodal can’t perform. And every intermodal program has gaps.

At InTek, we provide truckload capacity for our customers specifically in these situations:

Lane gaps. When a shipper’s origin or destination isn’t near an intermodal ramp and the dray distance makes intermodal uneconomical, truckload is the answer. Rather than forcing intermodal on a lane where it won’t perform, we route it by truck and protect the shipper’s service level.

Time-sensitive freight. Rush orders, production emergencies, customer escalations. These happen. And when they do, the shipper needs a provider who can pivot to truckload without starting a new procurement process.

Volume overflow. During peak seasons or demand spikes, intermodal equipment or ramp capacity can tighten. Having truckload as a backup ensures freight keeps moving even when the intermodal network is running hot.

Service recovery. When an intermodal move goes sideways, sometimes the fastest recovery path is to put the next load on a truck while the root cause gets resolved. An IMC that can do this instantly, without the shipper having to call a separate provider, delivers a materially better experience.

The key is that truckload should be offered in the context of the intermodal strategy, not in competition with it. We don’t put freight on trucks to pad volume. We put freight on trucks when it’s the right decision for the shipper. And we’re transparent about when and why.

This is also one of the reasons working with a dedicated intermodal provider who also has truckload capability matters.

If your intermodal provider can’t offer truckload when you need it, you end up managing two separate providers for what should be one coordinated freight program.

4. Drayage: where intermodal service lives or dies

It’s been said before and it bears repeating. Roughly 95% of intermodal service failures that affect shippers can be traced back to drayage, not rail linehaul.

The pickup was late. The appointment was missed. The container wasn’t positioned on time. The chassis had an issue. The empty wasn’t returned fast enough.

Every one of those is a dray problem. And dray is where the IMC’s operational execution either makes intermodal feel truck-like or makes it feel like a multi-party finger-pointing exercise.

At InTek, we manage dray as a core operating function, not a pass-through. That means:

• Selecting and vetting dray carriers at every ramp market we serve

• Scheduling pickups and deliveries to align with ramp cut-off times and shipper appointment windows

• Managing chassis availability and coordinating equipment returns

• Handling exceptions in real time when things don’t go to plan

This level of dray management is what creates the “one call, one contact” truck-like experience.

The shipper doesn’t need to coordinate separately with a dray carrier, a railroad, and an equipment provider. The IMC manages all of it and presents a single, clean service to the shipper.

Drayage isn’t a supporting service to intermodal. It IS intermodal, at least from the shipper’s perspective. And the quality of dray management is the single biggest differentiator between IMCs that deliver on the promise and those that don’t.

5. Transloading: extending intermodal’s reach

Transloading is one of the most powerful ways to make intermodal available in situations where a standard door-to-door move doesn’t work.

Transloading is the connection to the broader ecosystem:

Port-centric transloading converts import freight from ocean containers into 53’ domestic equipment. This plugs international freight into the domestic intermodal network, where service, equipment availability, and pricing are all optimized. It also reduces port dwell, eliminates chassis exposure, and gives the shipper routing flexibility that IPI doesn’t provide.

Domestic transloading extends intermodal’s geographic reach. A shipper whose facility is 100 miles from the nearest ramp can use a transload facility near the ramp as a staging point, getting intermodal economics on the long-haul portion of a move that would otherwise go 100% by truck.

Consolidation transloading gives smaller shippers access to intermodal pricing by combining multiple partial loads into full containers at a transload facility.

In every case, transloading doesn’t replace intermodal. It extends it. And when it’s coordinated by the same IMC managing the intermodal move, the handoffs are clean and the service is predictable.

6. Cross-border intermodal: the U.S.-Mexico opportunity

Freight volumes between the U.S. and Mexico have been growing steadily, driven by nearshoring, manufacturing shifts, and evolving trade patterns. And intermodal is an underutilized option for a lot of that freight.

Cross-border intermodal adds complexity that domestic intermodal doesn’t have:

An IMC that serves cross-border freight needs to manage all of this alongside the standard intermodal service. That means relationships with customs brokers, knowledge of border crossing operations, and the ability to coordinate dray in both U.S. and Mexican markets.

At InTek, we’ve been building our cross-border intermodal capability because it’s one of the most significant growth areas for intermodal over the next decade. Shippers who are currently moving U.S.-Mexico freight 100% by truck should be evaluating which lanes could shift to intermodal, especially on hauls over 700 miles where the rail economics are strongest.

For more on cross-border intermodal, including when it works and when truck still wins, check our InTek blog and the Intermodal Podcast where we’ve covered this topic with industry experts.

7. Small box and ocean container repositioning

Here’s one most shippers don’t know about.

Ocean carriers have a constant challenge: container imbalance. Containers arrive at inland destinations loaded with import freight. Then they need to get back to the port for the next export cycle. Often, there’s no paying export freight to fill them.

That creates an opportunity.

IMCs with ocean carrier relationships can offer shippers domestic capacity on 40’ or 45’ ISO containers that are repositioning back to port. The ocean carrier gets a paid move instead of an empty repo. The shipper gets an often deeply discounted rate. And the freight gets moved on the rail network just like any other intermodal load.

This is sometimes called “small box domestic repositioning” or “ocean container intermodal.” It’s not the right fit for every shipment. The container dimensions are different from standard 53’ domestic equipment, and the routing is directional (generally toward port). But for shippers with freight that fits and flows in the right direction, it can be a significant cost savings opportunity.

This is the kind of creative, intermodal-adjacent solution that you only learn about from a provider whose entire business revolves around intermodal. It’s not something a generalist 3PL typically offers or even knows to recommend.

8. Bulk, railcar, and specialty freight services

Intermodal is the container-on-flatcar (COFC) world. But freight doesn’t always move in containers.

Some industries need bulk railcar service for materials like chemicals, food ingredients, resins, aggregates, or forest products. Those moves use boxcars, tank cars, gondolas, or hopper cars and move on the same railroad network that carries intermodal freight.

The connection to intermodal? Many shippers who use intermodal for their finished goods also need bulk rail service for raw materials or components. If the same provider can coordinate both, the shipper gets:

• Consolidated railroad relationships and contract management

• Aligned scheduling between inbound raw material rail shipments and outbound finished goods intermodal

• Simplified vendor management

• One partner who understands their full freight picture

At InTek, we don’t pretend to be a bulk railroad specialist. But we do support customers who need railcar services coordinated alongside their intermodal program, particularly in scenarios where transloading between railcar and truck is part of the last-mile solution.

9. Managed transportation: putting it all together

For some shippers, the right answer isn’t to buy each service individually. It’s to have one provider manage their entire freight program with intermodal as the strategic foundation.

That’s what managed transportation looks like when it’s built around intermodal:

Routing optimization. Every load gets evaluated for the best mode based on lane, timeline, cost, and service. Intermodal gets first consideration on lanes where it fits. Truckload fills the gaps. The shipper doesn’t have to make the mode decision on every shipment because the routing logic is built into the program.

Carrier management. The managed transportation provider handles railroad contracts, dray carrier relationships, truckload capacity, and transload facility coordination. The shipper deals with one partner.

Performance management. Service metrics, cost analysis, accessorial tracking, and continuous improvement across all modes. One dashboard. One set of KPIs. One review process.

Strategic planning. Network design, seasonal preparation, rate cycle positioning, and technology integration. The managed transportation provider doesn’t just execute. They advise.

When the core of the managed program is intermodal, everything else gets optimized around it. Truckload isn’t competing with intermodal for volume. It’s serving the lanes intermodal can’t. Transloading isn’t an afterthought. It’s planned into the network design. Cross-border isn’t a separate program. It’s integrated.

This is what a complete freight strategy looks like when intermodal is the center of gravity.

10. Temperature-controlled intermodal

Worth mentioning because it’s an area where intermodal is gaining ground but still underutilized.

Refrigerated intermodal uses container-on-flatcar (COFC) reefer equipment to move temperature-sensitive freight by rail. Food, beverage, pharmaceutical, and other perishable goods can move intermodal on lanes where transit times are compatible with product requirements.

The economics are attractive. Reefer truckload rates are significantly higher than dry van rates, which means the intermodal savings percentage is often even larger for temp-controlled freight than for dry.

The challenge is that temperature-controlled intermodal requires:

• Specialized equipment

• Monitoring throughout transit

• Tighter operating discipline at ramps and during dray

• Clear accountability for temperature excursions

Not every IMC offers temp-controlled intermodal. The ones that do need specific equipment relationships, monitoring capability, and operational protocols to ensure product integrity throughout the move.

For food and beverage shippers in particular, this is worth evaluating. The long-haul lanes where reefer intermodal works are often the same lanes where the cost savings are most significant.

11. Thinking about intermodal as a platform, not a product

Here’s the frame to take away from this.

When a shipper evaluates intermodal, the natural tendency is to think about it as a product. A container on a train. A rate per mile. A transit time. And that’s fine as a starting point.

But the shippers who get the most value from intermodal think about it as a platform.

Intermodal is the foundation that sits at the center of a freight strategy. Around it, you build:

• Truckload for lanes and loads that don’t fit intermodal

• Transloading for import freight and geographic extensions

• Drayage management as the operational engine that makes every intermodal move work

• Cross-border logistics for U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada freight

• Ocean container repositioning for directional savings opportunities

• Temp-controlled service for reefer freight on qualifying lanes

• Managed transportation when you want one partner to run the full program

Each of these services exists in service of the core intermodal strategy. They don’t dilute it. They complete it.

And the IMC that can deliver across this ecosystem, or at minimum coordinate it, is the one that turns “we use intermodal sometimes” into “intermodal is how we run our freight program.”

Final words

Intermodal isn’t just a container on a train. It’s the foundation of a freight strategy that gets stronger when the right supporting services are built around it.

Here’s what to take away:

• The best intermodal programs are supported by truckload, transloading, drayage management, cross-border logistics, and other services that extend intermodal’s reach and fill its gaps.

• Truckload isn’t the competitor. It’s the complement. An IMC that can offer both modes in a coordinated strategy delivers better results than forcing every load onto rail.

• Drayage is where intermodal service lives or dies. Managing it as a core function, not a pass-through, is what creates the truck-like experience shippers expect.

• Transloading extends intermodal into import supply chains, geographic gaps, and consolidation opportunities that don’t fit standard door-to-door moves.

• Cross-border, ocean container repositioning, temp-controlled, and bulk services are intermodal-adjacent capabilities that a dedicated IMC can offer or coordinate as part of a complete program.

• When shippers hear “intermodal,” they should know there’s a full ecosystem behind it. The intermodal move is the center of gravity. Everything else orbits around it.

At InTek, this is what we mean when we say we’re 100% about intermodal. Not because every load we move is a container on a train. But because everything we do, from truckload to transloading to managed transportation, is designed to make intermodal the strongest possible foundation for our customers’ supply chains.

That’s been the vision since 2007. And as the intermodal ecosystem continues to evolve, so does our commitment to helping shippers build freight programs that are smarter, more resilient, and more complete.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

Rick LaGore CEO, InTek Logistics

Last July, the IMF (International Monetary Fund) published a working paper called “Trade Partners’ Responses to US Tariffs.” It modeled expected outcomes when the US raises tariffs and outlined three paths trading partners could take in response. Interesting stuff. Bookmarked it and moved on.

Then earlier this month, global container traffic was reported to have set an all-time record in 2025. And the United States was the only major region on the planet where volumes went backwards.

That’s not a forecast. That’s not a model. Those are TEUs through ports.

So the IMF paper came back off the shelf this weekend. And the shifts they modeled are already showing up in the data, faster than most people expected. The predictions aren’t theoretical anymore. They’re actually happening.

The deeper dive was worth it, and worth sharing.

And before jumping into the article, this is not a political piece. The debate over whether tariffs are good or bad policy is for someone else.

These trade flows are our freight flows. And the data tells a story that North American shippers and carriers need to understand and plan around to successfully manage through in the coming months.

At the end of this newsletter, you will understand:

• Where global container volume actually went in 2025 (and where it didn’t)

• Why an IMF working paper predicted this exact divergence before it happened

• What the IMF’s model says about the three paths forward and why only one of them works

Initially published on my LinkedIN page … https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/global-container-volumes-just-hit-all-time-record-us-wasnt-lagore-z0o1c/?trackingId=jXRYMEs5tRIcaEOVgTk5FA%3D%3D

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1. The numbers: a record year for everyone except US

Container Trade Statistics (CTS), the industry’s official source for global container trade data, published its full-year 2025 report. The headline: global container traffic reached 192.9 million TEUs, an all-time record. December alone hit 16.97 million TEUs, capping a year in which eight out of twelve months exceeded 16 million TEUs. That threshold was reached only three times in all of 2024.

John McCown, an independent container shipping analysts in the industry, tracks volumes through the ten largest US ports on a monthly basis. In a recent Transport Topics article, we find his data tells the other side of the story.

US container imports ended 2025 in a four-month slide. December inbound volumes dropped 6.4% year over year to 1.9 million TEUs, following a 5.7% decline the month before. Every single one of the ten largest ports McCown tracks posted year-over-year declines in imports in December. The Port of Los Angeles, the country’s busiest for maritime cargo, saw volumes increase 3.3% in the first half of 2025 and then drop 4.2% in the second half.

And through the first four weeks of 2026, Port of LA volumes are down another 2.2%.

Descartes data tells a similar story. US container imports totaled 2.23 million TEUs in December 2025, finishing the full year 0.4% below 2024 levels. That modest full-year number masks what actually happened: frontloading in the first half inflated the totals, and the second half fell hard once those inventories were in place and tariff impacts took hold.

McCown’s conclusion was direct: the downward turn was due solely to tariffs. And there is nothing at present that suggests it will be short-lived.

Let that sink in. The world set records. We went the other direction.

And here’s the thing that keeps getting missed. We have a habit in this country of measuring ourselves against ourselves. GDP grew. The stock market was up. Container volumes held up okay for the full year. The narrative sounds fine when the only comparison is last year’s version of us.

But when you look outside, the picture changes fast.

Take the stock market. The S&P 500 gained 17.9% in 2025. Most coverage called it a great year. And in isolation, it was. But ranked against more than 60 global stock indexes, the S&P landed in 41st place. South Korea’s KOSPI surged nearly 76%. Spain’s IBEX 35 was up 48%. Japan’s Nikkei 225 gained 28%. Germany’s DAX rose 23%. The UK’s FTSE 100 posted its best year since 2009 at over 21%. China’s CSI 300 was up 21%. The MSCI All Country World ex-USA index, which tracks 46 countries, returned 29.2%, nearly double the S&P.

Now, stock markets and container volumes don’t move in lockstep. They have different drivers. AI spending lifted Asian chipmakers. European defense budgets boosted those indexes. A weakening US dollar made international returns look even better when converted back. The causes are distinct.

But the direction is the same. Capital and commerce are both flowing more aggressively outside the United States than they have in years. The container data shows it in physical goods. The stock market shows it in where investors are placing their bets. Two very different measures, telling the same directional story.

Container volumes are where this matters most for freight. Full-year US imports finished barely below 2024. That sounds stable. But the rest of the world grew to an all-time record of 192.9 million TEUs while we went sideways and then backwards. When you only look inward, you miss what’s forming around you. And what’s forming is a global trade network that is learning to operate without the US at the center of it.

2. Where the volume went

The regional breakdown is where this story really comes into focus.

CTS published its full-year 2025 data by region. Import growth versus 2024:

• Sub-Saharan Africa: up 18%

• South and Central America: up 10%

• Indian Sub-Continent and Middle East: up 9%

• Europe: up 7%

• North America: down 2%

North America was the only region on the planet to post an overall decline in imports for the full year.

To put the progression in context: global container volumes were 172.1 million TEUs in 2022, 173 million in 2023, 184.3 million in 2024, and 192.9 million in 2025. The world kept growing. North America fell off the curve.

On the export side, all regions posted year-to-date growth except North America. The Indian Sub-Continent and Middle East led with exports up 9%, equivalent to an additional 1.2 million TEUs. The Far East increased exports by nearly 7 million TEUs compared with 2024. North America’s exports were flat to negative.

McCown’s monthly data reinforces the pattern. His November comparison showed the divergence in sharper relief: imports into Africa up 25.3%, Middle East and India up 16.4%, Latin America up 14.6%, Europe up 11.3%. North America down 3.9%. Global volume grew 7.2% that month while North America fell nearly 4%.

On the US side specifically, Descartes reported that US container imports from China fell 28% year over year in 2025. China’s share of total US container imports dropped from a peak of 40% in July 2024 to as low as 28.8% by mid-2025, recovering only slightly to 31.7% by December. Southeast Asian origins picked up some of the slack. Indonesia posted 34% import growth to the US. Thailand recorded 28%.

But the broader point is this: the volume that left the US didn’t disappear. It went somewhere else. And CTS just told us exactly where.

Every other region on the planet grew. We shrank.

3. The China-Europe lane tells the diversion story

If you want to see trade diversion in real time, look at the Far East to Europe container lane.

CTS full-year data shows European imports were driven largely by a 9% increase in cargo originating from the Far East. Monthly liftings on that route reached up to 1.8 million TEUs, the highest levels ever recorded on the lane. Europe’s total imports rose by nearly 2 million TEUs for the year while its exports grew by just 15,000 TEUs.

The imbalance is growing fast. The Far East to Europe import-export ratio widened to 3.3 containers inbound for every 1 outbound, up from 2.9 to 1 in 2024. That’s an extra half TEU of imbalance per unit in a single year. More Chinese goods are flowing into Europe than ever before, and the return freight isn’t keeping pace.

Meanwhile, Europe’s exports to the Far East actually declined approximately 8% year to date. So Europe is absorbing significantly more goods from Asia while shipping less back. That’s a structural shift, not a seasonal blip.

Intra-Far East trade also rose 5% year over year and became the single largest trade lane in 2025, more than double the size of the Far East to North America route. That’s worth reading twice. Trade within Asia is now more than double the volume of trade from Asia to North America.

McCown put it plainly: world container supply chains have begun to adapt and reconfigure trading patterns faster than he would have thought, while US volume languishes and declines.

4. The IMF modeled this. Before it happened.

Here’s where this gets interesting.

In July 2025, the International Monetary Fund published a working paper called “Trade Partners’ Responses to US Tariffs” by Lorenzo Rotunno and Michele Ruta. It’s 38 pages of quantitative trade modeling using data from OECD input-output tables across 73 countries and 20 sectors.

The paper modeled US tariff increases announced through April 2, 2025. The average US effective tariff rate moved from roughly 3% to 25% in their model, with significant variation by country and sector. China faced the steepest increases. East Asian exporters like Vietnam and Thailand were close behind. Canada and Mexico, while facing lower rates, were disproportionately exposed because of their structural dependence on the US market.

Here’s what the IMF’s model projected would happen:

US goods imports: decline by 32%. Domestic sales: increase by 15% to substitute for the drop. The domestic share of total US expenditure on goods: rise from 77% to 85%.

China’s real exports to the US: collapse by 70% under the April 2 scenario. Under even higher tariffs modeled in the April 11 scenario, that number hit 88%.

But here’s the key finding: those goods don’t just vanish. They get redirected. The model projected China’s exports to non-US markets would increase by roughly 4% under the April 2 scenario and 6.4% under the higher-tariff April 11 scenario. The biggest increases would show up in exports to the EU, UK, Mexico, and Canada.

Sound familiar? That is exactly what the container volume data just confirmed.

The IMF published this in July. CTS and McCown published the actual volume data in the months that followed. The model and the reality match.

5. Three paths forward. Only one works.

So the IMF nailed the diagnosis. But the paper goes further. It models three possible responses by US trading partners and runs each through the same quantitative framework.

This is where it gets valuable for freight planning.

Response one: Retaliation.

The model assumes tit-for-tat retaliatory tariffs by all countries on US goods at the product level.

Result: US exports decline by up to 49% compared to the pre-tariff baseline. That’s a massive hit. But the model finds retaliation does not result in increased exports for other countries. In fact, exports from countries like Mexico and Canada decline further, as their production gets reoriented toward domestic substitution for US imports.

On welfare, real income for the US drops further. But the retaliating countries don’t come out ahead either. Most trading partners see no net increase in real GDP. Global welfare losses increase.

The mechanism is clear: retaliatory tariffs introduce their own consumption and production distortions. They can offset the terms-of-trade effect, but they also make the retaliating country’s goods more expensive globally.

In freight terms: retaliation doesn’t create new trade. It shrinks the total pie. Less freight volume globally. Not more.

Response two: Subsidies.

The second scenario models countries redirecting subsidies toward sectors most affected by the loss of US market access.

The model finds subsidies are ineffective in offsetting the drop in exports to the US. Domestic subsidies don’t target output sold to any specific destination, and the estimated support levels are small relative to the tariff hikes.

Where subsidies do have an effect is in amplifying the trade diversion already happening. Under this scenario, China’s exports to non-US destinations increase more than under tariffs alone, especially to the EU, Canada, and the UK. The increases concentrate in electronics, textiles, and the broad “other manufacturing” category that includes furniture, precision instruments, and toys.

The paper quantifies it: China’s exports to non-US markets increase by approximately $24 billion in “other manufacturing,” $27 billion in electronics, and $18 billion in textiles and apparel. Those increases are equivalent to roughly 1 to 2 percent of the importing economies’ goods GDP.

But the welfare effects are negative. Subsidies reduce real income for the subsidizing countries, especially China. The paper explains that tariffs reduce demand for targeted products while subsidies increase their supply. That widens the mismatch between global demand and supply.

And the paper warns of a secondary effect: the subsidy-led diversion of Chinese exports could lead importing countries to enact countermeasures like countervailing duties, creating yet another round of trade barriers.

For the freight market: the subsidies scenario means more Chinese goods flowing into non-US markets, more competition for domestic producers in those markets, and a heightened risk of additional trade restrictions. The containers move, but the economics get worse.

Response three: Economic integration.

The third scenario models deeper economic integration through new and enhanced trade agreements. The paper includes deals already signed (EU-Mercosur, UK-CPTPP), those under negotiation (Canada-India, EU-India, EU-Indonesia), and hypothetical agreements (EU-CPTPP, deepening of RCEP, further EU single market integration).

The results are different from the other two options.

Some large RCEP members, including Japan and Korea, see increases in real exports of up to 15%, outweighing the export losses caused by US tariffs. EU integration leads to a projected 10% boost in intra-EU trade. The EU’s external agreements outweigh the export loss to non-EU destinations caused by US tariffs.

On welfare, this is the only scenario where the global picture improves. World real GDP increases by 0.3%, more than offsetting the welfare loss from US tariff increases. Japan, the EU, and smaller East Asian economies see the strongest gains, ranging between 0.5% and 1.2%.

The paper’s conclusion on this point is unambiguous: only policy mixes that include economic integration emerge as increasing world welfare even in the presence of US tariffs.

6. What the container data and the IMF paper tell us together

When you lay the actual volume data alongside the IMF’s modeling, a clear picture forms. The theory and the reality are aligned. And for anyone managing freight, there are practical implications.

Trade flows are shifting, not disappearing. The US lost container volume. The rest of the world gained it. That is not a forecast. It already happened. For intermodal and ocean freight planning, this means mapping alternative flows now. The lanes that are growing are in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America. Those are where the freight is going.

The demand problem for North American freight isn’t going away. None of the three response scenarios modeled by the IMF produce a meaningful uplift in global trade volumes. Retaliation shrinks the pie. Subsidies distort it. Integration grows it, but gradually and over time. This is consistent with what we’ve been saying: freight demand recovery is not a 2026 story. It’s a 2027 story at the earliest, and the tariff environment makes the path slower, not faster.

Canada and Mexico are the most exposed. The IMF paper repeatedly highlights that Canada and Mexico face disproportionate impacts not because of the highest tariff rates, but because of their structural dependence on US market access. For cross-border intermodal and drayage operators, this dependency creates ongoing uncertainty that will keep shippers cautious with inventory positioning.

China’s trade diversion is reshaping the competitive landscape. Full-year CTS data confirmed it: the Far East to Europe lane hit record volumes in 2025. Monthly liftings reached 1.8 million TEUs, never seen before on that route. Europe absorbed nearly 2 million additional TEUs in imports while its exports grew by just 15,000 TEUs. Whether through tariff-driven price advantages or subsidy-enhanced competitiveness, more Chinese goods are flowing into non-US markets. The IMF warns this could trigger countervailing duties and additional trade barriers from the receiving countries, creating yet another layer of uncertainty.

The 2019 parallel holds. I’ve written extensively about how the current tariff environment of 2026 mirrors 2019, when three Fed rate cuts failed to produce a freight recovery because demand headwinds from trade uncertainty were simply too strong. The IMF’s modeling reinforces this. Even under the most optimistic response scenario, the benefits accrue over the medium to long run. There is no quick fix. The National Retail Federation projects US container imports will remain below 2025 levels through at least April 2026, with January down over 10% year over year and March potentially declining nearly 17%. ING economists are projecting global trade growth of just 0.5% to 1% for 2026, compared with 4.2% in 2025. That is not a recovery.

7. What shippers and freight providers should be doing

Map your lane exposure against the actual volume shifts. If your top lanes include origins or destinations tied to US-China trade, you’re operating on a lane that has fundamentally changed. The CTS data gives you the directional signals. Use it.

Monitor trade diversion into non-US markets. If you’re moving freight in or through Europe, the UK, or Canada, watch for increased import competition from redirected Chinese exports. The 3.3:1 import-export imbalance on the Far East to Europe lane means more containers are coming in than going out. That creates repositioning challenges and rate pressure on the return leg.

Don’t count on demand recovery from rate cuts alone. The IMF’s welfare analysis shows that even under aggressive integration scenarios, the benefits are gradual. Monetary policy will not create the demand that moves goods. Manufacturing output, consumer spending, and trade stability will. Watch those indicators, not the Fed.

Treat 2026 as a positioning year. This has been our message at InTek, and both the volume data and the IMF’s work support it. Lock in favorable intermodal rates while they last. Build relationships with providers who understand the lanes that are growing, not just the ones that are shrinking. Use this window to strengthen your network before the next cycle turns.

Final words

Global container volumes hit 192.9 million TEUs in 2025. A record. North America was the only region that went backwards.

The IMF modeled this divergence before it fully materialized. Their paper projected the US moving toward a closed economy, Chinese exports redirecting to Europe and other markets, and trade partners facing three response paths: retaliation, subsidies, or integration. The container data confirmed the shift. The research explains the mechanisms. And only one of the three responses actually improves global welfare.

For freight, the takeaway is this: the demand recovery everyone is waiting for is not coming from tariff adjustments, rate cuts, or government subsidies. It is coming from real economic growth, new trade relationships, and deeper market integration. And that takes years, not quarters.

In the meantime, the freight market will be shaped by trade diversion, shifting lane economics, and persistent uncertainty. The operators and shippers who plan for that reality will be the ones best positioned when the cycle eventually turns.

So, all that was just said, my opinion is the freight volume / demand recovery is less likely to be a 2026 sstory.

Want to go deeper on intermodal and freight market trends?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the InTek Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

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January delivered something unexpected: ISM Manufacturing expanded for the first time in 12 months, jumping to 52.6 from December’s 47.9. New orders surged to their highest level since February 2022. On the surface, that looks like a demand signal.

But consumer confidence collapsed to its lowest level since May 2014. The Expectations Index fell to 65.1, well below the 80 threshold that historically signals recession ahead. And intermodal spot rates? Still flat. Still sitting at December 2019 lows.

This is the tension shippers need to understand heading into spring bid season: manufacturing is showing signs of life, but it’s unclear whether the ISM bounce reflects genuine demand or simply pre-tariff pull-forward and reorder activity after the holidays.

Truckload capacity continues to exit the market at a notable pace, driven by regulatory enforcement around non-domiciled CDLs, English proficiency requirements, and ELD compliance. The LMI’s transportation capacity reading stayed in contraction for the second straight month. Tender rejections hit multi-year highs in January.

Yet for all the supply-side tightening, intermodal rates haven’t moved.

That matters. Because as we’ve said for years: truckload spot rates signal a turn, but intermodal determines whether that turn has real momentum or is just a temporary blip.

Right now, intermodal is not confirming.

Article was published originally on my LinkedIn page.

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Key Market Trends

Intermodal Market Overview: February at a Glance

Intermodal Spot Rates (ex-FSC)~$1.12-1.14/miFlat since Week 11 of 2025; at December 2019 lows

Truckload Spot Rates (DAT, ex-FSC)~$1.68-1.72/miElevated from December highs, moderating post-weather

Diesel Fuel (EIA)$3.69/galStable; EIA projects $3.50 average for 2026

Market Sentiment: Cautious optimism. ISM expansion tempered by consumer confidence collapse

More on Truckload Market Conditions

The truckload market entered 2026 with unusual strength, but that strength requires context.

December’s spot rate surge was driven by a convergence of factors: severe winter storms across the Midwest and Great Lakes, holiday seasonality compressed into a shorter window, and regulatory-driven capacity exits. Tender rejections climbed above 13% in mid-January, the highest level since April 2022.

C.H. Robinson has raised its 2026 truckload spot rate forecast from 6% to 8% year-over-year growth, citing tighter-than-expected capacity. But their analysts are clear: this is supply-side tightening, not demand-side recovery.

The statistical relationship between truckload and intermodal spot rates remains tight at an r-value around 0.90. Historically, when truckload surges without intermodal coming along for the ride, the truckload move almost always proves short-lived.

Post-holiday normalization is taking longer than usual. Rejection rates and spot rates have only modestly eased from mid-January peaks, suggesting capacity continues to exit even as seasonal demand fades. But tender volumes reverted to a baseline roughly 6-7% lower year-over-year after the holidays, confirming that recent tightening is not supported by a broad demand recovery.

From the intermodal side, the story reinforces that this is temporary rather than structural. Intermodal spot rates, excluding fuel, have been flat since Week 11 of 2025. They’ve sat at the December 2019 low for nearly a year. That flatline speaks louder than any truckload spike.

Intermodal Volume Outlook

Intermodal demand remains stable with selective strength:

• Because of bad weather domestic intermodal volumes struggled to start 2026,supported by strong service, although there is a strong 20-30% rate advantage versus truckload in key lanes.

• West Coast outbound intermodal has opportunities, as Southern California enters semi-normal operations post-peak.

• Mode conversion interest surged over the holidays due to tightening over-the-road capacity, a trend continuing through RFPs as shippers target cost savings on longer-haul lanes.

Railroads are maintaining competitive spot pricing aligned with truckload rates, keeping rates steady until truckload markets strengthen more decisively.

Economic Pulse: February 2026

Sources:

Cass Freight Index – Shipments

Cass Freight Index – Expenditures Industrial Production (US)

NAICS 3327 - Machine Shops

ISM Manufacturing PMI

ISM Services PMI Housing Starts (SAAR)

Consumer Confidence Index

Inventory-to-Sales Ratio

Logistics Managers’ Index (LMI)

BLS Nonfarm Payrolls

U. Michigan Consumer Sentiment

Port of LA/LB Volumes

Summary: The macro environment is sending conflicting signals. Manufacturing is showing unexpected strength with the ISM PMI jumping to 52.6, ending a 26-month contraction streak. But consumer sentiment collapsed to levels not seen since 2014, with Americans citing concerns about prices, inflation, tariffs, and labor market conditions.

The ISM report carries an important caveat from Susan Spence, chair of the ISM Manufacturing Business Survey Committee: “Although these are positive signs for the start of the year, they are tempered by commentary citing that January is a reorder month after the holidays, and some buying appears to be to get ahead of expected price increases due to ongoing tariff issues.”

In other words, the manufacturing surge may be more about timing than trend.

Greater Depth Perspective: Consumer confidence’s plunge to 84.5 cannot be ignored. The Conference Board’s chief economist, Dana Peterson, noted that “confidence collapsed in January, as consumer concerns about both the present situation and expectations for the future deepened.” All five components of the index deteriorated, driving the overall index to its lowest level since May 2014, surpassing even its COVID-19 pandemic depths.

References to tariffs and trade, politics, and the labor market rose in January survey responses. This matters for freight because consumer spending drives the goods economy. When consumers are this pessimistic, restocking cycles remain muted regardless of what manufacturing PMIs suggest.

The freight market remains in a position where supply-side tightening is doing most of the work. Demand-side recovery, the ingredient needed for sustained rate improvement, remains elusive.

LMI Deep Dive: January 2026 Data

The January 2026 Logistics Managers’ Index rose 5.4 points to 59.6, the fastest rate of expansion since June. But the details tell a more nuanced story.

1. Overall LMI: 59.6 (up 5.4 from December’s 54.2)

The rebound was driven primarily by “milder restocking” to start the year after December’s historic inventory drawdown. However, the LMI has been below its all-time average of 61.3 for 11 straight months. This is not a return to robust expansion; it’s a normalization from extreme lows.

2. Transportation Capacity: 47.1 (up 10.2 from December’s 36.9)

Transportation capacity remained in contraction for the second consecutive month, though the pace of contraction slowed meaningfully. December’s 36.9 was the lowest reading since October 2021. January’s 47.1 suggests the market is leveling off after contracting quickly during peak season.

SegmentJanuary ReadingInterpretationLarge companies (1,000+ employees)41.5ContractionSmall companies52.5Modest expansionDownstream (retailers)50.0No changeUpstream (manufacturers/wholesalers)45.9Contraction

The capacity reading evolved through the month: 44.1 in the first two weeks of January, moving to near-neutral at 49.3 in the back half. This deceleration suggests the holiday-driven tightness is fading.

3. Transportation Prices: 71.4 (up 4.8 from December’s 66.7)

Transportation prices expanded at the fastest rate since April 2022, the last days of the freight boom. The reading moved into “significant expansion” territory above 70.

The capacity-price spread now stands at 24.3 points (71.4 minus 47.1), still a substantial positive freight inversion, though narrower than December’s 29.8-point gap.

Some of this price surge may be tied to mode-mix shifts away from intermodal to truckload as inventories are again being managed under just-in-time strategies.

4. Transportation Utilization: 58.1 (down 0.1 from December)

Utilization remained stable in expansion territory. Utilization jumped nearly 6 points in the back half of January, likely due to winter storms disrupting networks.

5. Inventory Levels: 53.9 (up 18.8 from December’s all-time low of 35.1)

December marked an all-time low for inventory levels in the nine-year LMI dataset. January’s rebound was expected, but the subdued growth (second-lowest for any January) suggests companies are “running inventories relatively lean to start the year” as carrying costs remain elevated.

SegmentJanuary ReadingInterpretationDownstream (retailers)62.8Restocking brisklyUpstream (manufacturers/wholesalers)47.1Slight contraction

Downstream firms are restocking after the holiday drawdown. Upstream firms are not building inventory aggressively.

6. Inventory Costs: 71.3 (up 8.4 from December)

Inventory costs returned to “significant expansion” territory. This index has recorded significant expansion in 12 of the past 13 months. The message is clear: holding inventory remains expensive.

7. Warehousing Metrics

• Warehousing Capacity: 50.0 (down 11.2), flat growth after December’s expansion

• Warehousing Utilization: 54.4 (up 11.6), rebounding as “firms restocked after the holiday rush”

• Warehousing Prices: 64.8 (down 1.5), continued expansion but at a slower rate

The warehousing utilization index has contracted only twice in its history: November and December 2025. January’s rebound suggests that was “a temporary byproduct of a historic rundown in inventories” rather than a structural shift.

Future Predictions

LMI respondents predict:

• Overall index: 65.3+ one year out

• Transportation Capacity: 42.3 (significant contraction expected)

• Transportation Utilization: 69.0 (robust expansion)

• Transportation Prices: 79.5 (near-significant expansion)

If these predictions hold, it would mark a meaningful shift in transportation markets. The key will be consumer demand holding steady despite potential price increases from tariffs.

Industry Spotlight: UP-NS Merger Application Rejected; Resubmission Pending

The Surface Transportation Board rejected the Union Pacific-Norfolk Southern merger application on January 16, ruling it incomplete.

This was not a rejection of the merger itself. The STB found that the 6,692-page application filed December 19 did not contain certain information required by the board’s merger regulations, including full system impact analyses with market share projections.

All four Class I competitors (BNSF, CN, CPKC, CSX) had filed formal objections on December 30 arguing the application was incomplete. UP and NS filed their defense on January 2, but the STB sided with the objectors.

What happens next:

• UP and NS must file a letter by February 17, 2026 indicating if and when they anticipate refiling

• A revised application must be submitted no later than June 22, 2026

• The companies have not commented publicly but are expected to refile

Congressional attention is building:

Representative Dusty Johnson (R-SD) led 47 House colleagues in a letter to STB Chairman Patrick Fuchs dated February 4, urging a “rigorous and comprehensive review” of any revised application. The letter emphasized potential impacts on agriculture’s ability to move grain to domestic and export markets.

“I am inherently skeptical that consolidation in any market leads to better outcomes for customers,” Johnson stated.

Competitive responses continue:

The merger conversation has already delivered value for shippers. BNSF and CSX announced new coast-to-coast intermodal services, and railroads are accelerating service enhancements and opening additional lanes independent of whether the merger proceeds.

InTek’s Take:

The application rejection creates additional uncertainty but does not fundamentally change the strategic calculus. Shippers should continue mapping their lane portfolios against potential post-merger scenarios while recognizing that the merger timeline has extended. The February 17 letter and any revised application will provide more clarity on whether UP and NS believe they can address the STB’s concerns.

Asset-Based IMC & Provider Updates

J.B. Hunt

J.B. Hunt reported Q4 2025 earnings on January 15, delivering EPS of $1.90 versus $1.53 in the prior year, a 24% improvement. The company cited strong execution and operational excellence despite a challenging market.

Key intermodal metrics:

• Intermodal volume decreased 2% year-over-year in Q4

• Transcontinental network loads down 6%

• Eastern network loads up 5%

• Intermodal operating income up 16% to $135.5 million

CEO Shelley Simpson stated: “As we move into 2026, the freight market feels fragile. Capacity continues to exit the truckload market, and we are testing the elasticity of supply.”

On rail partnerships, Darren Field, EVP and President of Intermodal, noted: “We have a strong brand and service product and offer tremendous value to our rail providers given our scale, technology capabilities, and how we go to market. Our ability to deliver seamless, differentiated service across the entire North American intermodal network is a competitive advantage.”

The company continues conversations with all Class I railroads, including discussions around the UP-NS merger implications. Management emphasized that spring bid season is in early innings and declined to comment on rate expectations.

Schneider National

Schneider reported Q4 2025 earnings on January 29, with results falling short of expectations. Adjusted EPS came in at $0.13 versus consensus of $0.20.

Key intermodal metrics:

• Intermodal revenue (ex-fuel) down 3% to $268 million

• Revenue per order down 5% due to customer rate and freight mix

• Volume growth of 3%, marking seven consecutive quarters of growth

• Intermodal operating income up 5% to $18 million

• Operating ratio improved 50 basis points to 93.3%

CEO Mark Rourke cited “softer than expected market conditions beginning in November, particularly for volume, reflecting a very truncated peak season.”

Notable developments:

• Mexico intermodal volumes grew over 50% year-over-year

• Schneider launched “Fast Track” premium rail service with exceptional service reliability

• Company remains engaged with both Eastern railroads regarding merger-related opportunities

• Leadership transition: Jim Filter will become President and CEO effective July 1, 2026

Schneider guided 2026 adjusted EPS to $0.70-$1.00, assuming supply continues to exit the market due to regulatory enforcement.

Hub Group

Hub Group continues to benefit from what industry observers describe as a “flight to quality” during the freight downturn. The company has emphasized service reliability and customer retention as key differentiators.

What We’re Watching in Q1 2026

• UP-NS February 17 letter indicating intent and timeline for revised merger application

• Spring bid season dynamics as shippers and carriers negotiate 2026 contracts

• ISM Manufacturing follow-through to determine if January’s expansion was genuine or tariff pull-forward

• Consumer spending patterns as confidence sits at decade lows

• Regulatory enforcement pace on non-domiciled CDLs, English proficiency, and ELD compliance

• Import container traffic as Lunar New Year (February 15) affects Asian trade lanes

• Chassis and dray utilization as post-holiday freight normalizes

• Severe weather impacts as La Nina pattern continues across northern U.S.

Freight Market Outlook

Truckload: Supply-side tightening is doing the heavy lifting. Spot rates remain elevated from December highs but are expected to moderate through Q1 as weather effects fade and seasonal demand softens. C.H. Robinson expects rates to trough around $1.60/mi by April before seasonal patterns lift them again. Contract rates are beginning to firm modestly but shipper leverage largely persists.

Intermodal: The 20-30% pricing advantage versus truckload, combined with improved rail service reliability, positions intermodal as one of the most attractive levers for cost and risk management. Railroads are maintaining competitive spot pricing aligned with truckload rates. West Coast outbound lanes offer particular opportunity as shippers revisit intermodal after peak season.

LTL: Stable with selective tightening. Pricing is stable in dense classes (70-85), rising in higher classes above 125, and compressing in heavier lower classes. LTL is likely to lag truckload tightening by several months.

Ocean: Contract rates stabilizing after earlier volatility. Import season winding down post-Lunar New Year. Vessel repositioning and geopolitical risks add volatility.

Air: Weak but steady with ample capacity keeping rates suppressed.

Macro: 2026 continues to resemble 2019 structurally, with tariff uncertainty adding stronger headwinds than Federal Reserve rate cuts can overcome. The ISM manufacturing expansion is notable but requires confirmation over multiple months to signal a genuine demand recovery. Consumer confidence at decade lows suggests caution is warranted.

Intermodal Outlook

Intermodal is positioned to remain one of the most cost-effective, resilient modes as 2026 progresses.

The combination of improved rail service discipline, competitive pricing relative to truckload, and capacity availability creates favorable conditions for shippers willing to commit volume. Railroads are motivated to grow intermodal share, and IMCs with strong execution capabilities are winning business based on service rather than price alone.

For shippers, the most actionable move is to treat Q1 2026 as an opportunity window: firm up intermodal programs while pricing remains favorable, test additional lanes, and position networks to benefit if and when freight demand moves off the bottom later in the year.

Intermodal’s role as a confirmation signal for freight market turns remains unchanged. The fact that intermodal spot rates have not moved despite truckload tightness tells us this is supply-driven, not demand-driven. When intermodal confirms, we’ll know the turn has real momentum.

Until then, disciplined execution and lane-by-lane evaluation remain the right approach.

Final Words

• ISM Manufacturing expanded to 52.6 in January, ending 26 months of contraction, but the bounce may reflect holiday reordering and tariff pull-forward rather than genuine demand recovery.

• Consumer confidence collapsed to 84.5, the lowest since May 2014, with the Expectations Index at 65.1, well below the 80 threshold that historically signals recession ahead.

• Transportation capacity stayed in contraction for the second consecutive month at 47.1, though the pace of contraction slowed meaningfully from December’s 36.9.

• Transportation prices hit 71.4, the highest since April 2022, creating a 24-point positive freight inversion. But this is supply-side driven, not demand-side.

• Intermodal spot rates remain flat at December 2019 lows, now nearly a year without meaningful movement. This is the clearest signal that the truckload tightness is not yet structural.

• UP-NS merger application was rejected as incomplete; resubmission expected by June 22, with February 17 letter indicating intent.

• J.B. Hunt and Schneider both reported Q4 results showing intermodal operating income improvements despite volume softness, highlighting the value of operational excellence in a challenging market.

About This Report

The Monthly Intermodal Shipping Report provides a comprehensive, data-driven snapshot of North American intermodal trends integrating rail network performance, economic indicators, intermodal pricing, and strategic market intelligence for shippers.

If you’d like to contribute insight or suggest topics for future editions, InTek Intermodal welcomes collaboration.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the The Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

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Intermodal Marketing Company.

Say it out loud. Now imagine you’re a shipper who’s never used intermodal before. What does that name tell you?

Marketing. That’s the word that sticks.

Not logistics. Not operations. Not transportation. Marketing.

And that single word has cost our industry countless conversions. It’s a self-inflicted wound we’ve been carrying since the railroads decided they didn’t want to sell direct to shippers back in the 1980s.

I published an earlier version of this piece on my LinkedIn page that received a great deal of feedback, so I took a deeper dive that even includes consideration of not only the name intermodal marketing company, but also the operating authority used by intermodal logistics companies.

At the end of this article, you will understand:

• Why the term “IMC” made sense in 1984 but creates instant confusion today

• How the IMC role has transformed while the name stayed frozen in time

• What shippers actually think when they hear “Intermodal Marketing Company”

• The real conversation that needs to happen in our industry about terminology

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1. Where the name came from

Before I explain why IMC is killing us, I need to explain why it made sense when it was created.

The term “Intermodal Marketing Company” emerged in the early to mid 1980s, right after the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 deregulated U.S. rail pricing and contracts.

Here’s the problem the railroads faced: they wanted to grow intermodal volume, but they did not want to become truckload sales organizations. Running trains was their business. Selling door-to-door freight service to thousands of individual shippers? That wasn’t.

And shippers had their own problem. They didn’t want to buy rail service lane by lane with fragmented billing, dealing with multiple railroads, dray carriers, and equipment providers separately.

IMCs emerged as the bridge.

The name “Marketing Company” was actually accurate at the time. Early IMCs:

• Sold the service

• Bundled rail and dray into one offering

• Took pricing risk

• Issued a single invoice

• Shielded the railroad from shipper service complexity

They were not carriers in the trucking sense. They were not railroads. “Marketing company” described what they did. They marketed rail intermodal capacity as a door-to-door product.

In 1984, that made sense.

It’s not 1984 anymore.

2. The name stayed. The job did not.

Here’s what IMCs did in the 1980s and 1990s:

• Sales-driven focus

• Lane-based approach

• Limited visibility

• Heavy reliance on railroad execution

• Shippers accepted rail variability as the cost of savings

Here’s what IMCs do now:

• Execution-first operations

• Network engineering

• Drayage orchestration across origin and destination

• Exception management

• Real-time visibility, tracking, and analytics

• Security protocols, dwell control, and theft mitigation

• Accessorial management and cost control

Modern IMCs function more like a control tower. A non-asset integrator. A risk manager.

The name stayed. The job did not.

This mismatch is exactly why so many shippers misunderstand IMCs today. We’re using a 40-year-old label to describe a role that has transformed beyond recognition.

3. The five-minute tax

Here’s what happens almost every time I talk to a shipper who’s new to intermodal.

They ask: “Why am I talking to you instead of Union Pacific or BNSF directly?”

Then they ask: “What’s an IMC? You’re just another broker, right?”

Then I spend five minutes explaining what an IMC actually is. That we purchase rail capacity direct from the Class I railroads. That we have contracts, not load boards. That we manage drayage on both ends. That we’re the single point of accountability for the entire move.

Five minutes. Every. Single. Time.

That’s the IMC tax. And it’s killing us.

Anne Reinke, President and CEO of IANA, and I discussed this recently on the Intermodal Logistics Podcast. Her observation was spot on: “If you don’t understand the nomenclature instinctively and you have to explain it and it takes five minutes, you can lose some people that way.”

She’s right. Words matter. And our word is working against us.

4. What shippers actually hear

When a shipper hears “Intermodal Marketing Company,” here’s the mental translation:

“Oh, so you’re the sales and marketing arm. You’re the middleman. You’re not actually doing the logistics. You’re just... marketing.”

And you know what? That interpretation makes perfect sense given the words we chose.

The term was created when railroads wanted companies to perform “sales and marketing” for their intermodal service. That was literally the original job description.

But that was 40 years ago.

Today, a good IMC does so much more:

• Purchases rail capacity direct from all Class I railroads

• Manages origin and destination drayage

• Secures container and chassis capacity

• Handles all customer communication and exception management

• Provides visibility and tracking

• Owns accountability for the entire door-to-door move

• Mitigates accessorial charges

• Delivers a truck-like experience

That’s not marketing. That’s end-to-end transportation management.

But we’re stuck with a name that says otherwise.

5. The broker problem

Here’s where it gets worse.

When shippers hear “marketing company,” many immediately think: broker.

And not in a good way.

I’ve heard it countless times: “Oh, you’re just another broker. If you don’t own the containers, you’re just brokering freight.”

The frustrating part? It’s not true. There’s a meaningful difference between an IMC and a freight broker who happens to move some intermodal.

A true IMC has direct contractual relationships with the Class I railroads. We purchase capacity wholesale. We’re part of the UIIA (Uniform Intermodal Interchange and Facilities Access Agreement) ecosystem. We have committed capacity programs. We’re accountable in ways that a broker running occasional intermodal loads simply isn’t.

But when your name includes the word “marketing,” good luck explaining that distinction, then if you get past that phase of the conversation and you share your operating authority we’re right back where we started from giving them our brokerage authority.

(And if we can ever move past the naming conversation, here's what comes next: operating authority that actually distinguishes an IMC from a truckload broker. Require IANA certification where the Class I railroads certify that the IMC has direct contracts with the railroads to run intermodal. Same model drayage providers already follow with UIIA agreements.)

The industry itself acknowledges this confusion. As we state on our own website: “You are not alone if the definition of an IMC confused you more because there are many shippers confused on the subject topic of an IMC.”

We literally have to tell people it’s okay to be confused. That’s our starting point. That’s the hole we dig ourselves out of before we can even discuss service or pricing.

6. The 53-foot container changed everything (except the name)

Here’s another piece of history that matters.

IMCs existed before 53-foot domestic containers. In the early days, we were selling 40-foot and 48-foot equipment. The service worked, but it wasn’t truly truck-competitive.

The 53-foot domestic container emerged in the early to mid 1990s and became the U.S. standard by the late 1990s and early 2000s. The drivers were truckload compatibility, double-stack rail economics, West Coast long-haul growth, and container pool scale.

Railroads like BNSF and UP invested heavily. Asset-based IMCs like J.B. Hunt and Hub Group accelerated adoption.

Think of it this way:

• IMCs validated the commercial model in the 1980s

• 53-foot containers perfected the product in the 1990s

The success of IMCs proved there was a market for truck-like intermodal. That demand justified railroad investment in equipment that could truly compete with over-the-road.

So the IMC role became even more important. We weren’t just selling a rail alternative anymore. We were selling a legitimate truckload conversion product with comparable dimensions, competitive transit times, and meaningful cost savings.

The job got bigger. The accountability got deeper. The execution requirements got more complex.

And the name? Still “Marketing Company.”

7. Why this matters for market share

Intermodal sits at roughly 5% market share. The industry has been talking about growth for decades. IANA is investing in a multi-year PR campaign to understand what prevents shippers from using intermodal.

You know what one of the barriers might be?

The front door.

If the first conversation with a potential intermodal user requires a five-minute vocabulary lesson, we’re losing people before we can even talk about cost savings, sustainability, or capacity.

Kevin Baxter, my podcast co-host, put it well: “The marketing part has been like a roadblock for me. I do marketing, but I don’t think it describes what an IMC does.”

He’s been covering this industry for years, and even he finds the term inadequate.

Anne Reinke acknowledged this head-on: “How do we educate people who don’t know much about intermodal? The words matter. And so if you don’t understand the nomenclature kind of instinctively and you have to explain it, you can lose some people that way.”

8. What shippers from the truck world expect

Let me paint the picture of a typical shipper we’re trying to convert.

They’ve been shipping truckload for years. They understand that world. They know what an asset carrier is. They know what a broker is. They know the difference.

Now they’re exploring intermodal for the first time. Maybe they’ve heard about the cost savings on long-haul lanes. Maybe they’re under pressure to hit sustainability targets. Maybe they’re looking for capacity alternatives.

They pick up the phone.

And immediately, they’re lost.

“Intermodal Marketing Company? What is that?”

“Are you asset or non-asset?”

“Wait, you’re non-asset but you’re not a broker? I don’t understand.”

“If you don’t own the containers, why wouldn’t I just call the railroad directly?”

These aren’t unreasonable questions. They’re the logical questions anyone would ask when the terminology doesn’t match their mental model of how freight transportation works.

In the truck world, the landscape is clear: you have asset carriers who own trucks, and you have brokers who connect shippers with carriers. Simple.

In our world, we’ve created a category that sounds like neither. And the name we chose makes it sound like we’re in the advertising business.

9. What we actually are

Let me describe what a good IMC actually does, without using industry jargon.

We are the single point of contact for your intermodal freight. When you call us, you’re not calling a marketing department. You’re calling the company that will:

1. Quote your lane

2. Book the container

3. Dispatch the dray driver to pick it up

4. Get it to the rail ramp

5. Track it across the country

6. Dispatch another driver to deliver it

7. Handle every exception along the way

8. Send you one invoice

That’s not marketing. That’s transportation.

We have direct contracts with all the Class I railroads. We’re not going to a spot market. We’re not brokering loads through someone else. We have committed capacity. We have pricing authority. We have direct escalation paths when things go wrong.

The railroads don’t sell direct to most shippers. They never have. They’ve structured their intermodal business to work through IMCs. We’re not an afterthought or a workaround. We’re the designed channel.

But the name “Intermodal Marketing Company” communicates none of that.

10. The naming conversation we need to have

I’ll be honest. I’ve been in this industry for 37 years, and I don’t have a perfect answer for what we should call ourselves.

But I know we need to have the conversation.

Anne Reinke and I discussed this. She’s leading IANA’s effort to understand barriers to intermodal adoption. Part of that work involves surveying BCOs (beneficial cargo owners) who don’t use intermodal to understand why.

I wouldn’t be surprised if terminology comes up.

Some ideas I’ve kicked around:

Intermodal Service Provider (ISP) - Simple, clear, emphasizes service over sales. But ISP is already associated with internet providers.

Intermodal Logistics Provider (ILP) - Puts “logistics” front and center. Might create confusion with 3PLs.

Intermodal Logistics Company (ILC) - Another simple and clear name that puts “logistics” at the center of it all … and it might catch on because we only changed the “M” to “L”.

Intermodal Transportation Company (ITC) - Direct, clear about what we do. Transportation, not marketing.

Rail-Truck Integration Partner - Describes the actual service but might be too long.

None of these are perfect. And changing a 40-year-old industry term is no small undertaking. IANA would need to be involved. The railroads would need to be involved. It would take years.

But the status quo has a cost. Every confused shipper, every five-minute explanation, every “so you’re just a broker” objection represents friction that works against intermodal adoption.

11. What you can do today

Until the industry figures this out, here’s what I do in every first conversation:

I don’t lead with “We’re an IMC.”

Instead, I lead with outcomes.

“We’re your single point of contact for intermodal. We have direct contracts with all the Class I railroads. When you call us, we handle everything from pickup to delivery. One call, one invoice, one company accountable for your freight.”

Then, if they ask what we’re called in industry terms, I explain IMC. But by that point, they already understand what we do. The terminology becomes a footnote, not a stumbling block.

It’s not a perfect solution. But it’s a workaround that acknowledges the problem.

Final words

The term “Intermodal Marketing Company” was coined in the early 1980s as a commercial bridge between railroads and shippers. The name reflected selling, not operating. At the time, it was accurate.

That’s not what we do anymore.

The role has evolved into high-touch execution and risk management. We’re control towers. We’re integrators. We’re the single point of accountability for a complex, multi-party freight movement.

The industry kept the IMC label even though the function outgrew it.

And we’re paying for that every day in confused shippers, lost conversions, and five-minute explanations that shouldn’t be necessary.

I don’t know if we’ll ever change it. Industry terminology has incredible inertia. But I do know this: if we’re serious about growing intermodal market share beyond 5%, we need to look at every barrier to adoption.

The words we use to describe ourselves are one of those barriers.

Anne Reinke and the team at IANA are doing important work to understand what’s holding intermodal back. They’re talking to shippers who use it, shippers who don’t, and everyone in between.

My prediction? The IMC naming problem will show up in that research. Because when you have to spend five minutes explaining what you are before you can explain what you do, you’ve already lost the conversation.

If this article sparked some thinking or healthy debate about how we present ourselves as an industry, then it accomplished its goal.

Want to learn more about intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, or listen to the Intermodal Logistics Podcast where we continue these conversations.

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Subscribe now

Rick LaGore CEO, InTek Logistics

#Intermodal #FreightTransportation #SupplyChain #Logistics #ShippingIndustry #IMC #IntermodalMarketing #FreightLogistics #SupplyChainManagement #Transportation

What I’ll add, is this article isn’t another run at why railroads should merge. It’s also is not a pitch for why intermodal is “the future.” And it’s not a sustainability lecture disguised as logistics advice.

This is about why a freight solution that should be an obvious choice for most shippers … on most long-haul lanes, most of the time … simply isn’t. And what would actually have to change for that to shift.

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I published an earlier version of this piece on my LinkedIn page, and it became my most-read article. It struck a nerve. But it also drew thoughtful pushback, particularly from people who argued I’d underweighted the structural and policy issues that constrain intermodal, independent of how well it’s marketed or productized.

They weren’t wrong.

So this is the fuller version. The one that addresses the network fragmentation problem. The policy distortion problem. And the product and marketing problems I originally focused on.

Because intermodal’s challenges aren’t singular. They’re layered. And fixing one without addressing the others won’t be enough.

At the end of this article, you will understand:

• Why structural network fragmentation limits intermodal’s ceiling … and what the UP-NS merger conversation is really about

• Why truckload’s “simplicity” is partially subsidized simplicity … and how that distorts modal competition

• Why intermodal is still sold as a mode rather than a product … and what a properly designed intermodal offering would look like

• What would actually have to change … for railroads, IMCs, shippers, and policymakers … for intermodal to become the default

Let’s get into it.

1. The math works. So why doesn’t the behavior?

Let me be direct.

Intermodal should be the default choice far more often than it is.

The economics are compelling. On long-haul lanes over 700 miles, intermodal typically delivers 12-15% lower linehaul cost than truckload. When you factor in fuel exposure, rate volatility, and long-term cost trends, the total landed cost advantage often reaches 20%-plus.

The sustainability benefits are real. Rail produces approximately 75% fewer greenhouse gas emissions than trucking on a ton-mile basis. Rail is 25-30x more fuel-efficient than truck. As ESG reporting requirements tighten and Scope 3 emissions come under scrutiny, that advantage becomes financially material.

The capacity diversification is meaningful. Intermodal provides access to a distinct capacity pool that doesn’t move in lockstep with the truckload market. When truck tightens, shippers with established intermodal programs have options. Those without scramble.

And yet, for most shippers, intermodal remains something they evaluate, not something they default to. Even on lanes where it appears to be an obvious fit on paper, organizations hesitate, delay, or walk away altogether.

Why?

The answer isn’t simple. It involves at least three distinct but interconnected problems:

1. A structural problem — network fragmentation that injects friction and unreliability

2. A policy problem — subsidized competition that distorts modal economics

3. A product and marketing problem — intermodal sold as a mode rather than a designed service

Most industry commentary focuses on one of these. The reality is that all three are at play and they reinforce each other.

2. The structural problem: Network fragmentation is real

Let me give credit where it’s due.

When I first published this piece, a reader pushed back thoughtfully. Their core argument: I’d treated intermodal’s failures as primarily product-design or marketing problems, largely independent of network structure. He argued they are not.

They were right … at least partially.

Intermodal’s biggest reliability and confidence gaps are structural. Interline gateways, revenue splits, cross-town transfers, and divided operational control inject fragility that no amount of IMC execution or product packaging can fully overcome.

Here’s what that means in practice:

When a shipment moves on a single railroad from origin to destination, accountability is clear. One railroad owns the linehaul service. One operating plan governs the move. Exceptions get resolved within one system by the IMC, as they tie in their dray capacity at origin and destination.

When a shipment requires interchange between two railroads, which many intermodal lanes do, everything gets harder. Two operating plans. Two sets of priorities. Revenue splits that create misaligned incentives. Cross-town transfers in congested terminals. Handoffs where information gets lost and delays compound.

Single-line service consistently outperforms interline service on the very outcomes shippers care about most: reliability, predictability, accountability, and recovery from disruption. That’s operating reality, not theory.

This is why the UP-NS merger conversation matters.

Whatever you think about the competitive implications, a combined UP-NS network would create the first true single-line transcontinental railroad. That means:

• Fewer interchanges and reduced dwell on coast-to-coast lanes

• Unified operating plans instead of coordinated (but separate) ones

• Clearer accountability when things go wrong

• Potentially 24-48 hours of transit time improvement on select corridors

The merger isn’t a promise to “fix intermodal.” But it represents a structural correction that would reduce friction on lanes that currently require interline coordination.

However … and this is important … structural improvements alone won’t make intermodal the default.

Even with a perfectly unified rail network, intermodal would still struggle if:

• IMCs behave like brokers of disconnected touchpoints rather than accountable service providers

• Accessorials remain unpredictable and poorly managed

• Visibility stays fragmented across dray, rail, and terminal systems

• The offering is often sold as “rail plus dray” rather than a designed product

Network structure sets the ceiling. Product design and execution determine how close you get to it.

3. The policy problem: Truckload’s subsidized simplicity

Here’s something that rarely gets discussed in intermodal advocacy: truckload’s simplicity is partially subsidized simplicity.

Trucks operate on publicly funded infrastructure: highways, bridges, and roads maintained by federal and state governments. The federal fuel tax that funds much of this infrastructure hasn’t been raised since 1993. Meanwhile, road maintenance costs have increased, vehicle miles traveled have grown, and the gap between what trucks pay and what they cost has widened.

Rail, by contrast, must recover its infrastructure costs privately. Railroads own and maintain their own track, bridges, and terminals. They pay property taxes on that infrastructure. They fund capital improvements from operating revenue.

This creates an uneven playing field.

When a shipper compares a truckload rate to an intermodal rate, they’re comparing:

• A truck rate that doesn’t fully reflect the public infrastructure cost it consumes

• An intermodal rate that must cover private infrastructure investment and maintenance

The policy distortion means intermodal has to be significantly cheaper to overcome the structural subsidy baked into truckload pricing. On many lanes, it still is. But the margin is thinner than it should be.

What would change this?

• Updating the federal fuel tax to reflect actual road costs

• Implementing vehicle-miles-traveled fees that capture infrastructure usage more accurately

• Carbon pricing that reflects the true emissions cost of each mode

None of these are imminent. But shippers should understand that when they compare modes, they’re not comparing on a level field.

What also needs to be said is that Class I railroads are intensely focused on operating ratio (OR).

Over the past several years, the railroads have driven OR improvements to increase profitability and generate the margins required to reinvest in their networks.

Critics argue those ORs are already higher than what most trucking companies could ever achieve. Others counter that railroads must run higher ORs than other modes because they fully fund their own infrastructure rather than relying on public dollars.

I’m not taking a position in that debate. The point is simply that OR discipline now sits at the center of how Class I railroads operate and make decisions.

4. The product problem: Intermodal is sold as a mode, not a product

Now we get to what I focused on in the original article and what I still believe is the most addressable problem in the near term.

Intermodal has never been fully designed as a modern, easy-to-adopt logistics service.

It’s been sold as a mode. “Rail plus dray that’s cheaper but maybe a day slower.”

That’s not a compelling product. It’s a spec.

Compare that to how other transportation categories have won share:

Parcel ground: “2-day delivery nationwide, predictable tracking, guaranteed delivery windows, money-back if we miss.”

Rideshare: “Tap the app, car arrives, transparent ETA and price, ratings-based quality, clear accountability.”

Premium truckload: “Dedicated capacity, real-time GPS visibility, driver communication, appointment management, all-in pricing.”

These services won because the experience was easy to use, predictable in execution, and clearly owned from start to finish.

Intermodal, despite its structural advantages, often fails to feel that way.

What shippers actually buy

No shipper is loyal to a mode. They’re loyal to outcomes.

A logistics service becomes a default only when it delivers these things consistently, not occasionally, not “on average,” but in a way that feels dependable day after day:

1. Reliability — It works when I need it to work

2. Simplicity — I don’t have to manage the complexity

3. Visibility — I know where my freight is and when it will arrive

4. Predictable cost — No surprises on the invoice

5. Flexibility — It adapts when my needs change

6. Strategic value — It makes my supply chain better, not just cheaper

Intermodal can deliver all of these. But it often doesn’t — not because the mode is incapable, but because the offering hasn’t been designed to consistently produce these outcomes.

Where intermodal falls short

Reliability feels lane-specific and fragile. Performance varies by lane, by IMC, by railroad, by season. Shippers feel like it’s “good here, terrible there.” One high-profile service failure on a critical lane can shape an organization’s perception for years.

Complexity is visible even when it’s managed well. An intermodal move involves origin dray, ramp-in, rail linehaul, ramp-out, and destination dray. Even if your IMC makes that seamless, the perception is: “More touchpoints, more ways to screw up, more parties to blame each other.”

Accountability can feel unclear. When something goes wrong, who owns the problem? The railroad? The IMC? The dray carrier? The chassis pool? This should never be the shipper’s problem to sort out, but with the wrong IMC, it is.

Visibility remains fragmented. Rail event data exists, but it often isn’t surfaced in the real-time, exception-driven, map-based format shippers expect from premium truckload and parcel networks.

Pricing wins on paper but loses on predictability. The base rate is attractive. But detention, demurrage, storage, chassis fees, lift fees, and per diem can stack quickly. Many shippers have been burned by “great base rate, brutal accessorial reality.”

5. The 4 P’s diagnosis: Product, Price, Place, Promotion

Time for a flashback to my first marketing class at The Ohio State University, where Professor Dr. Roger Blackwell introduced the 4 P’s of marketing.

When you evaluate intermodal through this framework, the gaps become clear.

Product — What exactly are we selling?

Too often, intermodal is sold as: “Rail plus dray that’s cheaper but maybe a day slower.”

That’s a spec, not a product.

What’s missing:

Tiered offerings. Where’s the Basic / Standard / Premium / Guaranteed structure? Parcel has it. Hotels have it. Airlines have it. Intermodal doesn’t.

Industry-specific packages. Where’s the retail-compliance solution? The food and beverage package? The high-value freight program with enhanced security? These exist in pockets, but they’re not productized and marketed.

Bundled solutions. Port-to-DC with customs, dray, transload, and rail under one structured program. These services exist, but they’re often assembled ad-hoc rather than sold as integrated products.

What productized intermodal would look like:

• Published service tiers with explicit commitments (transit windows, on-time guarantees, exception response times)

• Lane-level SLAs, not network-average metrics

• Embedded features sold as part of the product, not buried in operations

• Standardized exception playbooks that define what happens when things go wrong

Price — How we charge and present value

Intermodal has a pricing story problem.

The base rate is almost always cheaper than truckload on qualifying lanes. But shippers worry about:

• Accessorial exposure they can’t predict

• Invoice surprises that blow up budgets

• The complexity of comparing total landed cost

What intermodal could do better:

• All-in pricing bundles within defined parameters, so cost predictability is real

• Lane-level landed cost calculators that show total cost including expected accessorials

• Shared-savings models tied to accessorial reduction and asset utilization

• Transparent accessorial rules so shippers know exactly what triggers charges and how to avoid them

Successful services don’t lead with a list of accessorials. They lead with clear bundles, predictable costs, and optional add-ons that feel like choices rather than hidden penalties.

Place — Where and how intermodal is available

“Place” is about access and availability.

There are lanes where intermodal is a slam dunk. But mid-market shippers may not know they exist, or think they’re “too small” to access intermodal.

Current gaps:

• Many shippers can’t easily self-serve a quote, lane feasibility check, and booking in one place

• Onboarding feels onerous: credit applications, EDI setup, IT alignment, carrier rules

• TMS integration isn’t always simple or standardized, especially for mid-market shippers

• Cross-border and port-to-door services can feel like a black box

What frictionless access would look like:

• Online lane qualification: “Enter your origin and destination, see if intermodal fits”

• API-based quoting and booking that integrates with existing systems

• Standard TMS integrations that don’t require custom development

• Structured 90-day pilot programs with defined success criteria

Promotion — How we tell the story

This is intermodal’s most obvious marketing weakness.

Intermodal is still fighting outdated perceptions: “slow,” “unreliable,” “old economy,” “for the big guys only.”

A lot of intermodal promotion is technical, internal, and rail-centric. It talks about networks, terminals, and trains rather than shipper outcomes.

What’s missing:

• Honest education about when intermodal fits and when it doesn’t

• Case studies showing real results with real metrics

• Total cost of ownership tools that help shippers build the business case

• Role-specific messaging: what operations needs to know vs. finance vs. leadership

What the messaging should be:

Not: “Intermodal is cheap rail.”

But: “Intermodal is high-service long-haul freight with better economics and lower emissions designed around the outcomes shippers actually care about.”

6. Why the IMC matters in the intermodal partnership with the railroad

Here’s something that consistently shows up in industry research: the shipper experience is shaped by the Intermodal Marketing Company (IMC), as they are the customer interface to the intermodal service.

The JOC Intermodal Service Scorecard surveys shippers regularly. The findings are instructive:

• Shippers rated smaller IMCs first and J.B. Hunt second in five of six key performance indicators

• Customer service was ranked most important; price competitiveness was second

• Nearly 85% of shippers were satisfied with their IMCs

• One shipper wrote: “Our IMC communicates well and is a great long-term partner, so while their rates may be a little higher, their service is excellent.”

This makes sense when you understand what an IMC actually does.

An intermodal move is a three-part service: origin dray, railroad linehaul, and destination dray. The railroad handles the middle portion. But the IMC orchestrates everything else — and everything else is where most failures happen.

According to our data, drayage is responsible for approximately 95% of intermodal service failures. Not the railroad. The first and last mile.

That means the IMC’s ability to:

• Manage dray carriers and maintain backup capacity

• Track containers and prevent accessorial charges

• Provide unified visibility across all legs

• Own accountability when problems arise

• Communicate proactively before you have to ask

...determines whether intermodal works for you or doesn’t.

The best IMCs deliver a “truck-like” experience: one call, one contact, one invoice, clear accountability, proactive communication. The worst behave like brokers of disconnected touchpoints, leaving shippers to manage the complexity themselves.

Choose accordingly.

7. The current market context: Why this matters now

We’re in January 2026. Here’s what the freight market looks like:

Truckload has been in a freight recession since July 2022. Spot rates have bounced along the bottom for over two years. Contract rates have compressed. Capacity remains abundant.

Intermodal spot rates have been flat since Week 19 of 2024, sitting at December 2019 lows since Week 11 of 2025. The market hasn’t recovered because demand hasn’t recovered.

The correlation between truckload and intermodal is extremely tight — an r-value around 0.90. Here’s what that means in practice:

• Truckload spot rates signal a turn

• Intermodal determines whether that turn has real momentum

When truckload spikes but intermodal doesn’t follow, the spike is usually temporary driven by weather, holidays, or short-term demand blips. When intermodal follows truckload up, the market is genuinely tightening.

Right now, truckload has seen brief pops without intermodal confirming any sustained recovery. That tells us the market remains soft.

The UP-NS merger is a live conversation. Regulatory review will likely stretch into 2027, but the implications are significant. If approved, it would create the first single-line transcontinental railroad, potentially reshaping intermodal routing, competition, and service on coast-to-coast lanes.

What this means for shippers:

1. Now is a good time to build intermodal into your network. Equipment is available. Service is solid. You can test lanes and optimize before the market turns.
   

2. Shippers who maintain intermodal programs during soft markets are better positioned when capacity tightens. We saw this in 2019-2021. History tends to repeat.
   

3. Don’t assume today’s truckload rates are permanent. They’re cyclical. Building a strategy around bottom-of-market truck rates is risky.

8. What would actually fix this?

If we’re honest about intermodal’s challenges being structural, policy-related, and product-related, then the solutions have to address all three.

What railroads need to do

• Reduce interline friction through better coordination, unified operating plans, or structural consolidation

• Invest in terminal fluidity to reduce dwell and improve turn times

• Provide better data to IMCs and shippers for real-time visibility

• Commit to service consistency rather than optimizing purely for operating ratio

• Facilitate better transitions between dray and their intermodal ramps, which would include flexibility on the accessorials

The UP-NS merger, if approved, would address some of this structurally. But even without consolidation, railroads can improve coordination and service discipline.

What IMCs need to do

• Own accountability end-to-end — no finger-pointing, no “the railroad was late” excuses

• Invest in drayage management — deep carrier relationships, backup capacity, proactive container tracking

• Control accessorials — prevention, not just pass-through billing

• Deliver unified visibility — one dashboard, one timeline, predictive ETAs

• Be honest about fit — tell shippers when intermodal isn’t right, protect the mode’s reputation on lanes where it can win

What shippers need to do

• Evaluate IMCs on service quality, not just price — customer service matters more than rate

• Set realistic expectations — intermodal adds 1-2 days of transit; if that doesn’t work for a lane, use truck

• Choose the right lanes — distance, ramp access, transit flexibility, volume consistency

• Build intermodal into your network strategically — don’t wait until truckload tightens

• Hold IMCs accountable — demand the truck-like experience you deserve

What policymakers need to do

• Update infrastructure funding to reflect actual modal costs

• Consider carbon pricing that accounts for emissions differences between modes

• Ensure merger review balances competition concerns with network efficiency gains

None of the policy changes are imminent. But the industry should advocate for a level playing field.

9. So does intermodal have a service problem or a marketing problem?

The honest answer: it has both. Plus a structural problem. Plus a policy problem. And they all reinforce each other.

If the network is fragmented, service will be inconsistent on interline lanes — regardless of how good the IMC is.

If policy subsidizes truckload, intermodal has to overcome a structural cost disadvantage just to compete.

If service is inconsistent, no amount of marketing can repair the reputation damage. Shippers have long memories.

If service is strong but the value is poorly packaged or poorly explained, adoption remains lower than it should be.

The opportunity is not to choose between these explanations but to address them together.

• Structural improvements raise the ceiling

• Policy corrections level the playing field

• Product design and marketing close the gap between what intermodal can do and what shippers experience

When all three align — when service execution and product design reinforce each other on a more rational competitive playing field — intermodal doesn’t need to be oversold.

It simply becomes trusted.

Final words

Intermodal should be a slam dunk far more often than it is.

Not because of spreadsheets, rate comparisons, or marketing slogans. But because the fundamentals are strong:

• Structural cost advantage on long-haul lanes

• Materially lower carbon footprint

• Access to a distinct capacity pool

• Meaningful network diversification

The challenges are real but addressable:

• Network fragmentation that injects friction → structural improvements and better coordination can help

• Policy distortion that subsidizes truckload → advocacy and eventual reform

• Product and marketing gaps → better IMC execution, productized offerings, honest education

Intermodal becomes a true default only when:

• The network delivers consistent, accountable service

• The product is deliberately designed around shipper outcomes

• The economics are framed in all-in, CFO-ready terms

• The experience is clearly owned, highly visible, and truck-like

• The story is told with the same rigor shippers apply to every other supply chain decision

For Shelli Austin and me, this isn’t a theory exercise. We’ve dedicated our careers to advancing intermodal, not just by talking about its value, but by working to make it a more dependable, repeatable service that shippers can trust day after day.

That focus began in 2007 and it hasn’t changed.

We believe intermodal’s best days are still ahead. But only if the industry which include: railroads, IMCs, shippers, and policymakers continue to challenge itself to raise the bar on structure, service, and education.

If this article sparked new thinking or healthy debate, it accomplished its goal.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

This article is part of a comprehensive series on intermodal strategy:

• When Intermodal Is the Wrong Choice — And What to Use Instead — The 10 situations where other modes win

• Intermodal vs. Truckload: A True Apples-to-Apples Comparison — How to fairly compare the modes

• The Hidden Cost Advantages of Intermodal — Why the savings are bigger than the rate sheet shows

• What Great IMCs Do Differently: A Shipper’s Checklist — How to evaluate providers

• Asset vs. Non-Asset IMCs: What Shippers Need to Know — Understanding the different provider models

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the InTek Intermodal Podcast as we continue this conversation.

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With that in mind, this isn’t another article predicting when rates will turn. It’s not a capacity-focused argument about carrier exits. And it’s definitely not the optimistic “things are about to break loose” forecast you’ve heard a dozen times since July 2022.

This is about what restocking can actually deliver. And why setting expectations too high sets the market up for disappointment.

This is about why a portion of the freight community keeps betting on the wrong horse. And what actually drives durable freight demand.

At the end of this article. you will get a better understanding:

• Why restocking creates activity, not recovery

• The four real drivers of freight demand (and where each stands today)

• What it would actually take to move freight off the bottom in 2026

1. The restocking hope

Every few months, the freight market latches onto the same narrative.

Inventories are lean. Shelves need replenishment. Once companies start restocking, freight volumes will surge and rates will follow.

It sounds logical. Inventories go down, orders go up, trucks get busy.

But here’s the problem: restocking is activity. It is not demand growth.

And that distinction matters more than most freight forecasters want to admit.

2. What Andy Jassy just told us

Amazon’s CEO Andy Jassy said something on CNBC this month that should concern anyone counting on restocking to rescue the freight market.

Amazon and its third-party sellers did massive forward-buying in early 2025 to get ahead of tariff costs. That inventory buffer? Much of it ran out during the holiday season.

He went on to say that tariffs are now creeping into prices. Some sellers are passing costs to consumers. Others are absorbing them to drive demand. Most are doing something in between.

This is the moment when the “pre-tariff inventory cushion” disappears. The stockpile that shielded consumer prices for most of 2025 is gone.

What comes next is not a restocking boom. It is cautious replacement buying at higher landed costs.

Jassy put it simply: retail runs on mid-single-digit operating margins. If input costs rise 10%, there are not many places to absorb that. You either raise prices or squeeze demand. Neither outcome is bullish for freight volume.

3. Restocking is replacement, not growth

Here is the key point the freight market keeps missing.

Restocking happens when inventories fall below operating minimums. It creates replacement freight. It does not create growth freight.

What restocking does well:

• Triggers import orders after inventory drawdowns

• Creates short-term volume bursts

• Tightens capacity temporarily

• Can lift spot rates briefly

What restocking does not do:

• Create ongoing freight growth

• Support long-term rate expansion

• Absorb excess capacity for multiple quarters

• Signal a healthy, sustained recovery

This is why restocking-driven freight cycles feel choppy. You get movement without momentum. Bursts followed by air pockets. Rate pops that fade before carriers can rebuild margins.

A good rule of thumb: restocking fixes inventory problems. It does not fix demand problems.

4. The four real drivers of freight demand

If restocking is not the answer, what is?

There are four primary drivers of durable freight demand. Everything else is noise.

1. End-consumer demand for goods

This is the big one.

Freight grows when consumers buy more stuff. Consistently. Not when retailers rebalance inventory.

Key signals to watch:

• Real wage growth

• Unit retail sales (not just dollar sales inflated by price increases)

• Household formation

• Consumer confidence

Right now, consumption is holding up but not accelerating. C.H. Robinson’s latest analysis shows domestic demand growth decelerated from 3% in 2024 to just 1.5% in Q1 2025 and 1.1% in Q2 2025. Consumers are spending, but not splurging. And they are favoring services over goods, which means less physical product moving through supply chains.

That caps freight upside even if inventories need replenishing.

2. Industrial production and manufacturing output

Manufacturing drives:

• Raw materials movement

• Intermediate goods flow

• Repetitive freight cycles

Manufacturing-led freight growth is sticky and predictable. It creates baseload demand that carriers can build networks around.

It is also currently weak.

The ISM Manufacturing PMI registered 47.9% in December 2025. That is the 10th consecutive month of contraction. The lowest reading of the year. New orders have contracted for four straight months. Employment has been in contraction for 18 of the last 19 months.

December data showed 85% of manufacturing GDP was in contraction. Up from 58% the previous month.

Without an industrial rebound, freight lacks a stable base load.

3. Housing and construction

Housing is one of the most freight-intensive sectors in the economy.

Every new home represents multiple truckloads. Building materials. Appliances. Furniture. Fixtures. Landscaping supplies. The ripple effect is enormous.

When housing turns:

• Flatbed demand rises

• Intermodal improves

• LTL strengthens

• Warehouse throughput increases

But housing is not turning. Not yet.

Existing home sales in 2025 hit a 30-year low. Just 4.06 million units. The fourth consecutive year of slump. Housing starts in October 2025 were down 7.8% year-over-year. New home inventory sits at 9.8 months of supply, a level historically associated with recessions.

The problem is lock-in. Nearly 69% of mortgage holders have rates below 5%. More than half are below 4%. Current mortgage rates around 6% are not enough to unlock mobility. People are staying put. And when people do not move, the freight that flows from housing transactions does not happen.

Housing is a potential 2026 tailwind. But it is not yet a driver.

4. Trade and policy stability

Freight hates uncertainty.

Tariffs, trade disputes, and shifting policy create two effects:

• Pull freight forward temporarily (as importers rush to beat deadlines)

• Suppress long-term ordering confidence (as businesses wait for clarity)

This produces freight spikes followed by air pockets. That is not healthy demand.

We have seen this movie before. In 2019, the Fed cut rates three times. Freight did not recover. Because tariff uncertainty and industrial softness overwhelmed the easing. Lower borrowing costs could not offset the demand drag from trade policy chaos.

The same dynamic is playing out now. Only larger. In 2019, the trade war was primarily with one country. Today, tariffs touch virtually every major trading partner at higher levels.

To put it plainly: higher prices mean less demand, and less demand means less freight.

5. Where we stand on each driver

Let’s be honest about the current state of each demand driver.

Consumer goods demand: Holding but not growing. Services outpacing goods. Spending resilient among higher-income households but weakening elsewhere. Tariff-driven price increases starting to bite.

Manufacturing: Contracting for 10 consecutive months. New orders weak. Employment declining. 85% of manufacturing GDP in contraction as of December 2025.

Housing: At 30-year lows. Lock-in effect keeping homeowners in place. Mortgage rates not low enough to stimulate activity. Starts and permits both down year-over-year.

Trade stability: Tariff uncertainty at elevated levels. Supreme Court review of IEEPA tariff authority creating policy limbo. Businesses cautious about long-term ordering commitments.

None of the four primary demand drivers are firing. That is the structural problem no amount of restocking can solve.

6. The data confirms the disconnect

The Cass Freight Index tells the story clearly.

December 2025 shipments fell 7.5% year-over-year. The index is tracked a 6.1% decline for full-year 2025. This follows a 5.5% decline in 2023 and a 4.1% decline in 2024.

Three consecutive years of volume contraction.

Meanwhile, the Cass Truckload Linehaul Index is up about 2.1% year-over-year. Rates are firming slightly. But shipments are still falling.

This is the classic late-cycle pattern: rates improve on capacity attrition, not demand recovery. Carriers exit. Trucks come off the road. The supply-demand balance tightens. Rates tick up. But there is no volume growth underneath it.

This is a rate story. It is not a volume story. And rates without volumes do not make a healthy freight market.

As I have said before: $100 a mile times zero miles is still zero.

7. What the inventory data actually shows

The inventory picture is more nuanced than the “lean inventories mean restocking boom” narrative suggests.

Total business inventory-to-sales ratio: 1.38 as of October 2025. Down from 1.41 a year ago. But not dramatically lean by historical standards.

Retail inventory-to-sales ratio: 1.29. Significantly below the 10-year average of 1.43. This is where restocking hopes get traction.

Manufacturing inventory-to-sales ratio: 1.56. Elevated. Manufacturers are sitting on stock amid tariff uncertainty and soft demand.

What this means: Retailers are lean. They may need to reorder. But manufacturers are already holding excess inventory that is not moving. The pipeline is not empty. It is backed up.

Restocking at the retail level runs into manufacturing overstocks upstream. That limits the freight multiplier effect.

8. What 2019 taught us (that we keep forgetting)

The 2019 freight recession is the cleanest parallel for 2026.

In 2019:

• The Fed cut rates three times (July, September, October)

• Housing responded. Mortgage rates fell. Home sales improved.

• Freight did not respond. Volumes stayed soft. Rates remained under pressure.

Why? Because tariff uncertainty and industrial weakness were stronger headwinds than lower borrowing costs were tailwinds.

The same dynamic is setting up for 2026.

Rate cuts are probably going to happen. Whether long-term rates decrease is questionable based on how we’ve seen the long end of the curve react to the recent cuts.

With that said, housing may improve. But if manufacturing stays in contraction, if tariff policy remains chaotic, if consumers shift further toward services, freight will not recover in a meaningful way.

But what about tax relief?

Some will argue the Big Beautiful Bill changes everything. That tax relief will be the catalyst that rate cuts alone could not deliver in 2019.

I understand the logic:

• More money in consumer pockets

• Lower corporate tax burdens

• Investment incentives that spur capital spending

But here is the problem with that argument.

The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was one of the largest tax overhauls in decades. It juiced corporate investment and helped fuel the 2018 freight boom. Yet it did not prevent the 2019 freight recession. Tax relief was already in place. It was not enough to overcome tariff drag and manufacturing weakness.

Tax policy works on a lag. Legislation has to pass. Implementation takes time. Behavioral changes in spending and investment follow months later. Even in an optimistic scenario, meaningful economic lift from new tax relief would not hit until late 2026 at the earliest.

And tax relief does not neutralize tariffs. It may offset some of the margin pressure for businesses. It may put dollars back in consumer wallets. But it does not:

• Reduce the landed cost of imported goods

• Restart factory orders paused due to trade uncertainty

• Unlock housing mobility for homeowners locked into sub-4% mortgages

• Create new consumer demand for goods over services

Tax cuts can help at the margins. They are not a freight demand switch.

The lesson from 2019: monetary policy could not manufacture demand that was not there. Fiscal policy faces the same limits.

9. What would actually move the needle

For freight demand to strengthen in a real way, at least two of these must happen together:

1. Sustained consumer unit growth. Not dollar sales inflated by higher prices. Actual unit volume increases in goods categories.

2. Manufacturing expansion. ISM Manufacturing PMI above 50 for multiple consecutive months. New orders growing. Employment stabilizing.

3. Housing acceleration. Existing home sales moving off 30-year lows. Housing starts increasing. Mortgage rate relief unlocking mobility.

4. Policy clarity. Tariff uncertainty resolved enough for businesses to commit to longer-term ordering patterns.

Restocking alone cannot carry the market. If only restocking occurs, expect:

• Short-term tightness

• Rate noise

• False recovery signals

• Continued shipper caution

10. What this means for shippers and carriers

For shippers:

Design freight around efficiency, not growth. Assume volatility, not smooth recovery. Optimize mode mix and inventory velocity. Use intermodal where it fits. Lock in capacity relationships now while leverage exists.

For carriers and IMCs:

Avoid pricing for a recovery that may not arrive. Focus on service reliability and cost control. Expect competition to remain intense. The carriers that survive this cycle will be the ones who did not bet the business on a demand surge that never came.

For everyone:

Watch the demand indicators, not just the rate indicators. Cass shipments. ISM Manufacturing PMI. Housing starts. Consumer goods spending by unit volume. These tell you whether freight is actually recovering or just going through inventory-driven gyrations.

11. Where intermodal fits in this picture

Intermodal is a tell.

In real recoveries, intermodal rail responds to sustained demand shifts. Intermodal pricing firms alongside truckload.

In inventory-led cycles, intermodal lags. The demand is not broad enough or durable enough to justify modal shifts.

Right now, intermodal spot rates (excluding fuel) have been flat since Week 19 of 2024. They have sat at December 2019 lows since Week 11 of 2025. InTek’s own data shows no confirmation of a turn.

The statistical relationship between truckload and intermodal spot rates sits around 0.90. They move together. When truckload surges without intermodal coming along, the truckload move almost always proves short-lived.

Truckload signals a turn. Intermodal determines whether that turn has real momentum or is just a temporary blip.

So far, intermodal is not confirming anything.

Final words

Restocking will move freight. It will not heal the freight market.

Durable freight demand comes from people buying more goods, factories producing more output, and houses being built and sold. Until those drivers turn together, 2026 risks being another year that feels active but underwhelming.

Busy does not mean healthy.

The freight industry has been waiting for a catalyst since the market turned in July 2022. Restocking is not that catalyst. It is a symptom of lean inventory management, not a sign of demand recovery.

If you are planning for 2026, do not plan for a boom. Plan for continued grinding. Plan for volatility. Plan for a market that stays active at times but structurally weak.

And watch the four real demand drivers. When they turn, freight will turn with them. Until then, restocking is just noise.

Want to go deeper on freight market dynamics?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the InTek Intermodal podcast as we continue tracking what actually moves freight.

While many will view the speech made by Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos through a political lens, I thought there was a lot said that could impact logistics and supply chain professionals across the globe.

For that reason, I wanted to summarize his points and amplify the logistics and supply chain aspects of the speech for those of us in the space to help with our strategic and tactical planning.

Carney used a story from Václav Havel to make a point that hits freight operators harder than any tariff announcement.

This isn’t geopolitics for its own sake. This is the clearest articulation I’ve heard of why the trade system we built our supply chains around is changing rapidly before our eyes.

By the end of this article, you will understand:

• The eight key points from Carney’s Davos speech

• What each one means for supply chains and freight flows

YouTube Link to the Davos Speech

The speech: key points

1. The rules-based order is effectively over

Carney argued we are not in a gradual transition, but a rupture. The idea that a neutral, rules-based international system constrains power is now largely fiction. Great powers increasingly use tariffs, finance, and supply chains as weapons, not as tools of mutual benefit.

He quoted Thucydides: “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”

What this means for freight:

Trade policy is no longer about lowest landed cost. It’s about reducing exposure to coercion. Expect more regional trade blocs, not global liberalization. Trade deals will increasingly bundle security, critical minerals, energy, and data together. Trade lanes become more politically stable but less globally efficient. Freight demand spreads across more corridors rather than concentrating in the cheapest one.

2. Compliance no longer buys safety

Drawing on Václav Havel’s essay “The Power of the Powerless,” Carney described how systems persist because participants perform belief in them even when they know they are false.

His example: a greengrocer who places a sign in his window every morning (”Workers of the world unite”) not because he believes it, but to avoid trouble. Everyone does the same. The system persists through participation in rituals everyone privately knows to be false.

Countries have continued to “put the sign in the window” by praising the rules-based order despite knowing it was selectively enforced. That bargain worked under U.S. hegemony. It no longer does.

What this means for freight:

Stop planning as if the old system still protects you. Companies that keep optimizing for a world of stable trade rules will find themselves increasingly vulnerable. Diversification is not optional. It’s the foundation of a resilient supply chain.

3. Economic integration has flipped from asset to vulnerability

Globalization once reduced risk. Now it often creates leverage for coercion. Financial infrastructure, trade rules, and supply chains are increasingly used to pressure weaker states.

As a result, countries are pursuing strategic autonomy in food, energy, minerals, defense, and finance. Carney acknowledged this is rational but warned a world of national fortresses will be poorer, more fragile, and less sustainable.

What this means for freight:

“Just-in-time” becomes “just-in-case.” Companies design supply chains to survive disruption, not optimize spreadsheets. This means more regional supply chains (North America, Europe, Indo-Pacific), higher inventory buffers in politically sensitive categories, more frequent restocking cycles with smaller batch sizes, and more duplication of sourcing (”China plus two” instead of “China plus nothing”).

Fewer mega-surges tied to single sourcing regions. More steady, choppy freight demand. Especially inland.

4. Middle powers face a structural disadvantage

Great powers can afford unilateralism. They have the market size, military capacity, and leverage to dictate terms. Middle powers do not.

When negotiating alone with hegemons, middle powers accept terms from a position of weakness. That is not real sovereignty. Carney called it “the performance of sovereignty while accepting subordination.”

The core strategic choice: compete with each other for favor from great powers, or combine to create leverage collectively.

What this means for freight:

Expect more South-South and middle-power trade lanes. New corridors emerge that bypass traditional hubs. Less dependence on any single country or port complex. Freight patterns look messier but more durable.

If you’re not diversified, you’re exposed. That applies to shippers and carriers.

5. Canada’s response: “value-based realism”

Canada’s strategy is framed as principled and pragmatic. Defend core values like sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights, while accepting that not all partners will share them.

This includes:

• Cutting taxes on incomes, capital gains, and business investment

• Removing all federal barriers to interprovincial trade

• Fast-tracking $1 trillion in investments in energy, AI, critical minerals, and new trade corridors

• Doubling defense spending by the end of the decade

• Signing 12 trade and security deals on four continents in six months

• Pursuing free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines, and Mercosur

• Working to build a bridge between the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European Union

Strength at home is presented as the prerequisite for principled foreign policy abroad.

What this means for freight:

New corridors. New trade lanes. New infrastructure bypassing traditional hubs.

Canada is positioning itself as a hub for energy, critical minerals, and capital. Watch for increased freight activity in Canadian corridors and cross-border lanes that skip traditional U.S. gateways altogether.

And while Carney was speaking about Canada’s direction. He called countries like his “the middle” and encouraged them all to adopt what he termed “value-based realism.” Translation: the middle powers are aligning. They’re building their own networks. And those networks won’t necessarily flow through U.S. ports.

The data already reflects this. Global TEU volumes increased in 2025 compared to 2024. But U.S. TEU volumes? Down.

That divergence tells you something. The world’s freight is still moving. It’s just not all moving through us anymore.

6. Coalitions over institutions

Rather than relying on weakened multilateral institutions, Canada is pursuing issue-specific coalitions. Different partners for different problems. Ukraine, Arctic security, NATO, AI governance, critical minerals, and trade each get their own geometry.

This is not idealism. It is practical risk management.

What this means for freight:

Supply chains become tools of statecraft. Governments influence where capacity gets built and how it’s financed. Defense and energy corridors get priority capacity. Commercial freight competes with strategic freight for rail, port, and labor resources.

Capacity tightens unevenly by corridor. Pricing becomes more lane-specific and less nationally uniform. Long-term contracts matter more than spot exposure. Policy risk shows up directly in logistics decisions.

7. Living “in truth” means abandoning comforting language

Carney called for explicitly dropping outdated language. Stop pretending the rules-based order functions as advertised. Name the reality. Apply standards consistently to allies and rivals. Build institutions that actually work, not ones that sound good.

Economic diversification is framed not just as prudence but as the foundation of honest foreign policy.

What this means for freight:

Stop invoking “supply chain normalization” as though we’re returning to “the good ole’ days”. We’re not. The old playbook of optimizing for lowest landed cost in a stable trade environment is over. Companies that recognize this will build supply chains for the new world. Companies that keep the sign in the window will find themselves increasingly vulnerable.

8. Canada’s leverage comes from real assets

Canada’s relevance is grounded in assets others need:

• Energy (one of the world’s largest reserves)

• Critical minerals

• Capital (among the world’s largest and most sophisticated pension funds)

• Human talent (most educated population in the world)

Middle powers with real economic inputs can shape outcomes, but only if they stop pretending the old system still protects them.

What this means for freight:

Watch Canada. Energy, critical minerals, and capital flows will drive freight demand in ways that don’t follow traditional patterns. Cross-border freight between the U.S. and Canada will evolve as Canada diversifies its relationships. New trade lanes to Europe, Asia, and Latin America will create freight opportunities outside the traditional U.S.-centric hub model.

Again, while the Prime Minister was talking about Canada he was using it as a template for those other in “the middle” to consider and adopt.

What this means for freight in 2026

The world is not de-globalizing. It’s re-wiring.

Freight growth shifts from explosive cycles to structural demand with lower highs. Resilience-driven restocking is smaller, more frequent, and more localized.

That means:

• More freight events

• Lower peak volumes

• Longer recovery timelines

The winners in this environment:

• Trucking for flexibility

• Intermodal for cost and capacity stability on long-haul lanes

• Diversified routing and mode strategies

• Operators who understand that the rules have changed

Characteristics of companies that will fall back in the new market:

• Companies still optimizing for a world that no longer exists

• Operators with concentrated exposure to single corridors or trade partners

• Anyone waiting for the old normal to return

Final words

The greengrocer who keeps the sign in the window avoids trouble in the short term. But he also participates in his own subordination.

Carney’s message to Davos was clear: it’s time to take the sign down.

For supply chain leaders, that means:

• Stop planning as if the rules-based order still functions

• Build resilience, not just efficiency

• Diversify trade lanes and sourcing

• Accept that freight patterns will be messier but more durable

• Understand that geopolitics is now logistics

The rules-based order was always partially fiction. But it was useful fiction. It allowed us to build global supply chains optimized for efficiency.

That fiction no longer holds.

It’s time to adapt.

Want to go deeper on freight market dynamics?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the InTek Intermodal podcast as we continue tracking what actually moves freight.

Introduction

January 2026 opens with the freight market sending its loudest mixed signals in years.

On one hand, the December LMI delivered the strongest transportation readings since early 2022. Transportation Capacity plunged into contraction at 36.9. Transportation Prices hit 66.7. The 29.8-point positive freight inversion was the largest in nearly three years.

On the other hand, intermodal spot rates haven’t budged. They’re still sitting at December 2019 lows.

That disconnect tells you everything you need to know about where we are in this cycle.

Intermodal continues to offer a compelling value proposition through steady pricing and improved service reliability. Rail service is entering its second straight year of “excellent” performance. The spread versus truckload remains attractive at 12-15%. And the competitive reshuffling triggered by the UP-NS merger is creating new lane options that didn’t exist six months ago.

But the underlying demand picture hasn’t changed. Manufacturing is in its 10th consecutive month of contraction. Consumer confidence remains 25% below January 2025 levels. Tariff uncertainty continues to suppress inventory strategies.

The December transportation tightness was real. But it was seasonal, not structural.

For shippers, the most actionable move remains the same: treat 2026 as a strategic build year. Lock in intermodal capacity while pricing is favorable. Pressure-test routing options. Position networks to benefit when freight demand finally moves off the bottom.

Key Market Trends

Intermodal Market Overview — December at a Glance

• Intermodal Spot Rates (ex-FSC): ~$1.12–1.14/mi has intermodal spot rates still sitting at the bottom of the cycle, which has been incredibly stable in this range since Week 11 of 2025. Rates are now at December 2019 lows. (InTek Spot Rate Index)

• Truckload Spot Rates (DAT, ex-FSC): ~$1.68–1.72/mi with December holiday-driven pressure that has begun easing into January. Tender rejections spiked above 13% nationally in mid-December before moderating.

• Diesel Fuel (EIA): $3.48/gal as of Week 1 of January, essentially flat year-over-year after 10 consecutive weeks of decline through year-end. EIA projects an average of $3.50/gal for 2026, down 7% from 2025.

• Market Sentiment: Cautiously optimistic but measured. December’s transportation metrics improved meaningfully, but driven by seasonal dynamics and historic inventory drawdowns rather than structural demand recovery. The holiday effect is now washing out.
  

More on Truckload Spot Market Pressure

December’s truckload spike caught everyone’s attention.

Tender rejections jumped above 13% nationally, the highest since April 2022. The DAT load-to-truck ratio hit 9.9-to-1 in early December, the highest of the current down cycle. Spot rates surged 8% in the weeks leading up to Christmas.

But context matters. This was a compressed holiday window with severe weather, the final push of historic inventory levels downstream to consumers, and carriers briefly gaining pricing power.

From the intermodal side, the story is different. Intermodal spot rates, excluding fuel, have been flat since Week 19 of 2024. They’ve sat at December 2019 lows since Week 11 of 2025. That’s 40+ weeks of flatline.

The statistical relationship between truckload and intermodal spot rates runs around a 0.90 r-value. Historically, when truckload surges without intermodal coming along for the ride, the truckload move almost always proves short-lived.

Truckload buys move faster than intermodal buys, so TL reacts immediately to short-term demand peaks. But unless intermodal confirms the move, the turn typically fades once the temporary demand surge burns off.

If anything, the statistical side reinforces what we have said for years:

• Truckload spot rates signal a turn.

• Intermodal determines whether that turn has real momentum or is just a temporary blip.

Right now, intermodal is not confirming. We expect the December truckload pressure to continue cooling through January as holiday volumes fade and the underlying demand weakness reasserts itself.

Intermodal Volume Outlook & Historical Context

Weekly AAR data through November-December reflect a muted peak season. Intermodal rail shipments fell 3% year-over-year in October per the Association of American Railroads, and that softness continued through November.

Much of the weakness reflects an early-year import surge tied to tariff concerns, which pulled forward demand that would normally appear later in the year.

Shipper takeaway: With rates at cycle lows and rail reliability entering its second consecutive year of “excellent” service, now remains an opportune moment to formalize 2026 intermodal strategies. Don’t wait for a demand recovery to lock in capacity.

Economic Pulse — January 2026

Key Freight-Economic Leading Indicators

• Cass Freight Index – Shipments

• Cass Freight Index – Expenditures

• Industrial Production (YoY)

• NAICS 3327 – Machine Shops

• ISM Manufacturing PMI

• ISM Services PMI

• Housing Starts (SAAR)

• Consumer Confidence Index

• Inventory-to-Sales Ratio

• Logistics Managers’ Index

• BLS Nonfarm Payroll

• ADP Payroll

• U of M Consumer Sentiment

• Port of LA/LB Volumes

Summary: The macro environment continues to signal “bottoming, not rebounding.” Manufacturing, freight-sensitive services, housing, and labor all point toward a slow-grind recovery rather than a sharp upturn.

The December ISM Manufacturing PMI fell to 47.9, the lowest reading of 2025 and the 10th consecutive month of contraction. New orders, production, and employment all remain in contraction territory. Susan Spence, Chair of the ISM Manufacturing Committee, put it plainly: “The manufacturing sector is sick.”

Consumer spending was robust through the holiday season. Mastercard and Visa both reported 3.9-4.2% increases year-over-year. But a significant portion was debt-financed. LendingTree reports 37% of Americans used debt for holiday shopping, averaging $1,223 per person, up from 2024.

The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index fell to 89.1 in December. The Expectations Index has tracked below 80 for 11 consecutive months, a threshold that historically signals recession ahead. The “Family Expected Financial Situation” component turned negative for the first time since July 2022.

Net message: Demand headwinds persist, inventory overhangs and tariffs are slowing restocking, and any freight recovery in 2026 is likely to be gradual and uneven. More likely a late-2026 or 2027 story. The wildcard in all this is whether or not the Supreme rules the Administration illegally instituted tariffs.

Greater Depth Perspective: As I’ve shared previously, the 2019 freight downturn followed what now seems like a skirmish with one trading partner (China). Even after three Fed rate cuts in 2019, freight didn’t recover until pandemic-induced economic incentives. Tariff headwinds were simply too strong.

This time around, we’ve effectively opened the field to all trading partners at higher tariff levels. The drag heading into 2026 is meaningfully larger. The demand side isn’t signaling the lift that was advertised.

More on the December LMI: What the Transportation Data Actually Shows

The December Logistics Manager’s Index read in at 54.2, down 1.5 points from November’s 55.7. That’s the lowest rate of expansion since April 2024.

But the real story is in the transportation metrics.

1. Transportation Capacity: 36.9 (Down 13.1 Points)

This is the first time Transportation Capacity has contracted since March 2022. The lowest reading since October 2021. Carriers have been waiting on this for nearly three years.

The contraction was consistent across upstream and downstream respondents. Upstream reported 34.7, downstream 42.9. The FMCSA compliance crackdown, including the non-domiciled CDL ruling that pulled 9,500 drivers off the road, contributed to the tightening. But the primary driver was simply the holiday push of goods downstream.

2. Transportation Utilization: 58.2 (Up 6.7 Points)

Utilization expanded robustly, though with an interesting split. Upstream respondents reported 62.1 while downstream contracted slightly at 47.6. This tells you retailers had largely finished their holiday replenishment by early December and were “standing pat” while upstream firms continued turning goods over.

3. Transportation Prices: 66.7 (Up 1.8 Points)

The highest reading for Transportation Prices since January. More importantly, this metric reads in 29.8 points higher than Transportation Capacity, the largest positive freight inversion since March 2022.

On paper, that spread screams “freight recovery.” In past cycles, a 15-point positive inversion would have carriers celebrating. But December’s price expansion was driven mainly by downstream retailers during the pre-holiday push. Both rates and utilization softened in the back half of the month.

This is seasonal strength, not structural shift.

4. Inventory Levels: 35.1 (Down 17.4 Points)

This is the lowest value ever recorded for this metric. The 17.4-point drop from November is the largest month-to-month movement in the index’s history.

This wasn’t market weakness. This was a historic drawdown of inventories driven by strong holiday sales. Retailers executed their lean inventory strategy well in 2025.

5. Warehousing Utilization: 42.9 (Down 4.7 Points)

A second consecutive all-time low. U.S. warehousing vacancy hit 7.6% in Q3, exceeding the pre-pandemic average of 7.1%. But the December softness was driven by dynamic downstream movement, not slack demand.

6. The Upstream vs. Downstream Split

Downstream retailers executed their inventory strategy well in 2025. They kept inventories lean through most of the year, built them quickly in October-November, and sold through aggressively in December. Inventory Levels dropped an astounding 31.7 points from November to December at the retail level.

Upstream firms are driving most of the logistics activity. They’re feeling the transportation tightness more acutely and paying higher prices as a result.

7. What Respondents Predict for 2026

LMI respondents expect:

• Overall index: 65.3 (up 2.4 from November’s prediction)

• Transportation Capacity: 40.5 (continued contraction)

• Transportation Prices: 76.8 (significant expansion)

• Inventory Levels: 59.0 (moderate expansion)

• Inventory Costs: 72.1 (robust expansion)

Upstream firms are predicting severe Transportation Capacity contraction at 36.2, while downstream expects moderate expansion at 52.4. The divergence suggests upstream firms expect to bear more of the logistics burden in 2026 as downstream retailers attempt to replicate their lean-inventory success.

Industry Spotlight: UP-NS Merger Update

The UP-NS merger continues to dominate intermodal industry attention as we enter 2026.

Merger Application Status

Union Pacific filed its 6,692-page merger application with the Surface Transportation Board on December 19, 2025. The week of December 30, all four independent Class I railroads (BNSF, CN, CPKC, and CSX) filed formal objections, marking the application as “incomplete.”

Key objections raised:

• Missing merger agreement: Critics argue the full UP-NS agreement should be public

• Incomplete competitive analysis: BNSF says required projected market shares are missing

• No analysis of follow-on mergers: Competitors want assessment of how UP-NS would affect potential BNSF-CSX or other combinations

• Control issues: CSX is seeking separate proceedings on Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad and Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis

Union Pacific filed its defense on January 2, 2026, arguing competitors are attempting to delay the process and that all required information is included.

The STB is expected to rule on completeness by January 16 or January 20.

Competitive Response: BNSF-CSX Partnership

In direct response to the merger, BNSF and CSX have announced a suite of new intermodal services:

• Southern California to Charlotte, NC and Jacksonville, FL: New direct domestic intermodal connections

• Phoenix to Atlanta: Targeting OTR-to-rail conversion

• Port of New York/New Jersey and Norfolk, VA to Kansas City: New international intermodal services

Additionally, CSX and Canadian National unveiled plans for a new interline intermodal service linking Nashville with Vancouver and Prince Rupert, BC via Memphis interchange.

InTek’s Take

This remains the most consequential rail development since the creation of the current Class I structure.

The competitive responses by all parties in the intermodal space are delivering value to shippers. New coast-to-coast lane options, accelerated service enhancements, and renewed attention to intermodal are all positives.

For shippers, the most actionable moves right now:

• Map your lane portfolio against both current and potential post-merger networks

• Test alternative routings using the new BNSF-CSX and CSX-CN services

• Ensure viable options across both rail and truck should certain lanes become less competitive

Regulatory review is expected to stretch into 2027. Until more details are known, it’s difficult to place a firm stake in the ground. But the conversations alone are adding significant value to the intermodal market.

Asset-Based IMC & Dray Provider Update

J.B. Hunt

J.B. Hunt reports Q4 2025 earnings on January 15. The report serves as the first of many to come on the “state of the union” for intermodal.

The takeaway: JB Hunt’s results reinforce the narrative we’ve been highlighting. The freight floor appears to be in, but this is a cost-discipline story, not a demand recovery story. Volumes remain soft. And as we’ve said for years, truckload spot rates signal a turn, but intermodal determines whether that turn has real momentum. Right now, intermodal volumes aren’t confirming a sustained recovery.

Other Comments from Intermodal Industry Leadership:

• Service levels on rail have improved with fewer delays and more consistency

• Timing and market positioning are critical for rail conversion

• Mode conversion conversations have accelerated

• This is the time for people to start looking at rail as an option

• There is a “flight to quality” as shippers consolidate freight with larger, more financially stable carriers

What We’re Watching Heading into Q1 2026

• January freight volumes as the holiday effect washes out and we see true underlying demand

• Intermodal spot rates for confirmation (or lack thereof) of the truckload strength

• J.B. Hunt Q4 earnings (January 15) for intermodal-specific commentary on pricing and volume

• STB completeness ruling on UP-NS merger application (expected January 16-20)

• ISM Manufacturing PMI for any signs of stabilization after 10 consecutive months of contraction

• Consumer debt levels and whether holiday spending debt creates a Q1 hangover

• Terminal and interchange fluidity

• Chassis and dray utilization throughout the U.S. heading into post-holiday freight

• Import container traffic inland as it impacts IMC ability to offer repositioning intermodal solutions

Freight Market Outlook

• Truckload: In our opinion December’s spike was seasonal, not structural. Expect rates to moderate through Q1 as holiday volumes fade. The market is closer to equilibrium but not there yet.

• Intermodal: The 12-15% pricing advantage versus truckload, coupled with rail service entering year two of “excellent” performance, positions intermodal as one of the most attractive levers for cost and risk management in 2026. Contract rates remain stable. Spot rates at cycle lows.

• LTL: Stable with post-holiday normalization expected. Ongoing rate increases in soft market causing some shippers to consolidate LTL loads into TL.

• Ocean: Import season winding down. Record container capacity being deployed in January-February could put further pressure on already weak rates. U.S.-China trade framework extending through 2026 signals improved stability.

• Air: Weak but steady. Ample capacity keeping rates suppressed.
  

• Macro: 2026 still resembles a freight economy structurally similar to 2019, with tariff uncertainty adding stronger headwinds than Fed rate cuts will overcome. A meaningful freight recovery remains a late-2026 or 2027 story.

Intermodal Outlook

Intermodal is set up to remain one of the most cost-effective, resilient modes as 2026 begins.

Structural gains will be gradual: better rail service discipline, more thoughtful network design, growing shipper willingness to diversify away from pure truckload, and new competitive lane options emerging from the merger-driven reshuffling.

The key question for 2026: Can improved rail service and competitive repositioning drive meaningful road-to-rail conversion even in a soft demand environment?

The fundamentals say yes. Rail service is excellent. Pricing is attractive. New lanes are opening. IMCs are motivated. Shippers are receptive.

The macro headwinds say patience. Manufacturing remains in contraction. Consumer confidence is depressed. Tariff uncertainty persists. Volume growth requires demand recovery.

For shippers, the most actionable move is to treat 2026 as a strategic build year: firm up intermodal programs while pricing is favorable, pressure-test routing options in light of the competitive reshuffling, and position networks to benefit when freight demand finally moves off the bottom.

Final Words

Here’s what January’s data landscape actually tells us:

• Transportation Capacity contracted for the first time since March 2022. Significant, but driven by seasonal dynamics, not demand recovery.

• The 29.8-point positive freight inversion reported in LMI is the largest since March 2022. On paper, a freight recovery signal. In practice, intermodal isn’t confirming.

• Inventory levels hit an all-time low. Strong holiday sales execution, not market weakness.

• Manufacturing is in its 10th consecutive month of contraction. The demand side isn’t signaling the lift.

• Intermodal spot rates remain at December 2019 lows, with January 2026 starting off at mid-2017 rates. In other words, the confirmation signal carriers need hasn’t arrived.

• Rail service is entering year two of “excellent” performance. The supply side is ready. The demand side isn’t.
  

The freight market is performing better seasonally, but the structural recovery remains elusive. The real test comes over the next 60-90 days as the holiday effect fully washes out.

Stay measured. Stay focused on what the data actually shows, not what you want it to show.

About This Report

The Monthly Intermodal Shipping Report provides a comprehensive, data-driven snapshot of North American intermodal trends integrating rail network performance, economic indicators, intermodal pricing, and strategic market intelligence for shippers.

If you’d like to contribute insight or suggest topics for future editions, InTek Intermodal welcomes collaboration.

Want to go deeper on intermodal?

Visit InTek Logistics, read our blog, and listen to the InTek Intermodal podcast as we continue the conversation.

Rick LaGore CEO, InTek Logistics

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